Document Purpose
Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 108 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior.
Product and cybersecurity architecture understanding package generated from Markdown-derived requirements.
Responsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC · Key / Certificate Handling · Core ECA system behavior
Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 108 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior. Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model.
Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 20 accept; 24 accept with assumption; 60 partially accept; 1 needs internal review; 3 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 18 supplier system requirement records. Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them.
Requires customer confirmation: 3 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.; Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision. Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed.
Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 108 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior.
Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model.
Core ECA system behavior; Cybersecurity concept and evidence; Responsibility and customer approval model; System architecture design; Key, certificate, and PKI handling (showing 5 of 8)
Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them.
Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 20 accept; 24 accept with assumption; 60 partially accept; 1 needs internal review; 3 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 18 supplier system requirement records.
Requires customer confirmation: 3 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.; Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision.
Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed.
| Theme | Engineering Meaning | Requirement Count | Representative Requirements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Core ECA system behavior | Defines actuator ECU behavior, drivetrain integration, electrical/mechanical constraints, and verification scope. | 86 | REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00881 |
| Cybersecurity concept and evidence | Drives cybersecurity concept, risk treatment, verification evidence, and traceability obligations. | 67 | REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00886 |
| Responsibility and customer approval model | Creates supplier/OEM allocation decisions for work products, backend infrastructure, approvals, and residual risk. | 57 | REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00884 |
| System architecture design | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 41 | REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00882 |
| Key, certificate, and PKI handling | Affects ECU trust material storage, provisioning, lifecycle ownership, and customer PKI dependencies. | 40 | REQ-AUTO-00889; REQ-AUTO-00891; REQ-AUTO-00892 |
| System | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 32 | REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00882 |
| System core | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 31 | REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00882; REQ-AUTO-00884 |
| Cybersecurity | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 22 | REQ-AUTO-00892; REQ-AUTO-00895; REQ-AUTO-00907 |
| Section | Requirements | Critical | Open Points | SSR Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Scope | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| -- 1.1 Summary | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2 Abbrevations | 3 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| 3 subFunctions | 43 | 29 | 3 | 12 |
| -- 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional | 14 | 9 | 2 | 8 |
| -- -- 3.1.1 Request | 5 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| -- -- 3.1.2 Response | 9 | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| -- 3.2 proofOfOwnership | 21 | 16 | 3 | 8 |
| -- -- 3.2.1 Request | 7 | 6 | 1 | 5 |
| -- -- 3.2.2 Response | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| -- -- 3.2.3 Negative Response | 7 | 6 | 1 | 4 |
| -- 3.3 deAuthenticate | 5 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| -- -- 3.3.3 Negative Response | 5 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| 4 General | 55 | 29 | 3 | 14 |
| -- 4.1 Certificate | 30 | 14 | 2 | 10 |
| -- -- 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension | 9 | 3 | 1 | 6 |
| -- -- 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time | 11 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| -- 4.2 State-keeping | 8 | 8 | 1 | 4 |
| -- 4.5 CRNG | 4 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| -- 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| -- -- 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| -- 4.9 Authentication completion timer | 6 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| 6 Normative references | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Source PDF | customer-input/pdf/CVS31.pdf |
| Converted Markdown | converted/markdown/CVS31.md |
| Document Type | Responsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC |
| Domain | Key / Certificate Handling |
| Scope Summary | 108 extracted requirements; 18 linked SSRs; 3 linked open points. |
| Main Themes | Core ECA system behavior; Cybersecurity concept and evidence; Responsibility and customer approval model; System architecture design; Key, certificate, and PKI handling (showing 5 of 8) |
| Does Not Confirm | Customer-owned responsibility, final customer decisions, and unresolved open points remain unconfirmed. |
| Confidence | High |
| Evidence Basis | Markdown-derived requirements and generated RFQX registers; no downstream PDF analysis. |
This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.
