Product Summary

Executive Interpretation

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The package describes the Electric Clutch Actuator (ECA) Control ECU for the TRATON GW Automated Manual Transmission (AMT) Gearbox Platform. The clutch-actuation function (CAN/PWM-commanded engage/disengage with position control and error handling) is explicit in the requirements. The requirement set is dominated by cybersecurity obligations: diagnostic access security, secure communication/data protection, certificate/key handling, secure update or flash readiness, backend/tooling evidence, and customer/OEM approval of residual risk. The exact security-control bindings, key hierarchy, and final item definition are not yet confirmed by the extracted requirements.

Evidence Basis:

What the System Appears to Be

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

A supplier-delivered 24V electric clutch actuator ECU with its own embedded controller, common across the TRATON GW AMT driveline range, surrounded by offboard engineering, backend, and OEM/customer evidence flows.

Evidence Basis:

What the System Is Responsible For

Classification: Explicit Requirement / Inferred from Requirements

Evidence Basis:

What the System Is Not Confirmed To Be

Classification: Needs Customer Clarification

Evidence Basis:

Evidence Basis

Assumptions

Customer Clarifications Needed

System Boundary

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The working boundary is the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU security scope plus supplier-controlled engineering evidence. It includes ECU hardware/software allocation, security services, diagnostic and communication protection, update/flash readiness, and the evidence needed for OEM/customer approval. It excludes unconfirmed vehicle functions, unconfirmed backend implementation details, and final customer risk acceptance.

Evidence Basis:

Boundary Elements

System Context

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The context is an automotive ECU/component security engineering scope embedded in a vehicle ecosystem and surrounded by supplier, OEM/customer, diagnostic, backend, tooling, and security-operations actors.

Evidence Basis:

See architecture/system_context.mmd for the rendered context view.

External Actors

OEM/customer cybersecurity approval and evidence interface

Classification: Explicit Requirement

Evidence Basis:

Diagnostic/service tool to ECU interface

Classification: Explicit Requirement

Evidence Basis:

Vehicle network secure data communication interface

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Evidence Basis:

Secure update, flash, and IVD interface

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Evidence Basis:

Certificate and key provisioning interface

Classification: Explicit Requirement

Evidence Basis:

Backend/cloud/IT operational interface

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Evidence Basis:

Development, ALM, and evidence tooling interface

Classification: Explicit Requirement

Evidence Basis:

Security operations and vulnerability reporting interface

Classification: Explicit Requirement

Evidence Basis:

High-Level Interfaces

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The main interfaces are diagnostic/service access, vehicle network data exchange, secure update/flash/IVD handling, certificate/key provisioning, backend/IT operations, development/evidence tooling, security operations, and OEM/customer approval.

Evidence Basis:

See interfaces/interface_catalog.md for the full interface catalog.

Main Product Features

System Capability Matrix

CapabilityProduct RoleArchitecture ComponentInterfacesSecurity RelevanceEvidence StatusOpen Decision
Clutch Actuation ControlCore actuator controlApplication Software / System CoreVehicle Network Interface (CAN)Safety-relevant command/status handlingConfirmedConfirm final variant scope
Vehicle Integration and CAN CommunicationVehicle command/status exchangeExternal Interfaces / Application SoftwareVehicle Network Interface (CAN), PWM wake-upMessage authenticity/freshness allocationConfirmedConfirm signal catalog and SecOC/SDT scope
Secure Diagnostics and Role-Based AccessControlled service and engineering accessDiagnostic Server / Security ServicesDiagnostic Tester InterfacePrivileged access controlInferredConfirm roles, service list and lockout policy
Secure Software Update and FlashMaintain trusted ECU softwareBootloader / Update LogicUpdate / Flash Interface, Diagnostic Tester InterfaceSoftware authenticity and integrityInferredConfirm signing chain, rollback and ownership
Key and Certificate HandlingTrust-material lifecycleSecurity Services / Hardware PlatformPKI / Provisioning InterfaceRoot of trust for diagnostics, update and secure communicationInferredConfirm HSM capability, key hierarchy and PKI ownership
Secure Data Transfer / Communication BoundaryProtected security-relevant data exchangeSecurity Services / External InterfacesVehicle Network Interface, Secure Data Transfer InterfaceAuthenticity, integrity and freshnessInferredConfirm protected signals and freshness model
Security Logging and Event HandlingSecurity evidence and response inputSecurity Services / Backend and IT SystemsLogging / Event Reporting InterfaceAuditability and incident supportInferredConfirm event set, storage and reporting path
Cybersecurity Lifecycle and EvidenceApproval-ready security caseCompliance Process / Engineering ToolchainSupplier Evidence, OEM Approval InterfaceTraceable residual-risk argumentConfirmedConfirm DIA split and approval authority

Capability Cards

Detailed Feature Model

This feature model groups Markdown-derived requirement clusters into system-security architecture domains. It is not a flat requirement repeat.

