1001379436_P10_000_01_RDDM-1140152501-1744.pdf · Cybersecurity Requirement Standard · Cybersecurity
1001379436_P10_000_01_RDDM-1140152501-1744.pdf · Cybersecurity Requirement Standard · Cybersecurity
Systems-engineering read of what this document defines for the system - scope, boundaries, interfaces, obligations, and what is still open.
Scope: this cybersecurity requirement standard specifies requirement, covering 2.1 Development process; 2.1.3 Cybersecurity concept; 2.1.5 Documentation; 2.2 System requirements; 2.2.3 Cryptographic libraries; 2.4 Information security.
System boundary and interfaces: the document constrains 2 interface(s) - OEM/Customer Review Interface; External Interfaces; OEM/Customer Review Interface; principal functions in scope are Security evidence and traceability.
Design and security impact: affects Security evidence and traceability; security capabilities touched: Cybersecurity requirement handling; Vulnerability management; Authentication; Key management (sample: 4 of 6); 17 supplier system requirement(s) were derived from this document.
Open for the customer: 4 document-linked open point(s) - mainly Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the split of monitoring, triage, vulnerability handling and field response between OEM PSIRT and supplier.; Confirm production/debug hardening expectations (debug lock, secure end-of-line, developer-access policy). (sample: 3 of 4) - plus 15 unidentified requirement-like statement(s). Do not baseline these until the customer confirms.
Confidence and limits: High confidence. Categorisation is derived from the converted Markdown (customer IDs, normative wording, and section context); no OCR or downstream PDF analysis is used.
| Theme | Engineering Meaning | Requirement Count | Representative Requirements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Requirement | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 46 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012 |
| Responsibility and customer approval model | Creates supplier/OEM allocation decisions for work products, backend infrastructure, approvals, and residual risk. | 46 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005 |
| Core ECA system behavior | Defines actuator ECU behavior, drivetrain integration, electrical/mechanical constraints, and verification scope. | 38 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008 |
| System architecture design | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 37 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0004; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009 |
| Cybersecurity concept and evidence | Drives cybersecurity concept, risk treatment, verification evidence, and traceability obligations. | 32 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005 |
| Cybersecurity | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 26 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005 |
| Cybersecurity verification report | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 26 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005 |
| Security services | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 24 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007 |
| Section | Requirements | Information | Unknown / Review Needed | Total Items | Critical | Open Points | SSR Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Introduction | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| -- 1.4 Abbreviated terms | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| -- 2.1 Development process | 10 | 1 | 0 | 16 | 5 | 1 | 4 |
| -- -- 2.1.3 Cybersecurity concept | 3 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| -- -- 2.1.5 Documentation | 7 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| -- 2.2 System requirements | 6 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| -- -- 2.2.3 Cryptographic libraries | 6 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| -- 2.4 Information security | 7 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| -- 2.6 Cybersecurity lifecycle | 23 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 10 | 3 | 10 |
| -- -- 2.6.1 Security updates | 8 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| -- -- 2.6.3 Vulnerability management | 7 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| -- -- 2.6.4 Product lifecycle | 6 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| -- -- 2.6.5 Logging | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 2 |
Tables are reconstructed column-correct from the document text layer (no OCR). Diagrams are linked from converted image assets.
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Shall | This word, or the term "Required", means that the definition is an absolute requirement of the specification. |
| Threat Analysis and | A structured approach to identify possible threats and evaluate risks with respect to the potential |
| Risk Assessment | damages and the effort needed for successful attack. A cybersecurity concept is a work product that documents cybersecurity relevant aspects of the |
| Cybersecurity concept | product. The cybersecurity concept shall describe the scope of the risk analysis, risks that were identified during the risk analysis, cybersecurity goals, cybersecurity requirements, mitigation strategies, validation, and verification strategies, etc. |
Table source context
| Abbreviation | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| ECU | Electronic Control Unit |
Security protocol or cryptographic context
| ID1 | Name Scania/MAN Unified | Version | Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| [1] | Diagnostic Services – Security access mechanisms | 1.0, 2018-04-18 | Scania/MAN Unified Diagnostic Services – Security access mechanisms |
Table source context
| Version | Date | Editor | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | 2021-06-02 | mxxm36 | Initial version. As close as possible to the last Excel sheet version of the requirements |
| 2.0 | 2021-06-30 | mxxm36 | Added new requirements and adjusted old requirements. More clarifications and cosmetics. |
Table source context
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Source PDF | 1001379436_P10_000_01_RDDM-1140152501-1744.pdf |
| Document Type | Cybersecurity Requirement Standard |
| Domain | Cybersecurity |
| Scope Summary | 46 confirmed requirements, 15 needing clarification, 1 information, 1 reference items; 17 linked SSRs; 4 linked open points. |
| Main Themes | Requirement; Responsibility and customer approval model; Core ECA system behavior; System architecture design; Cybersecurity concept and evidence (sample: 5 of 8) |
| Does Not Confirm | Customer-owned responsibility, final customer decisions, and unresolved open points remain unconfirmed. |
| Confidence | High |
| Evidence Basis | Markdown-derived requirements and generated RFQX registers; no downstream PDF analysis. |
This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.