| ID | Score | Category | Requirement / Reason | Supplier Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-AUTO-00889 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | Table 4 – Supported subFunctions (ISO 14229-1:2020) Name verifyCertificateBidirectional proofOfOwnership deAuthenticate AUTH_REQ 155 The server shall not accept an application-layer service 0x29 request when it is received inside an SDT (service 0x84) protected message.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00892 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | Table 5 – verifyCertificateBidirectional Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipServer Authentication Request SID Service ID for Authentication service request 0x29 M Yes verifyCertificateBidirectional] Initiate Authentication by verifying the Certificate and generating a Proof of Ownership from the server 0x02 M Yes communicationConfiguration NOT USED 0x00 M Yes lengthOfCertificateClient Length parameter for certificateClient uint16 M Yes certificateClient The Certificate to verify uint8[] M Yes lengthOfChallengeClient Length parameter for challengeClient uint16 M Yes challengeClient See 3.1.1.1 uint8[] M Yes AUTH_REQ 117 Upon reception of a verifyCertificateBidirectional request, the server shall determine whether the Authentication delay timer is currently running.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00893 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | AUTH_REQ 118 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is expired, the server shall continue to process the verifyCertificateBidirectional request.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00895 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | AUTH_REQ 45 If the server verifies the client certificate as valid, the server shall create the requested client authentication pending state.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00900 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | AUTH_REQ 173 The server shall verify the value of lengthOfCertificateClient upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00901 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | AUTH_REQ 174 If the lengthOfCertificateClient value is not within the expected range, the server shall send negative response code 0x13 (incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat).security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00906 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | 3.1.3 Negative Response AUTH_REQ 121 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is running, the server shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x37, indicating requiredTimeDelayNotExpired.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00907 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | AUTH_REQ 122 If the server verifies the client certificate as invalid, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00908 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | AUTH_REQ 123 If the server fails or cannot determine that the authentication pending state was stored, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00910 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | Table 7 – proofOfOwnership Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipClient Authentication Request SID Service ID for 0x29 M Yes proofOfOwnership] Verify the Proof of Ownership from the client 0x03 M Yes lengthOfProofOfOwnershipClient This field indicates the length (in octets) of the proofOfOwnershipClient field proofOfOwnershipClient See 3.2.1.1 uint8[] M No lengthOfEphemeralPublicKey Client Length parameter for ephemeralPublicKey Client ephemeralPublicKeyClient See 3.2.1.2 uint16 M Yes AUTH_REQ 110 The server shall verify whether any existing authentication pending state corresponds to the client submitting the proofOfOwnership request.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00922 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | AUTH_REQ 126 If the server cannot determine if the client does have an existing authentication pending state, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00924 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | AUTH_REQ 128 If the server is trying to delete the authentication pending state as consequence of the client proofOfOwnership signature verification failure, and the server cannot determine that the authentication pending state was deleted, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
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| Open Point | Priority | Question / Impact | Required Customer Decision | Recommended Supplier Position | Owner | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OP-002 | Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.Security-access design and verification scope cannot be frozen; risk of an unprotected diagnostic service. | Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy. | Implement configurable session/security-access on the ECU and request the customer-confirmed service-to-role table. | Shared (OEM policy / Supplier ECU) | Open | |
| OP-003 | Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.ECU secure-storage and provisioning design is blocked; production-line and PKI dependencies stay open. | Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier. | Provide ECU-side secure storage and provisioning hooks; require OEM confirmation of PKI ownership and the provisioning interface. | OEM / Customer (PKI) + Supplier (ECU) | Open | |
| OP-004 | Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied.Update-control scope and evidence ownership stay open; risk of an unprotected update path. | Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied. | Implement authenticated, integrity-protected ECU programming with controlled boot/app state; require OEM update-chain definition. | Shared (OEM backend / Supplier ECU) | Open |
This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.