Core Product Capabilities

Feature: Application software behavior

Feature ID: FEAT-X001

Purpose

Define supplier-controlled software behavior that realizes the extracted system and security requirements inside the ECU or application scope.

User/System Value

Gives the product a concrete software responsibility instead of treating the RFQ as only a document checklist.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Application logic, protocol handling, state handling, error handling, and allocation of software-side requirements.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

The exact application function, user-facing behavior, timing budget, and production ECU variant are not confirmed.

Interfaces Involved

Vehicle network, internal security services, diagnostics, backend/tooling where called by requirements.

Data Handled

Application state, protocol messages, configuration, diagnostic responses, security-relevant processing results.

Security Relevance

Software behavior is where malformed input handling, authorization decisions, freshness checks, and protected data processing become enforceable.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Inferred from Requirements

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Feature: Secure communication

Feature ID: FEAT-X002

Purpose

Address the extracted requirement cluster named Secure communication.

User/System Value

Provides a traceable product capability from the current requirements.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Scope is limited to requirements extracted from cleaned Markdown.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Detailed behavior needs customer confirmation.

Interfaces Involved

Unknown until interface allocation is confirmed.

Data Handled

Unknown or requirement-specific data.

Security Relevance

Security relevance needs detailed review.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Needs Customer Clarification

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Feature: System behavior

Feature ID: FEAT-X003

Purpose

Capture the expected behavior of the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU boundary before decomposing it into hardware, software, tooling, and operations.

User/System Value

Keeps the system-level intent visible while detailed requirements remain traceable.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

System behavior, stakeholder approvals, compliance obligations, timing/state requirements, and customer-facing deliverables.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

The package does not prove the complete vehicle function or end-user feature set.

Interfaces Involved

OEM/customer interface, vehicle network, supplier engineering flow, evidence flow.

Data Handled

Requirements, system states, approvals, evidence, release information.

Security Relevance

System behavior defines where security objectives attach and where residual risks must be agreed.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Inferred from Requirements

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Vehicle/ECU Integration Capabilities

Feature: Hardware platform support

Feature ID: FEAT-X004

Purpose

Represent ECU hardware, platform, connector, memory, and security hardware obligations implied by the source requirements.

User/System Value

Makes clear that the cybersecurity concept must be allocated across both hardware and software.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

ECU platform support, hardware protection, debug/physical exposure concerns, and implementation allocation.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

The exact MCU, HSM, memory map, connector pinout, and production hardware variant are not confirmed.

Interfaces Involved

Internal hardware/software interface, diagnostic access boundary, physical/service access.

Data Handled

Keys, certificates, firmware, platform state, debug/service data.

Security Relevance

Hardware is part of key protection, secure boot, anti-tamper posture, and diagnostic attack resistance.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Inferred from Requirements

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Communication and Connectivity Capabilities

Feature: External interfaces

Feature ID: FEAT-X005

Purpose

Identify communication touchpoints where the product exchanges data with vehicle, backend, customer, supplier, diagnostic, or tooling actors.

User/System Value

Creates the bridge from requirements to attack surface review.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

External message paths, data exchanged, interface purpose, and protection needs.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Protocol stack, exact network topology, endpoint ownership, and message catalog are not fully confirmed.

Interfaces Involved

Vehicle network, diagnostic tool, backend/cloud, OEM/customer, development/evidence tooling.

Data Handled

Messages, signals, requests/responses, certificates, software packages, logs, security events.

Security Relevance

Interfaces are the main places where authentication, authorization, encryption, freshness, replay protection, and logging must be designed.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Explicit Requirement

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Feature: Secure communication and freshness protection

Feature ID: FEAT-X006

Purpose

Protect vehicle or client/server data exchanges against unauthorized origin, modification, replay, and stale state.

User/System Value

Turns SecOC/SDT-style requirements into a coherent communication security behavior.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Authentication/encryption, verify/decrypt processing, counters, replay checks, and discard behavior for invalid traffic.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Exact algorithms, key lengths, message IDs, and bus allocation need customer confirmation.

Interfaces Involved

Vehicle network, ECU-to-ECU communication, client/server SDT flows.

Data Handled

Protected signals, counters, request/response payloads, authentication tags.