| ID | Score | Category | Requirement / Reason | Supplier Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | Documentation on the method and results shall be provided to the vehicle manufacturer.security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | Note: The vehicle manufacturer and supplier shall collaboratively define the context of the system or function to enable the supplier performing the risk assessment.security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | For each risk identified in the cybersecurity risk analyses, a risk treatment decision shall be made to avoid, reduce, share, or retain the risk.security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | It shall be possible to verify which cybersecurity controls were derived from which requirements.security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0035 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | The details shall be agreed upon between the vehicle manufacturer and the supplier.security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0056 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | The information shall contain • the version(s) of affected hardware or software components, • nature of the vulnerability, • description of the affected cybersecurity goal, • technical conditions to exploit the vulnerability, • impact of the exploitation and • possibilities to remove the vulnerability.security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| REQ_SEC_0016 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | It shall be possible for the vehicle manufacturer to securely inject key material and other data used for cybersecurity controls into the ECU according to the specification of the vehicle manufacturer.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009 | 66 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | Method and scope shall be proposed to and approved by the vehicle manufacturer.architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0026 | 66 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | Methods shall be proposed to and approved by the vehicle manufacturer.architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0033 | 66 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | Methods shall be proposed and approved by the vehicle manufacturer.architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0052 | 66 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | The report shall include information needed to identify the affected vehicles/products.architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0053 | 66 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | Methods including the stipulation of a reasonable notification time shall be proposed to and approved by the vehicle manufacturer.architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.
Confirm the split of monitoring, triage, vulnerability handling and field response between OEM PSIRT and supplier.
Confirm production/debug hardening expectations (debug lock, secure end-of-line, developer-access policy).
Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline.
This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.
| Open Point | Priority | Question / Impact | Required Customer Decision | Recommended Supplier Position | Owner | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OP-003 | Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.ECU secure-storage and provisioning design is blocked; production-line and PKI dependencies stay open. | Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier. | Provide ECU-side secure storage and provisioning hooks; require OEM confirmation of PKI ownership and the provisioning interface. | OEM / Customer (PKI) + Supplier (ECU) | Open | |
| OP-006 | Confirm the split of monitoring, triage, vulnerability handling and field response between OEM PSIRT and supplier.Lifecycle effort and field-response capability stay unbounded; risk of an R155 compliance gap. | Confirm the split of monitoring, triage, vulnerability handling and field response between OEM PSIRT and supplier. | Define supplier vulnerability handling and field-fix capability; require OEM confirmation of monitoring/communication ownership. | OEM / Customer (fleet) + Supplier (ECU) | Open | |
| OP-008 | Confirm production/debug hardening expectations (debug lock, secure end-of-line, developer-access policy).Hardware fusing and EOL process design stay open; risk of an exposed debug/production interface. | Confirm production/debug hardening expectations (debug lock, secure end-of-line, developer-access policy). | Apply debug lock and secured production access; request the customer-confirmed production-security and EOL requirements. | Shared (OEM process / Supplier ECU) | Open | |
| OP-011 | Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline.Supplier position, estimation, and affected design allocation remain conditional for the listed requirements. | Decide whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context. | Carry the items as customer-confirmation dependencies and review them in the next clarification workshop. | OEM / Customer | Open |
Items carrying a customer requirement ID and a normative (shall/must) statement.
It shall be possible for the vehicle manufacturer to securely inject key material and other data used for cybersecurity controls into the ECU according to the specification of the vehicle manufacturer. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Key management Page page 9 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Key management Supplier proposal Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. |
Only hardware interfaces and protocols specified by the vehicle manufacturer shall be available in series production. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.4 Information security Page page 8 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. |
Following each identified and reported vulnerability, the supplier and vehicle manufacturer shall agree on an initial response to the vulnerability. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.3 Vulnerability management Page page 10 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. |
All secrets specified by the vehicle manufacturer shall be protected throughout the lifecycle of the ECU. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Marcus Lindner EPXC Published 12(16) Page page 12 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. |
Selection of cryptographic methods and their use shall be agreed upon between the vehicle manufacturer and the supplier. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Cryptographic libraries Page page 7 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
Secrets, public keys and other data used for cybersecurity controls in production vehicle systems shall be different from those used in pre-production phases. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.1 Security updates Page page 9 Security capability Key management Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
It shall be possible to update the software of the ECU. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Security updates Page page 9 Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
The supplier shall provide documentation describing their strategies and methods for working with embedded systems cybersecurity. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Cybersecurity methods and strategies Page page 5 Feature / Interface Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. Related source tables/diagrams are treated as interpretation context, not separate customer IDs. Related Tables / DiagramsLinked tables: 1 | Linked diagrams: 0
|
The supplier shall perform risk assessment based on a threat and vulnerability analysis for each release, including any vehicle manufacturer-specific adaptations. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Risk assessment Page page 5 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Vulnerability management Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. Related source tables/diagrams are treated as interpretation context, not separate customer IDs. Related Tables / DiagramsLinked tables: 1 | Linked diagrams: 0
|
The supplier shall describe the cybersecurity concept and how it is implemented in hardware and software respectively. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Cybersecurity concept Page page 5 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Provide the cybersecurity concept as a supplier work product covering scope, assumptions, risk-treatment traceability, cybersecurity goals/requirements, mitigation strategy, V&V approach, and open responsibility dependencies. |
All risks identified in cybersecurity risk analyses shall be evaluated. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Marcus Lindner EPXC Published 6(16) Page page 6 Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
Cybersecurity controls shall sufficiently reduce the risk. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.1.5 Documentation Page page 6 Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
The cybersecurity concept of the supplier shall contain a documentation of the accepted residual risk and be agreed with the vehicle manufacturer. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.1.5 Documentation Page page 6 Feature / Interface Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Provide the cybersecurity concept as a supplier work product covering scope, assumptions, risk-treatment traceability, cybersecurity goals/requirements, mitigation strategy, V&V approach, and open responsibility dependencies. |