| ID | Requirement / Proposal | Supplier Position | Review | Security Capability | Feature / Interface | SSR | Open Point | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-AUTO-00889 | Table 4 – Supported subFunctions (ISO 14229-1:2020) Name verifyCertificateBidirectional proofOfOwnership deAuthenticate AUTH_REQ 155 The server shall not accept an application-layer service 0x29 request when it is received inside an SDT (service 0x84) protected message.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Application software behavior; Secure communication and freshness protection None | SSR-KEY-003 | OP-002 | 3 subFunctions page 7 Source detailsDocument section 3 subFunctions Section path 3 subFunctions Page reference page 7 |
| REQ-AUTO-00892 | Table 5 – verifyCertificateBidirectional Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipServer Authentication Request SID Service ID for Authentication service request 0x29 M Yes verifyCertificateBidirectional] Initiate Authentication by verifying the Certificate and generating a Proof of Ownership from the server 0x02 M Yes communicationConfiguration NOT USED 0x00 M Yes lengthOfCertificateClient Length parameter for certificateClient uint16 M Yes certificateClient The Certificate to verify uint8[] M Yes lengthOfChallengeClient Length parameter for challengeClient uint16 M Yes challengeClient See 3.1.1.1 uint8[] M Yes AUTH_REQ 117 Upon reception of a verifyCertificateBidirectional request, the server shall determine whether the Authentication delay timer is currently running.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-002 | 3.1.1 Request page 8 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.1 Request Page reference page 8 |
| REQ-AUTO-00893 | AUTH_REQ 118 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is expired, the server shall continue to process the verifyCertificateBidirectional request.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-KEY-005 | OP-003 | 3.1.1 Request page 8 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.1 Request Page reference page 8 |
| REQ-AUTO-00895 | AUTH_REQ 45 If the server verifies the client certificate as valid, the server shall create the requested client authentication pending state.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-003 | 3.1.1 Request page 8 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.1 Request Page reference page 8 |
| REQ-AUTO-00900 | AUTH_REQ 173 The server shall verify the value of lengthOfCertificateClient upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-KEY-005 | OP-003 | 3.1.2 Response page 9 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response Page reference page 9 |
| REQ-AUTO-00901 | AUTH_REQ 174 If the lengthOfCertificateClient value is not within the expected range, the server shall send negative response code 0x13 (incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat).Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-KEY-005 | OP-003 | 3.1.2 Response page 9 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response Page reference page 9 |
| REQ-AUTO-00906 | 3.1.3 Negative Response AUTH_REQ 121 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is running, the server shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x37, indicating requiredTimeDelayNotExpired.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-KEY-005 | OP-003 | 3.2 proofOfOwnership page 11 Source detailsDocument section 3.2 proofOfOwnership Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership Page reference page 11 |
| REQ-AUTO-00907 | AUTH_REQ 122 If the server verifies the client certificate as invalid, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-003 | 3.2 proofOfOwnership page 11 Source detailsDocument section 3.2 proofOfOwnership Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership Page reference page 11 |
| REQ-AUTO-00908 | AUTH_REQ 123 If the server fails or cannot determine that the authentication pending state was stored, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-KEY-005 | OP-003 | 3.2 proofOfOwnership page 11 Source detailsDocument section 3.2 proofOfOwnership Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership Page reference page 11 |
| REQ-AUTO-00910 | Table 7 – proofOfOwnership Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipClient Authentication Request SID Service ID for 0x29 M Yes proofOfOwnership] Verify the Proof of Ownership from the client 0x03 M Yes lengthOfProofOfOwnershipClient This field indicates the length (in octets) of the proofOfOwnershipClient field proofOfOwnershipClient See 3.2.1.1 uint8[] M No lengthOfEphemeralPublicKey Client Length parameter for ephemeralPublicKey Client ephemeralPublicKeyClient See 3.2.1.2 uint16 M Yes AUTH_REQ 110 The server shall verify whether any existing authentication pending state corresponds to the client submitting the proofOfOwnership request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Application software behavior None | SSR-RBAC-004 | OP-002 | 3.2.1 Request page 12 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request Page reference page 12 |
| REQ-AUTO-00922 | AUTH_REQ 126 If the server cannot determine if the client does have an existing authentication pending state, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-COM-003 | OP-004 | 3.2.3 Negative Response page 14 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response Page reference page 14 |
| REQ-AUTO-00924 | AUTH_REQ 128 If the server is trying to delete the authentication pending state as consequence of the client proofOfOwnership signature verification failure, and the server cannot determine that the authentication pending state was deleted, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-DAI-004 | OP-004 | 3.2.3 Negative Response page 14 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response Page reference page 14 |