Security Relevance

This feature directly protects integrity, authenticity, freshness, and in some cases confidentiality of vehicle data.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Inferred from Requirements

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Diagnostic and Maintenance Capabilities

Feature: Diagnostic security

Feature ID: FEAT-X007

Purpose

Control diagnostic access so service and engineering tools cannot become an uncontrolled security bypass.

User/System Value

Allows maintenance while preserving ECU security goals.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Diagnostic authentication, access control, request validation, negative responses, and secure sessions.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Exact diagnostic roles, tester certificates, and service whitelist are not fully confirmed.

Interfaces Involved

Diagnostic tool, UDS services, ECU diagnostic server, security services.

Data Handled

Diagnostic requests, responses, session state, credentials, certificates, unlock state.

Security Relevance

Diagnostics can alter state, extract data, or trigger programming; it needs strong access control and audit.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Explicit Requirement

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Cybersecurity Capabilities

Feature: Authentication

Feature ID: FEAT-X008

Purpose

Prove the identity or validity of tools, communication partners, data sources, software, or ECU-related entities.

User/System Value

Prevents unauthenticated entities from driving privileged behavior.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Entity authentication, message/source authentication, service authentication, and authentication failure handling.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

The final identity model and trust anchors require customer confirmation.

Interfaces Involved

Diagnostic, vehicle network, backend/update, certificate/key provisioning.

Data Handled

Credentials, certificates, authentication tags, session state.

Security Relevance

Authentication is a prerequisite for authorization, secure diagnostics, secure update, and protected communication.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Explicit Requirement

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Feature: Certificate handling

Feature ID: FEAT-X009

Purpose

Manage certificate formats, validation, trust anchors, and certificate-related lifecycle behavior.

User/System Value

Supports scalable trust for diagnostics, update, backend, and vehicle communication.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

X.509/certificate handling, validation expectations, and certificate-based trust decisions.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

CA hierarchy, enrollment, revocation, storage, and renewal process need confirmation.

Interfaces Involved

PKI, diagnostic tools, backend/update services, ECU security services.

Data Handled

Certificates, chains, trust anchors, validity metadata.

Security Relevance

Incorrect certificate handling can defeat authentication and secure communication.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Explicit Requirement

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Feature: Key management

Feature ID: FEAT-X010

Purpose

Protect cryptographic keys across generation, storage, use, update, and retirement.

User/System Value

Keeps communication, diagnostics, update, and platform integrity controls trustworthy.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Key storage, use restrictions, provisioning assumptions, and cryptographic material handling.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Key hierarchy, HSM APIs, rotation, ownership, and recovery are not fully confirmed.

Interfaces Involved

Security services, hardware platform/HSM, PKI/provisioning, backend/update.

Data Handled

Symmetric keys, private keys, public keys, certificates, key identifiers.

Security Relevance

Key compromise collapses multiple controls at once.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Explicit Requirement

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Feature: Logging and audit trail

Feature ID: FEAT-X011

Purpose

Record security-relevant actions and decisions for investigation, compliance, and operational feedback.

User/System Value

Supports accountability and incident analysis.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Security event capture, audit evidence, and traceability to requirements or validation results.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Log format, storage, retention, privacy, and upload path require customer confirmation.

Interfaces Involved

ECU logging, backend/security operations, ALM/evidence flow.

Data Handled

Security events, diagnostic attempts, update results, audit records.

Security Relevance

Logging is how misuse, failed controls, and residual-risk evidence become visible.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

High

Classification

Explicit Requirement

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Backend/IT/Tooling Capabilities

Feature: Backend and IT integration

Feature ID: FEAT-X012

Purpose

Represent backend, IT, server, portal, and offboard workflows referenced by the requirements.

User/System Value

Shows that security architecture extends beyond the ECU boundary where update, evidence, monitoring, or supplier workflows are involved.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Backend connectivity, IT systems, supplier/OEM portals, storage of evidence or operational security data.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Cloud provider, API contracts, hosting ownership, and network zones are not confirmed.

Interfaces Involved

Backend/cloud, supplier IT, OEM/customer systems, ECU/update path.

Data Handled

Software packages, certificates, logs, vulnerability data, evidence, configuration.

Security Relevance

Backend compromise can affect update integrity, certificate lifecycle, evidence integrity, and operational response.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Inferred from Requirements

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Feature: Engineering tooling

Feature ID: FEAT-X013

Purpose

Capture engineering, build, test, and evidence tooling needed to produce and prove the cybersecurity work products.