The supplier shall provide documentation of the verification and validation methods of cybersecurity features. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Verification and validation Page page 6 Feature / Interface Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
The supplier shall provide test reports detailing the results from the verification and validation of cybersecurity features. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.1.5 Documentation Page page 6 Feature / Interface Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
An inventory of software and protocols, including their versions, shall be provided by the supplier. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Documentation Page page 6 Feature / Interface Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
A BOM containing part numbers and versions of hardware components used in the product shall be provided by the supplier. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Marcus Lindner EPXC Published 7(16) Page page 7 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
The vehicle manufacturer and the supplier shall set up a cybersecurity DIA to agree on the responsibilities for the distributed cybersecurity activities. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.2.3 Cryptographic libraries Page page 7 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Provide the cybersecurity concept as a supplier work product covering scope, assumptions, risk-treatment traceability, cybersecurity goals/requirements, mitigation strategy, V&V approach, and open responsibility dependencies. |
The ECU shall be able to verify integrity and authenticity of a vehicle manufacturer-specified set of data stored within the ECU. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Software security Page page 7 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Authentication Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
The supplier shall apply methods for isolation of software/hardware components and data to reduce the effect in case of a cybersecurity breach. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Security architecture Page page 7 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
All network services implemented in the ECU shall undergo hardening. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Services Page page 8 Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
The ECU shall only expose network and communication services that have been agreed upon with the vehicle manufacturer. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.4 Information security Page page 8 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
Communication interfaces shall use boundary controls such as ingress/egress filtering. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Interfaces Page page 8 Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
Communication boundary controls shall be configurable by the vehicle manufacturer. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.4 Information security Page page 8 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
Any interfaces used for development purposes shall be removed or disabled in series production. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.4 Information security Page page 8 Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
It shall be possible for the vehicle manufacturer to securely inject data into the product in accordance with the specification provided by the vehicle manufacturer. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Information security Page page 8 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
ECUs shall only contain the secrets agreed between the vehicle manufacturer and the supplier. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.1 Security updates Page page 9 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
ECUs shall conform to the harmonized Security Access specification [1] provided by the vehicle manufacturer. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.1 Security updates Page page 9 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Implement the ECU-side diagnostic behavior with configurable authorization and verification evidence, subject to customer-confirmed UDS service allocation and role model. |
The supplier shall inform the vehicle manufacturer if any cybersecurity patches are available. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Marcus Lindner EPXC Published 10(16) Page page 10 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. |
An incident response process shall be proposed to and approved by the vehicle manufacturer. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Incident management Page page 10 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. |
In case of cybersecurity incidents, the incident response process shall be used. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.3 Vulnerability management Page page 10 Security capability Incident response Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. |
The incident response process shall be maintained for the entire product lifetime. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.3 Vulnerability management Page page 10 Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. |
The incident response process shall ensure that risk is managed in coordination with the vehicle manufacturer. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.3 Vulnerability management Page page 10 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. |
Any vulnerabilities that are identified during product lifecycle shall be promptly communicated to the vehicle manufacturer. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Vulnerability management Page page 10 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. |
Within adequate time after the initial vulnerability report, the supplier shall provide more information about the identified vulnerability. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Marcus Lindner EPXC Published 11(16) Page page 11 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. |
The supplier shall have a method for monitoring available vulnerability databases for vulnerabilities that can affect the delivered product. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.4 Product lifecycle Page page 11 Feature / Interface None / External Interfaces; OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. |
Identified vulnerabilities shall be considered in all current development projects or projects under field monitoring. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.4 Product lifecycle Page page 11 Supplier proposal Accept with assumption. Supplier can provide vulnerability monitoring, reporting, and initial response process evidence; vehicle-level incident ownership and escalation path require customer confirmation. |
Field-return analysis secrets shall not be operational in the field. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.4 Product lifecycle Page page 11 Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
Security related events shall be identified and logged. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Logging Page page 12 Security capability Logging and audit trail Supplier proposal Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. |
The vehicle manufacturer reserves the right to request documentation and evidence as well as to perform or order a compliance audit to determine whether the listed requirements are fulfilled. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.2.3 Cryptographic libraries Page page 7 Feature / Interface Security evidence and traceability / None Supplier proposal Informational only. Keep as context; do not treat as an implementation requirement unless the customer confirms applicability. |
Data specified by the vehicle manufacturer shall be protected from manipulations. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Marcus Lindner EPXC Published 9(16) Page page 9 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. |
Data specified by the vehicle manufacturer shall be protected from disclosure. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.1 Security updates Page page 9 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. |
Intellectual property of the vehicle manufacturer shall be protected from disclosure. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.1 Security updates Page page 9 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface Supplier proposal Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. |
An ECU returned from field shall allow for field-return analysis. Details & reviewer feedbackSection Product lifecycle Page page 11 Supplier proposal Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. |
An ECU enabled for field-return analysis shall not be possible to use as a spare part. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.6.4 Product lifecycle Page page 11 Supplier proposal Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. |
The vehicle manufacturer reserves the right to perform penetration testing on the ECU to identify potential vulnerabilities. Details & reviewer feedbackSection 2.1.5 Documentation Page page 6 Supplier proposal Informational only. Keep as context; do not treat as an implementation requirement unless the customer confirms applicability. |
Reads like a requirement but no customer requirement ID was identified in the source. Confirm with the customer before baselining — not counted as a confirmed requirement.