| REQ-AUTO-00925 | AUTH_REQ 129 If the server is deleting the authentication pending state as consequence of failure to store the authentication state, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | OP-004 | 3.2.3 Negative Response page 14 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response Page reference page 14 |
| REQ-AUTO-00931 | Internal Page 16 (31) AUTH_REQ 132 If the server is unable to delete the client's authentication state or cannot verify its presence, it shall respond to the deAuthenticate request with Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-COM-003 | OP-004 | 4.1 Certificate page 16 Source detailsDocument section 4.1 Certificate Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate Page reference page 16 |
| REQ-AUTO-00935 | AUTH_REQ 177 The server shall use the private key corresponding to the server certificate to generate the signatures.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-003 | 4.1 Certificate page 16 Source detailsDocument section 4.1 Certificate Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate Page reference page 16 |
| REQ-AUTO-00937 | AUTH_REQ 164 The server shall reject a received client’s certificate, sent using the verifyCertificateBidirectional subFunction, if it matches the server’s own certificate.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-003 | 4.1 Certificate page 16 Source detailsDocument section 4.1 Certificate Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate Page reference page 16 |
| REQ-AUTO-00938 | AUTH_INFO 7 It should not be possible to “unlock” the server using its own key/certificate.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-003 | 4.1 Certificate page 16 Source detailsDocument section 4.1 Certificate Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate Page reference page 16 |
| REQ-AUTO-00939 | AUTH_REQ 165 The server shall verify the client certificate, sent using the verifyCertificateBidirectional subFunction, according to Figure 3.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-003 | 4.1 Certificate page 16 Source detailsDocument section 4.1 Certificate Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate Page reference page 16 |
| REQ-AUTO-00940 | AUTH_REQ 134 The server shall verify the Signature of the Client certificate using the AUTH-CA EMP entity public key.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-003 | 4.1 Certificate page 16 Source detailsDocument section 4.1 Certificate Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate Page reference page 16 |
| REQ-AUTO-00942 | AUTH_REQ 9 • If the server NodeUID is not found in the NodeUID extension, the server shall reject the certificate and generate NRC 0x10 (generalReject).Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-003 | 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension page 18 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Page reference page 18 |
| REQ-AUTO-00950 | Internal Page 19 (31) As part of the certificate verification: AUTH_REQ 135 • The server shall validate the D-RBACC by parsing all its content.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-003 | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00951 | If content is invalid, the certificate is invalid and the server shall return a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Certificate handling | Certificate handling None | SSR-KEY-002 | OP-003 | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00953 | If non-compliant, the certificate is invalid and the server shall return a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Certificate handling | Certificate handling None | SSR-KEY-002 | OP-003 | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00960 | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time AUTH_REQ 169 The server shall validate the certificate so that: 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≤ 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒-𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ≤ 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 AUTH_INFO 137 The notBefore and notAfter are received as fields in the certificate while Certificate-Time is the EMP entity defined in CVS34.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | OP-003 | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00962 | AUTH_REQ 156 If a server reset is triggered by a client request (e.g., UDS service 0x11), the server shall send the corresponding response before invalidating the authentication pending state.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Application software behavior None | SSR-DIAG-004 | OP-002 | 4.2 State-keeping page 20 Source detailsDocument section 4.2 State-keeping Section path 4 General > 4.2 State-keeping Page reference page 20 |
| REQ-AUTO-00964 | AUTH_REQ 157 If a server reset is triggered by a client request (e.g., UDS service 0x11), the server shall send the corresponding response before invalidating the authentication state.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Application software behavior None | SSR-DIAG-004 | OP-002 | 4.2 State-keeping page 20 Source detailsDocument section 4.2 State-keeping Section path 4 General > 4.2 State-keeping Page reference page 20 |
| REQ-AUTO-00967 | AUTH_REQ 147 • Client roles (ECU diagnostic Role extension in client’s certificate) AUTH_REQ 148 • Client D-RBACC, if provided in the client’s certificate AUTH_REQ 149 The server shall support only one authentication state.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-RBAC-002 | OP-002 | 4.2 State-keeping page 21 Source detailsDocument section 4.2 State-keeping Section path 4 General > 4.2 State-keeping Page reference page 21 |