User/System Value

Makes development and verification responsibilities visible in the architecture package.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

ALM, build/test tooling, verification evidence, traceability artifacts, review workflows.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Tool names, integrations, access model, and retention policy are not confirmed.

Interfaces Involved

Supplier engineering, ALM, CI/test environment, OEM/customer evidence handoff.

Data Handled

Requirements, test reports, traceability, artifacts, build outputs.

Security Relevance

Toolchain integrity affects trust in delivered software and evidence.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Explicit Requirement

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Operational and Lifecycle Capabilities

Feature: Incident response

Feature ID: FEAT-X014

Purpose

Provide a lifecycle path for handling confirmed or suspected cybersecurity incidents.

User/System Value

Connects product security signals to customer and supplier response obligations.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Incident identification, escalation, documentation, and customer communication assumptions.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Severity model, reporting timelines, and operational owner are not confirmed.

Interfaces Involved

Security operations, OEM/customer, supplier support, backend/tooling.

Data Handled

Incident records, logs, evidence, mitigation status.

Security Relevance

Incident response limits damage and provides evidence after preventive controls fail.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

High

Classification

Explicit Requirement

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Feature: Secure software update and flash readiness

Feature ID: FEAT-X015

Purpose

Ensure software update, flash, and IVD-related flows preserve authenticity, integrity, and regulatory evidence.

User/System Value

Supports UNECE-style software update obligations and safe maintenance of E/E components.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Update package handling, flash/programming paths, integrity validation data, and update evidence.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Update transport, campaign management, rollback policy, and production signing chain need confirmation.

Interfaces Involved

Backend/update infrastructure, diagnostic/programming tool, ECU boot/update manager, PKI.

Data Handled

Software packages, signatures, IVD data, certificates, programming requests, update logs.

Security Relevance

Unauthorized or corrupted software undermines ECU authenticity and all data security goals.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

High

Classification

Inferred from Requirements

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Feature: Vulnerability management

Feature ID: FEAT-X016

Purpose

Identify, assess, treat, verify, and communicate vulnerabilities and risks over releases.

User/System Value

Keeps the system secure beyond a single development milestone.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Risk assessment, vulnerability evaluation, penetration-test readiness, mitigation tracking, release impact review.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Customer-specific vulnerability intake SLAs and tool workflow are not confirmed.

Interfaces Involved

OEM/customer, supplier security team, development tooling, incident process.

Data Handled

Vulnerability records, risk treatment decisions, mitigation evidence, release notes.

Security Relevance

Unmanaged vulnerabilities become residual risk without ownership.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

High

Classification

Explicit Requirement

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Compliance and Evidence Capabilities

Feature: Cybersecurity requirement handling

Feature ID: FEAT-X017

Purpose

Maintain a verifiable chain from cybersecurity requirements to controls, implementation, validation, residual risk, and customer agreement.

User/System Value

Turns the RFQ into an auditable security engineering package instead of disconnected controls.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Cybersecurity concept, risk assessment input, control derivation, verification/validation evidence, residual risk documentation.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Final TARA results and customer-approved risk treatment are not claimed.

Interfaces Involved

OEM/customer, supplier engineering, ALM/evidence repository, security review process.

Data Handled

Requirements, risks, controls, test reports, residual-risk decisions, review evidence.

Security Relevance

Evidence discipline is required to prove that controls exist and reduce risk sufficiently.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

High

Classification

Explicit Requirement

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Feature: Security evidence and traceability

Feature ID: FEAT-X018

Purpose

Provide proof that requirements, controls, architecture decisions, verification, validation, and residual risk remain connected.

User/System Value

Gives reviewers a way to audit security decisions before accepting the architecture.

Requirement Basis

Functional Scope

Traceability matrices, evidence reports, human-review queues, quality gates, and open decisions.

Out of Scope / Not Confirmed

Customer acceptance workflow and evidence repository ownership are not confirmed.

Interfaces Involved

ALM/evidence repository, OEM/customer review, supplier security process.

Data Handled

Requirement IDs, source sections, controls, test reports, decisions, open questions.

Security Relevance

Without evidence traceability, control implementation cannot be credibly argued.

Impacted Architecture Elements

Confidence Level

Medium

Classification

Inferred from Requirements

Open Questions

Evidence Basis:

Operational Context

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The operational picture spans development, release, service/diagnostics, update/flash handling, monitoring or vulnerability handling, and OEM/customer security review. The runtime product boundary is only one part of the package; the RFQ also requires a controlled lifecycle evidence flow.

Evidence Basis:

Assumptions and Unknowns

Unknowns and Assumptions