Documentation on the method and results shall be provided to the vehicle manufacturer. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.1.3 Cybersecurity concept Page page 5 Feature / Interface Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface |
Note: The vehicle manufacturer and supplier shall collaboratively define the context of the system or function to enable the supplier performing the risk assessment. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.1.3 Cybersecurity concept Page page 5 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface |
For each risk identified in the cybersecurity risk analyses, a risk treatment decision shall be made to avoid, reduce, share, or retain the risk. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.1.5 Documentation Page page 6 Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling |
It shall be possible to verify which cybersecurity controls were derived from which requirements. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.1.5 Documentation Page page 6 Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling |
The details shall be agreed upon between the vehicle manufacturer and the supplier. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.4 Information security Page page 8 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface |
The information shall contain • the version(s) of affected hardware or software components, • nature of the vulnerability, • description of the affected cybersecurity goal, • technical conditions to exploit the vulnerability, • impact of the exploitation and • possibilities to remove the vulnerability. Confirm the split of monitoring, triage, vulnerability handling and field response between OEM PSIRT and supplier. DetailsSection 2.6.4 Product lifecycle Page page 11 Security capability Vulnerability management |
Method and scope shall be proposed to and approved by the vehicle manufacturer. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.1.3 Cybersecurity concept Page page 5 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface |
Methods shall be proposed to and approved by the vehicle manufacturer. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.2.3 Cryptographic libraries Page page 7 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface |
Methods shall be proposed and approved by the vehicle manufacturer. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.4 Information security Page page 8 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface |
The report shall include information needed to identify the affected vehicles/products. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.6.3 Vulnerability management Page page 10 |
Methods including the stipulation of a reasonable notification time shall be proposed to and approved by the vehicle manufacturer. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.6.3 Vulnerability management Page page 10 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface |
Methods including the stipulation of a reasonable reporting time shall be proposed to and approved by the vehicle manufacturer. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.6.4 Product lifecycle Page page 11 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface |
End-of-life and decommissioning shall be specifically considered. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.6.5 Logging Page page 12 |
Notes: a) It shall not be possible for a third party to reuse an ECU without system support from the vehicle manufacturer. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.6.5 Logging Page page 12 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface |
b) Decommissioning of an ECU shall not have the potential of causing unacceptable risk to the road user or the vehicle manufacturer. Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. DetailsSection 2.6.5 Logging Page page 12 Feature / Interface None / OEM/Customer Review Interface |
Descriptive or contextual statements with a customer ID but no binding (shall/must) wording.
Cybersecurity principles are high level requirements that drive development and refinement of functional and technical cybersecurity requirements. DetailsSection General cybersecurity requirements Page page 5 Related Tables / DiagramsLinked tables: 1 | Linked diagrams: 0
|
Definitions, abbreviations, document history, scope and other boilerplate. Not customer requirements.
Abbreviated terms Term Definition Shall This word, or the term "Required", means that the definition is an absolute requirement of the specification. Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment A structured approach to identify possible threats and evaluate risks with respect to the potential damages and the effort needed for successful attack. Cybersecurity concept A cybersecurity concept is a work product that documents cybersecurity relevant aspects of the product. The cybersecurity concept shall describe the scope of the risk analysis, risks that were identified during the risk analysis, cybe rsecurity goals, cybersecurity requirements, mitigation strategies, validation, and verification strategies, etc. Table 1: Definition of terms The cybersecurity concept shall describe the scope of the risk analysis, risks that were identified during the risk analysis, cybe rsecurity goals, cybersecurity requirements, mitigation strategies, validation, and verification strategies, etc. This document contains general cybersecurity requirements. The requirements specified in this document are applicable to all ECUs. The supplier of ECU is responsible to take all the necessary measures and steps to comply with the requirements listed in this document. The target readers of this specification are ECU suppliers, which can be either internal or external in relation to the vehicle manufacturer. In both cases, whenever the term “ECU supplier” or just “supplier” is used in this specification it refers to the company and organization which is responsible for the implementation and delivery of the ECU according to the requirements in this specification. And in both cases, whenever the term “vehicle manufacturer” is used in this specification this term refers to the system owner (responsible receiver) at the vehicle manufacturer. Abbreviation Description ECU Electronic Control Unit Table 2: Abbreviated terms DetailsSection 1.4 Abbreviated terms Page page 3 Feature / Interface Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface Security capability Cybersecurity requirement handling Related Tables / DiagramsLinked tables: 1 | Linked diagrams: 0
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This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.