| REQ-AUTO-00973 | Internal Page 23 (31) 4.6 Role Based Access Control AUTH_REQ 25 The server shall always allow the Authentication 0x29 service (ISO 14229-1:2020) regardless of the RBAC logic (CVS151).Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Application software behavior None | SSR-RBAC-004 | OP-002 | 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication page 23 Source detailsDocument section 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Section path 4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Page reference page 23 |
| REQ-AUTO-00982 | AUTH_REQ 151 If the delay timer is not running, the server shall start it as part of verifyCertificateBidirectional request.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-KEY-005 | OP-003 | 4.9 Authentication completion timer page 24 Source detailsDocument section 4.9 Authentication completion timer Section path 4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer Page reference page 24 |
| REQ-AUTO-00890 | If such an encapsulated 0x29 request is detected, the server shall return application-layer NRC 0x39, provided as a correctly formatted SDT positive response.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Application software behavior; Secure communication and freshness protection None | SSR-RBAC-004 | OP-002 | 3 subFunctions page 7 Source detailsDocument section 3 subFunctions Section path 3 subFunctions Page reference page 7 |
| REQ-AUTO-00930 | AUTH_REQ 131 If the server cannot determine that the client is currently authenticated, it shall respond to the deAuthenticate request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating a ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-COM-003 | OP-004 | 3.3.3 Negative Response page 15 Source detailsDocument section 3.3.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.3 deAuthenticate > 3.3.3 Negative Response Page reference page 15 |
| REQ-AUTO-00896 | Internal Page 9 (31) AUTH_REQ 119 If an authentication pending state already exists, the server shall replace the existing authentication pending state with the new one.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.1.2 Response page 9 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response Page reference page 9 |
| REQ-AUTO-00903 | AUTH_REQ 120 Upon positively responding, the server shall start the Authentication completion timer.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.1.2 Response page 9 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response Page reference page 9 |
| REQ-AUTO-00904 | ephemeralPublicKeyServer See 3.1.2.3 uint8[] M Yes 3.1.2.1 challengeServer AUTH_REQ 6 The challengeServer field shall consists of 32 octets generated using a CRNG.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 3.1.2 Response page 10 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response Page reference page 10 |
| REQ-AUTO-00911 | AUTH_REQ 111 If an existing authentication pending state is found, the server shall verify if the Authentication completion timer is currently running.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.2.1 Request page 12 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request Page reference page 12 |
| REQ-AUTO-00912 | AUTH_REQ 112 If the Authentication completion timer is currently running, the server shall continue to process the client’s proofOfOwnership request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.2.1 Request page 12 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request Page reference page 12 |
| REQ-AUTO-00913 | AUTH_REQ 113 If the client proofOfOwnership signature verification fails, the server shall delete the authentication pending state connected to the client submitting the proofOfOwnership request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-DAI-004 | - | 3.2.1 Request page 12 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request Page reference page 12 |
| REQ-AUTO-00914 | AUTH_REQ 114 If the server fails or cannot determine that the authentication state was stored, the server shall delete the authentication pending state connected to the client submitting the proofOfOwnership request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-COM-003 | - | 3.2.1 Request page 12 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request Page reference page 12 |
| REQ-AUTO-00915 | AUTH_REQ 115 If the client’s proofOfOwnership signature is successfully verified, the server shall establish a new authentication state for the client.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-DAI-004 | - | 3.2.1 Request page 12 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request Page reference page 12 |
| REQ-AUTO-00916 | Internal Page 13 (31) If an active authentication state already exists, the server shall replace the existing state with the newly established one.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.2.2 Response page 13 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.2 Response Page reference page 13 |
| REQ-AUTO-00920 | 3.2.3 Negative Response AUTH_REQ 124 If the server determines that the client does not have an existing authentication pending state, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x24, indicating requestSequenceError.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.2.3 Negative Response page 14 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response Page reference page 14 |
| REQ-AUTO-00921 | AUTH_REQ 125 If the server determines that the client have an existing authentication pending state and the Authentication completion timer is expired, the server shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x24, indicating requestSequenceError.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.2.3 Negative Response page 14 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response Page reference page 14 |
| REQ-AUTO-00923 | AUTH_REQ 127 If the server is trying to delete the authentication pending state as consequence of the client proofOfOwnership signature verification failure, and the server determines that the authentication pending state was deleted, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-DAI-004 | - | 3.2.3 Negative Response page 14 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response Page reference page 14 |
| REQ-AUTO-00928 | 0x00 – 0xFF M AUTH_REQ 158 The server shall delete/invalidate the client’s authentication prior to positively responding to the deAuthenticate request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.3.3 Negative Response page 15 Source detailsDocument section 3.3.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.3 deAuthenticate > 3.3.3 Negative Response Page reference page 15 |
| REQ-AUTO-00961 | Internal Page 20 (31) 4.2 State-keeping The server shall invalidate the authentication pending state in the event of: AUTH_REQ 138 • The server is reset (i.e server is power cycled).Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 4.2 State-keeping page 20 Source detailsDocument section 4.2 State-keeping Section path 4 General > 4.2 State-keeping Page reference page 20 |
| REQ-AUTO-00963 | If a client and server have successfully completed the authentication process, the server shall invalidate the authentication state in the event of: AUTH_REQ 16 • The server is reset (i.e server is power cycled).Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 4.2 State-keeping page 20 Source detailsDocument section 4.2 State-keeping Section path 4 General > 4.2 State-keeping Page reference page 20 |
| REQ-AUTO-00965 | The server’s authentication pending state shall contain the minimum of (non-exhaustive list): AUTH_REQ 140 • Client address that issued the authentication request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 4.2 State-keeping page 20 Source detailsDocument section 4.2 State-keeping Section path 4 General > 4.2 State-keeping Page reference page 20 |
| REQ-AUTO-00966 | The server’s authentication state shall contain the minimum of (non-exhaustive list): AUTH_REQ 21 • SessionKey.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 4.2 State-keeping page 21 Source detailsDocument section 4.2 State-keeping Section path 4 General > 4.2 State-keeping Page reference page 21 |
| REQ-AUTO-00968 | AUTH_REQ 150 The server shall support only one authentication pending state.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-003 | - | 4.2 State-keeping page 21 Source detailsDocument section 4.2 State-keeping Section path 4 General > 4.2 State-keeping Page reference page 21 |
| REQ-AUTO-00971 | AUTH_REQ 24 The server shall ensure that the sessionKey is exclusively used for the application responsible for communication over securedDataTransmission (CVS32).Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Application software behavior None | SSR-SYS-008 | - | 4.5 CRNG page 22 Source detailsDocument section 4.5 CRNG Section path 4 General > 4.5 CRNG Page reference page 22 |
| REQ-AUTO-00975 | 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication AUTH_REQ 26 The server shall start the timer (A3) after a valid proofOfOwnership has been received.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-003 | - | 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication page 23 Source detailsDocument section 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Section path 4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Page reference page 23 |
| REQ-AUTO-00977 | AUTH_REQ 28 If the A3 timer timeouts before a new request is received (from the same client), the server shall invalidate the authentication state.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-003 | - | 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication page 23 Source detailsDocument section 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Section path 4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Page reference page 23 |
| REQ-AUTO-00983 | AUTH_REQ 152 If the server can determine that a delay is not running after reset, it shall accept a subsequent authentication request without any delay.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-COM-003 | - | 4.9 Authentication completion timer page 24 Source detailsDocument section 4.9 Authentication completion timer Section path 4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer Page reference page 24 |
| REQ-AUTO-00984 | AUTH_REQ 153 If the server cannot determine that a delay is not running after reset, it shall not accept a subsequent authentication request without any delay.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-COM-003 | - | 4.9 Authentication completion timer page 24 Source detailsDocument section 4.9 Authentication completion timer Section path 4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer Page reference page 24 |
| REQ-AUTO-00886 | It contains the information required for the server to verify the client’s subsequent request and to generate the corresponding response.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 2 Abbrevations page 6 Source detailsDocument section 2 Abbrevations Section path 2 Abbrevations Page reference page 6 |
| REQ-AUTO-00887 | It contains the information required for the server to maintain continuous authenticated communication with the client and to generate authenticated responses.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-COM-003 | - | 2 Abbrevations page 6 Source detailsDocument section 2 Abbrevations Section path 2 Abbrevations Page reference page 6 |