| SSR | Statement / Trace | Feature | Security Capability | Interface | Responsibility | Status | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSR-COM-001 | OEM/Customer Review Interface — Secure Communication and Boundary ControlThe ECU shall restrict and protect communication for OEM/Customer Review Interface, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals (Hardware domain; allocated to Hardware Platform; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0030; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0036. | OEM/Customer Review Interface | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Ready for Customer Alignment | Review + Test |
| SSR-COM-002 | Secure Communication and Boundary Control — Secure Communication and Boundary ControlThe ECU shall restrict and protect communication for Secure Communication and Boundary Control, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals (System domain; allocated to System Core).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0031; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0034. | Secure Communication and Boundary Control | None | None | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test + table/diagram context review |
| SSR-COM-003 | OEM/Customer Review Interface — Secure Communication and Boundary ControlThe ECU shall restrict and protect communication for OEM/Customer Review Interface, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals (System domain; allocated to System Core; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0032. | OEM/Customer Review Interface | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test |
| SSR-CON-001 | Security evidence and traceability — Cybersecurity Concept and EvidenceThe supplier shall produce and maintain the cybersecurity concept and verification evidence covering Security evidence and traceability (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Cybersecurity requirement handling; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019. | Security evidence and traceability | Cybersecurity requirement handling | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test + table/diagram context review |
| SSR-CON-002 | Cybersecurity Concept and Evidence — Cybersecurity Concept and EvidenceThe supplier shall produce and maintain the cybersecurity concept and verification evidence covering Cybersecurity Concept and Evidence (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Cybersecurity requirement handling; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0024; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0027; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0037; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0044; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0045; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0046. | Cybersecurity Concept and Evidence | Cybersecurity requirement handling | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Ready for Customer Alignment | Review + Test + table/diagram context review |
| SSR-CON-003 | Security evidence and traceability — Cybersecurity Concept and EvidenceThe supplier shall produce and maintain the cybersecurity concept and verification evidence covering Security evidence and traceability (Software domain; allocated to Application Software; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0021. | Security evidence and traceability | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test |
| SSR-DAI-001 | Data Authenticity and Integrity Verification — Data Authenticity and Integrity VerificationThe ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of Data Authenticity and Integrity Verification data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Authentication; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0025. | Data Authenticity and Integrity Verification | Authentication | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test + table/diagram context review |
| SSR-HW-001 | Hardware / HSM / Secure Storage — Hardware / HSM / Secure StorageThe ECU hardware shall provide the platform and secure-storage capabilities required for Hardware / HSM / Secure Storage (Hardware domain; allocated to Hardware Platform; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0022; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0060; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0063. | Hardware / HSM / Secure Storage | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Ready for Customer Alignment | Review + Test + table/diagram context review |
| SSR-KEY-001 | Key and Certificate Handling — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Key and Certificate Handling across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Certificate handling; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0041; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0042. | Key and Certificate Handling | Certificate handling | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test + table/diagram context review |
| SSR-LIFE-001 | Lifecycle / Field Return / Decommissioning — Lifecycle / Field Return / DecommissioningThe ECU and supplier process shall handle lifecycle, field return and decommissioning for Lifecycle / Field Return / Decommissioning, including secure data and key handling (Hardware domain; allocated to Hardware Platform).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0062. | Lifecycle / Field Return / Decommissioning | None | None | Supplier-Owned | Ready for Internal Review | Review + Test |
| SSR-LOG-001 | Security Logging and Event Handling — Security Logging and Event HandlingThe ECU shall record bounded security-relevant events for Security Logging and Event Handling with sufficient integrity and context for diagnostics and incident evidence (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Logging and audit trail).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0067. | Security Logging and Event Handling | Logging and audit trail | None | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test |
| SSR-PROD-001 | Supplier Development and Production Hardening — Supplier Development and Production HardeningThe ECU and production process shall enforce development/production hardening for Supplier Development and Production Hardening, including debug lock and protected access (Hardware domain; allocated to Hardware Platform).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0029. | Supplier Development and Production Hardening | None | None | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test |
| SSR-SYS-001 | System Function — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System Function behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing (System domain; allocated to System Core; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0028; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0038; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0039; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0040; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0043; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0051; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0059; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0061. | System Function | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Test + table/diagram context review |
| SSR-VIH-001 | Vulnerability and Incident Handling — Vulnerability and Incident HandlingThe supplier shall support vulnerability monitoring and incident handling for Vulnerability and Incident Handling over the defined lifecycle, including field updates (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Vulnerability management; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0048. | Vulnerability and Incident Handling | Vulnerability management | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test + table/diagram context review |
| SSR-VIH-002 | Vulnerability and Incident Handling — Vulnerability and Incident HandlingThe supplier shall support vulnerability monitoring and incident handling for Vulnerability and Incident Handling over the defined lifecycle, including field updates (Process / compliance domain; allocated to Compliance Process; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0047; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0049; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0050. | Vulnerability and Incident Handling | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test |
| SSR-VIH-003 | Vulnerability and Incident Handling — Vulnerability and Incident HandlingThe supplier shall support vulnerability monitoring and incident handling for Vulnerability and Incident Handling over the defined lifecycle, including field updates (System domain; allocated to System Core; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0054; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0055. | Vulnerability and Incident Handling | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Ready for Customer Alignment | Review + Test |
| SSR-VIH-004 | Vulnerability and Incident Handling — Vulnerability and Incident HandlingThe supplier shall support vulnerability monitoring and incident handling for Vulnerability and Incident Handling over the defined lifecycle, including field updates (Interface domain; allocated to External Interfaces; interface: External Interfaces).From this PDF: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0058. | Vulnerability and Incident Handling | None | External Interfaces | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test |
| Impact Area | Evidence From This PDF |
|---|---|
| Impacted system features | Security evidence and traceability |
| Impacted interfaces | External Interfaces; OEM/Customer Review Interface; OEM/Customer Review Interface |
| Impacted security capabilities | Authentication; Cybersecurity requirement handling; Incident response; Key management; Logging and audit trail; Vulnerability management |
| Impacted architecture elements | Application Software; OEM/Customer Review Interface; Compliance Process; Compliance Process; OEM/Customer Review Interface; External Interfaces; OEM/Customer Review Interface; Hardware Platform; Hardware Platform; OEM/Customer Review Interface; Security Services; Security Services; OEM/Customer Review Interface; System Core; System Core; OEM/Customer Review Interface |
| Impacted work products | Cybersecurity concept; Cybersecurity verification report; DIA / cybersecurity case; System/architecture design |
| Tools / IT / hardware / test | High/Low/Low; Low/High/Low; Low/Low/High; Low/Low/Low; Low/Low/Medium; Medium/Low/High; Medium/Low/Low; Medium/Low/Medium |
| Design assumptions introduced | Security-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed. Linked source table/diagram context was considered for interpretation.; Security-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed. |
| Design decisions required | Confirm with customer whether this is a binding requirement and assign a customer ID. |
| Impact | Status |
|---|---|
| Estimation impact | yes |
| Resource/tool/IT/HW/test impact | High/Low/Low; Low/High/Low; Low/Low/High; Low/Low/Low; Low/Low/Medium; Medium/Low/High; Medium/Low/Low; Medium/Low/Medium |
Generated from document-specific requirement, traceability, SSR, and open-point evidence.