| REQ-AUTO-00894 | AUTH_INFO 24 The column “Included in proofOfOwnershipServer”, present in several message-definition tables, indicates whether the corresponding field shall be covered by the proofOfOwnershipServer signature computed by the server and included in its response.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-DAI-004 | - | 3.1.1 Request page 8 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.1 Request Page reference page 8 |
| REQ-AUTO-00948 | AUTH_REQ 14 If D-RBACC extension is detected, the server shall overrule the RBACC with the D-RBACC permissions.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-RBAC-003 | - | 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension page 18 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Page reference page 18 |
| REQ-AUTO-00949 | AUTH_INFO 61 This means that if D-RBACC logic denies/permits certain access, the server shall deny/permit the access regardless of what RBACC logic permits/denies.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Application software behavior None | SSR-RBAC-004 | - | 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension page 18 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Page reference page 18 |
| REQ-AUTO-00952 | AUTH_REQ 136 • The server shall verify that the D-RBACC version provided by the client is compatible with the server’s supported D-RBACC version.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-RBAC-003 | - | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00891 | Internal Page 8 (31) 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional 3.1.1 Request AUTH_REQ 2 The request for verifyCertificateBidirectional subfunction shall be formatted according to Table 5.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-KEY-004 | - | 3.1.1 Request page 8 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.1 Request Page reference page 8 |
| REQ-AUTO-00899 | 3.1.1.2 lengthOfCertificateClient AUTH_REQ 172 The expected range values of lengthOfCertificateClient shall be from 0x00C8 to 0x0800.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-KEY-004 | - | 3.1.2 Response page 9 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response Page reference page 9 |
| REQ-AUTO-00902 | 3.1.2 Response AUTH_REQ 5 The response for verifyCertificateBidirectional subfunction shall be formatted according to Table 6.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-KEY-004 | - | 3.1.2 Response page 9 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response Page reference page 9 |
| REQ-AUTO-00927 | Table 9 – deAuthenticate request message layout Field Description Type/Value Cvt Authentication Request SID Service ID for 0x29 M SubFunction = [AuthenticationTask = deAuthenticate] Subfunction for request to leave the authenticated state 0x00 M 3.3.2 Response AUTH_REQ 96 The response for deAuthenticate subfunction shall be formatted according to Table 10.Proposal: Accept with assumption. Implement the ECU-side diagnostic behavior with configurable authorization and verification evidence, subject to customer-confirmed UDS service allocation and role model. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | Application software behavior None | SSR-RBAC-004 | - | 3.3.3 Negative Response page 15 Source detailsDocument section 3.3.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.3 deAuthenticate > 3.3.3 Negative Response Page reference page 15 |
| REQ-AUTO-00933 | 4 General 4.1 Certificate AUTH_REQ 175 The signature algorithm used throughout the authentication process shall be ED25519.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | - | 4.1 Certificate page 16 Source detailsDocument section 4.1 Certificate Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate Page reference page 16 |
| REQ-AUTO-00934 | AUTH_REQ 176 The client shall use the private key corresponding to the client certificate to generate the signatures.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | - | 4.1 Certificate page 16 Source detailsDocument section 4.1 Certificate Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate Page reference page 16 |
| REQ-AUTO-00936 | AUTH_REQ 163 The format and the structure of the certificates shall be based on (CVS30).Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-KEY-004 | - | 4.1 Certificate page 16 Source detailsDocument section 4.1 Certificate Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate Page reference page 16 |
| REQ-AUTO-00943 | AUTH_REQ 106 If the NodeUID extension is not detected, the operation shall continue as in AUTH_INFO 25 A certificate without NodeUID extension implies that the certificate is applicable for any NodeUID.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | - | 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension page 18 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Page reference page 18 |
| REQ-AUTO-00944 | 4.1.2 ECU-Diagnostic Role extension AUTH_REQ 170 The ECU-Diagnostic role extension shall be included in the client certificate.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-RBAC-002 | - | 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension page 18 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Page reference page 18 |