flowchart LR
doc["1001379436_P10_000_01_RDDM-1140152501-1744.pdf"]
d0["Authentication"]
doc --> d0
d1["Cybersecurity requirement handling"]
doc --> d1
d2["Incident response"]
doc --> d2
f0["Feature: Security evidence and traceability"]
doc --> f0
i0["Interface: External Interfaces; OEM/Customer Review Interface"]
doc --> i0
i1["Interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface"]
doc --> i1
s0["SSR: SSR-COM-001"]
doc --> s0
s1["SSR: SSR-COM-002"]
doc --> s1
s2["SSR: SSR-COM-003"]
doc --> s2
o0["Open point: OP-003"]
doc --> o0
o1["Open point: OP-006"]
doc --> o1
o2["Open point: OP-008"]
doc --> o2
1001379436_P10_000_01_RDDM-1140152501-1744.pdf
Cybersecurity Requirement Standard
Cybersecurity
46 requirements, 1 information, 17 SSRs
4 tables, 0 diagrams
Markdown-derived requirements and registers; OCR disabled; no downstream PDF analysis
This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.
| Customer Requirement | SSR | Disposition | Confidence | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001 | None | Informational Only | n/a | Non-binding; not derived. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002 | None | Informational Only | n/a | Non-binding; not derived. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003 | None | Needs Internal Review | n/a | Low confidence / human review before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0004 | None | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | n/a | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005 | None | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | n/a | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006 | None | Informational Only | n/a | Non-binding; not derived. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007 | SSR-CON-001 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008 | SSR-VIH-001 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012 | SSR-CON-002 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013 | SSR-CON-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015 | SSR-CON-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017 | SSR-CON-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018 | SSR-CON-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019 | SSR-CON-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0020 | None | Informational Only | n/a | Non-binding; not derived. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0021 | SSR-CON-003 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0022 | SSR-HW-001 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0023 | None | Informational Only | n/a | Non-binding; not derived. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0024 | SSR-CON-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0025 | SSR-DAI-001 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0026 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0027 | SSR-CON-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0028 | SSR-SYS-001 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0029 | SSR-PROD-001 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0030 | SSR-COM-001 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0031 | SSR-COM-002 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0032 | SSR-COM-003 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0033 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0034 | SSR-COM-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0035 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0036 | SSR-COM-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0037 | SSR-CON-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0038 | SSR-SYS-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0039 | SSR-SYS-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0040 | SSR-SYS-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0041 | SSR-KEY-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0042 | SSR-KEY-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0043 | SSR-SYS-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0044 | SSR-CON-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0045 | SSR-CON-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0046 | SSR-CON-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0047 | SSR-VIH-002 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0048 | SSR-VIH-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0049 | SSR-VIH-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0050 | SSR-VIH-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0051 | SSR-SYS-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0052 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0053 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0054 | SSR-VIH-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0055 | SSR-VIH-003 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0056 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0057 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0058 | SSR-VIH-004 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0059 | SSR-SYS-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0060 | SSR-HW-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0061 | SSR-SYS-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0062 | SSR-LIFE-001 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | High | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0063 | SSR-HW-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0064 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0065 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0066 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0067 | SSR-LOG-001 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
1001379436_P10_000_01_RDDM-1140152501-1744.pdfconverted/markdown/source documentScope: this cybersecurity requirement standard specifies requirement, covering 2.1 Development process; 2.1.3 Cybersecurity concept; 2.1.5 Documentation; 2.2 System requirements; 2.2.3 Cryptographic libraries; 2.4 Information security. System boundary and interfaces: the document constrains 2 interface(s) - OEM/Customer Review Interface; External Interfaces; OEM/Customer Review Interface; principal functions in scope are Security evidence and traceability.
Engineering obligations: 46 confirmed customer requirement(s) carry an explicit ID and normative wording and must be implemented and verified; 15 further requirement-like statement(s) have no customer ID and must be clarified before they can be baselined; 1 informational and 5 reference item(s) were separated out as non-binding. Design and security impact: affects Security evidence and traceability; security capabilities touched: Cybersecurity requirement handling; Vulnerability management; Authentication; Key management (sample: 4 of 6); 17 supplier system requirement(s) were derived from this document.
Open for the customer: 4 document-linked open point(s) - mainly Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the split of monitoring, triage, vulnerability handling and field response between OEM PSIRT and supplier.; Confirm production/debug hardening expectations (debug lock, secure end-of-line, developer-access policy). (sample: 3 of 4) - plus 15 unidentified requirement-like statement(s). Do not baseline these until the customer confirms. Confidence and limits: High confidence. Categorisation is derived from the converted Markdown (customer IDs, normative wording, and section context); no OCR or downstream PDF analysis is used.
| Field | Interpretation |
|---|---|
| Document Purpose | Scope: this cybersecurity requirement standard specifies requirement, covering 2.1 Development process; 2.1.3 Cybersecurity concept; 2.1.5 Documentation; 2.2 System requirements; 2.2.3 Cryptographic libraries; 2.4 Information security. |
| Engineering Interpretation | System boundary and interfaces: the document constrains 2 interface(s) - OEM/Customer Review Interface; External Interfaces; OEM/Customer Review Interface; principal functions in scope are Security evidence and traceability. |
| Supplier Proposal Impact | Engineering obligations: 46 confirmed customer requirement(s) carry an explicit ID and normative wording and must be implemented and verified; 15 further requirement-like statement(s) have no customer ID and must be clarified before they can be baselined; 1 informational and 5 reference item(s) were separated out as non-binding. |
| System / Security Impact | Design and security impact: affects Security evidence and traceability; security capabilities touched: Cybersecurity requirement handling; Vulnerability management; Authentication; Key management (sample: 4 of 6); 17 supplier system requirement(s) were derived from this document. |
| Customer Clarification Impact | Open for the customer: 4 document-linked open point(s) - mainly Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the split of monitoring, triage, vulnerability handling and field response between OEM PSIRT and supplier.; Confirm production/debug hardening expectations (debug lock, secure end-of-line, developer-access policy). (sample: 3 of 4) - plus 15 unidentified requirement-like statement(s). Do not baseline these until the customer confirms. |
| Confidence and Limits | Confidence and limits: High confidence. Categorisation is derived from the converted Markdown (customer IDs, normative wording, and section context); no OCR or downstream PDF analysis is used. |
| Theme | Summary | Requirement Count | Representative Requirements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Requirement | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 46 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012 |
| Responsibility and customer approval model | Creates supplier/OEM allocation decisions for work products, backend infrastructure, approvals, and residual risk. | 46 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005 |
| Core ECA system behavior | Defines actuator ECU behavior, drivetrain integration, electrical/mechanical constraints, and verification scope. | 38 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008 |
| System architecture design | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 37 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0004; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009 |
| Cybersecurity concept and evidence | Drives cybersecurity concept, risk treatment, verification evidence, and traceability obligations. | 32 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005 |
| Cybersecurity | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 26 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005 |
| Cybersecurity verification report | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 26 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005 |
| Security services | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 24 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007 |
| Section | Requirements | Information | Unknown | Excluded | Total Items | Critical | Open Points | SSR Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Introduction | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| -- 1.4 Abbreviated terms | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| -- 2.1 Development process | 10 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 5 | 1 | 4 |
| -- -- 2.1.3 Cybersecurity concept | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| -- -- 2.1.5 Documentation | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| -- 2.2 System requirements | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| -- -- 2.2.3 Cryptographic libraries | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| -- 2.4 Information security | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| -- 2.6 Cybersecurity lifecycle | 23 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 10 | 3 | 10 |
| -- -- 2.6.1 Security updates | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| -- -- 2.6.3 Vulnerability management | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| -- -- 2.6.4 Product lifecycle | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| -- -- 2.6.5 Logging | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 2 |
| Artifact | Type | Caption | Page | Related Requirements | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TABLE-1001379436P1000001RDDM11-0001 | Table | Table 1: Definition of terms | page 3 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003 | Table source context |
| TABLE-1001379436P1000001RDDM11-0002 | Table | Table 2: Abbreviated terms | page 3 | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0004; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008 | Security protocol or cryptographic context |
| TABLE-1001379436P1000001RDDM11-0003 | Table | Table 3: Bibliography | page 15 | None | Table source context |
| TABLE-1001379436P1000001RDDM11-0004 | Table | Table 4: History of the document | page 16 | None | Table source context |
Customer-owned responsibility, final customer decisions, and unresolved open points remain unconfirmed.
| ID | Score | Category | Reason | Statement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Documentation on the method and results shall be provided to the vehicle manufacturer. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Note: The vehicle manufacturer and supplier shall collaboratively define the context of the system or function to enable the supplier performing the risk assessment. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | For each risk identified in the cybersecurity risk analyses, a risk treatment decision shall be made to avoid, reduce, share, or retain the risk. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | It shall be possible to verify which cybersecurity controls were derived from which requirements. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0035 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | The details shall be agreed upon between the vehicle manufacturer and the supplier. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0056 | 81 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | The information shall contain • the version(s) of affected hardware or software components, • nature of the vulnerability, • description of the affected cybersecurity goal, • technical conditions to exploit the vulnerability, • impact of the exploitation and • possibilities to remove the vulnerability. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0041 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | It shall be possible for the vehicle manufacturer to securely inject key material and other data used for cybersecurity controls into the ECU according to the specification of the vehicle manufacturer. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009 | 66 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Method and scope shall be proposed to and approved by the vehicle manufacturer. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0026 | 66 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Methods shall be proposed to and approved by the vehicle manufacturer. |
| RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0033 | 66 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation | Methods shall be proposed and approved by the vehicle manufacturer. |
| Open Point | Priority | Question | Impact | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OP-003 | Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier. | ECU secure-storage and provisioning design is blocked; production-line and PKI dependencies stay open. | Open | |
| OP-006 | Confirm the split of monitoring, triage, vulnerability handling and field response between OEM PSIRT and supplier. | Lifecycle effort and field-response capability stay unbounded; risk of an R155 compliance gap. | Open | |
| OP-008 | Confirm production/debug hardening expectations (debug lock, secure end-of-line, developer-access policy). | Hardware fusing and EOL process design stay open; risk of an exposed debug/production interface. | Open | |
| OP-011 | Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. | Supplier position, estimation, and affected design allocation remain conditional for the listed requirements. | Open |
| SSR | Title | Statement | Reqs From This PDF | Other PDFs | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSR-COM-001 | OEM/Customer Review Interface — Secure Communication and Boundary Control | The ECU shall restrict and protect communication for OEM/Customer Review Interface, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals (Hardware domain; allocated to Hardware Platform; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0030; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0036 | no | Ready for Customer Alignment |
| SSR-COM-002 | Secure Communication and Boundary Control — Secure Communication and Boundary Control | The ECU shall restrict and protect communication for Secure Communication and Boundary Control, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals (System domain; allocated to System Core). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0031; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0034 | no | Candidate |
| SSR-COM-003 | OEM/Customer Review Interface — Secure Communication and Boundary Control | The ECU shall restrict and protect communication for OEM/Customer Review Interface, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals (System domain; allocated to System Core; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0032 | no | Candidate |
| SSR-CON-001 | Security evidence and traceability — Cybersecurity Concept and Evidence | The supplier shall produce and maintain the cybersecurity concept and verification evidence covering Security evidence and traceability (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Cybersecurity requirement handling; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019 | no | Candidate |
| SSR-CON-002 | Cybersecurity Concept and Evidence — Cybersecurity Concept and Evidence | The supplier shall produce and maintain the cybersecurity concept and verification evidence covering Cybersecurity Concept and Evidence (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Cybersecurity requirement handling; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0024; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0027; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0037; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0044; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0045; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0046 | no | Ready for Customer Alignment |
| SSR-CON-003 | Security evidence and traceability — Cybersecurity Concept and Evidence | The supplier shall produce and maintain the cybersecurity concept and verification evidence covering Security evidence and traceability (Software domain; allocated to Application Software; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0021 | no | Candidate |
| SSR-DAI-001 | Data Authenticity and Integrity Verification — Data Authenticity and Integrity Verification | The ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of Data Authenticity and Integrity Verification data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Authentication; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0025 | no | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-HW-001 | Hardware / HSM / Secure Storage — Hardware / HSM / Secure Storage | The ECU hardware shall provide the platform and secure-storage capabilities required for Hardware / HSM / Secure Storage (Hardware domain; allocated to Hardware Platform; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0022; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0060; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0063 | no | Ready for Customer Alignment |
| SSR-KEY-001 | Key and Certificate Handling — Key and Certificate Handling | The ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Key and Certificate Handling across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Certificate handling; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0041; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0042 | no | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-LIFE-001 | Lifecycle / Field Return / Decommissioning — Lifecycle / Field Return / Decommissioning | The ECU and supplier process shall handle lifecycle, field return and decommissioning for Lifecycle / Field Return / Decommissioning, including secure data and key handling (Hardware domain; allocated to Hardware Platform). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0062 | no | Ready for Internal Review |
| SSR-LOG-001 | Security Logging and Event Handling — Security Logging and Event Handling | The ECU shall record bounded security-relevant events for Security Logging and Event Handling with sufficient integrity and context for diagnostics and incident evidence (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Logging and audit trail). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0067 | no | Candidate |
| SSR-PROD-001 | Supplier Development and Production Hardening — Supplier Development and Production Hardening | The ECU and production process shall enforce development/production hardening for Supplier Development and Production Hardening, including debug lock and protected access (Hardware domain; allocated to Hardware Platform). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0029 | no | Candidate |
| SSR-SYS-001 | System Function — System Function | The ECU shall implement the System Function behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing (System domain; allocated to System Core; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0028; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0038; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0039; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0040; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0043; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0051; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0059; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0061 | no | Candidate |
| SSR-VIH-001 | Vulnerability and Incident Handling — Vulnerability and Incident Handling | The supplier shall support vulnerability monitoring and incident handling for Vulnerability and Incident Handling over the defined lifecycle, including field updates (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Vulnerability management; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0048 | no | Candidate |
| SSR-VIH-002 | Vulnerability and Incident Handling — Vulnerability and Incident Handling | The supplier shall support vulnerability monitoring and incident handling for Vulnerability and Incident Handling over the defined lifecycle, including field updates (Process / compliance domain; allocated to Compliance Process; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0047; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0049; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0050 | no | Candidate |
| SSR-VIH-003 | Vulnerability and Incident Handling — Vulnerability and Incident Handling | The supplier shall support vulnerability monitoring and incident handling for Vulnerability and Incident Handling over the defined lifecycle, including field updates (System domain; allocated to System Core; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0054; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0055 | no | Ready for Customer Alignment |
| SSR-VIH-004 | Vulnerability and Incident Handling — Vulnerability and Incident Handling | The supplier shall support vulnerability monitoring and incident handling for Vulnerability and Incident Handling over the defined lifecycle, including field updates (Interface domain; allocated to External Interfaces; interface: External Interfaces). | RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0058 | no | Candidate |