| REQ-AUTO-00955 | 4.1.5 Key Usage extension AUTH_REQ 15 The Key Usage extension (RFC 5280) shall be included in the client certificate.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | - | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00956 | AUTH_REQ 47 The Key Usage extension shall contain DigitalSignature.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | - | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00957 | 4.1.6 Extended Key Usage extension AUTH_REQ 95 The Extended Key Usage extension (RFC 5280) shall be included in the client certificate.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | Authentication | Authentication None | SSR-DAI-001 | - | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00958 | AUTH_REQ 107 The extension ExtendedKeyUsage shall contain clientAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2).Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00969 | AUTH_REQ 167 The private keys shall be generated using a CRNG.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-KEY-004 | - | 4.5 CRNG page 22 Source detailsDocument section 4.5 CRNG Section path 4 General > 4.5 CRNG Page reference page 22 |
| REQ-AUTO-00970 | AUTH_REQ 168 The sessionKey shall be generated according to the pseudo code below.Proposal: Accept with assumption. Implement the ECU-side diagnostic behavior with configurable authorization and verification evidence, subject to customer-confirmed UDS service allocation and role model. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 4.5 CRNG page 22 Source detailsDocument section 4.5 CRNG Section path 4 General > 4.5 CRNG Page reference page 22 |
| REQ-AUTO-00974 | AUTH_REQ 109 Only Passive time-based de-authentication shall be supported.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication page 23 Source detailsDocument section 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Section path 4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Page reference page 23 |
| REQ-AUTO-00980 | Internal Page 24 (31) 4.8 Authentication delay timer AUTH_INFO 38 The delay timer represents the required minimum time between verifyCertificateBidirectional request attempts.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-KEY-004 | - | 4.9 Authentication completion timer page 24 Source detailsDocument section 4.9 Authentication completion timer Section path 4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer Page reference page 24 |
| REQ-AUTO-00985 | AUTH_REQ 154 The Authentication completion timer shall be set to 1 minute.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 4.9 Authentication completion timer page 24 Source detailsDocument section 4.9 Authentication completion timer Section path 4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer Page reference page 24 |
| REQ-AUTO-00932 | AUTH_INFO 133 If the server is unable to delete the client’s authentication state or cannot retrieve it due to internal errors, the server responds NRC 0x94.This informs the client that the authentication state may still exist on the server.Proposal: Informational only. Keep as context; do not treat as an implementation requirement unless the customer confirms applicability. | Informational Only | Proposal Ready | None | None None | None | - | 4.1 Certificate page 16 Source detailsDocument section 4.1 Certificate Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate Page reference page 16 |
| REQ-AUTO-00947 | While the ECU-Diagnostic Role extension specifies the roles assigned to a client, the D-RBACC extension may both grant additional permissions and restrict permissions beyond those derived from the client’s roles.Proposal: Informational only. Keep as context; do not treat as an implementation requirement unless the customer confirms applicability. | Informational Only | Proposal Ready | None | None None | None | - | 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension page 18 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Page reference page 18 |
| REQ-AUTO-00979 | AUTH_INFO 14 The A3 timer differs from S3 timer in terms of expected behavior during timeout and should not be implemented as a single timer.Proposal: Needs internal review. Confirm whether this should-level requirement is in the committed baseline. | Needs Internal Review | Reviewed Internally | None | System behavior None | None | - | 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication page 23 Source detailsDocument section 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Section path 4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Page reference page 23 |
| REQ-AUTO-00885 | Shall be agreed between the supplier and the vehicle manufacturer.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 2 Abbrevations page 6 Source detailsDocument section 2 Abbrevations Section path 2 Abbrevations Page reference page 6 |
| REQ-AUTO-00905 | AUTH_REQ 7 The proof/signature shall be generated according to the pseudo code below.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-DAI-002 | - | 3.2 proofOfOwnership page 11 Source detailsDocument section 3.2 proofOfOwnership Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership Page reference page 11 |
| REQ-AUTO-00919 | AUTH_REQ 162 The signature shall be generated according to the pseudo code below.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-DAI-002 | - | 3.2.3 Negative Response page 14 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response Page reference page 14 |
| REQ-AUTO-00945 | AUTH_REQ 13 The roles shall correspond to a bit pattern-octet string.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension page 18 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Page reference page 18 |
| REQ-AUTO-00946 | AUTH_INFO 8 The interpretation of the roles should follow as the example below: • Role 1 -> 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 – 00 00 00 01 • Role 32 -> 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 – 80 00 00 00 • Role 2 and 4 -> 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1010 – 00 00 00 0A.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension page 18 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Page reference page 18 |
| REQ-AUTO-00959 | 4.1.7 SignatureAlgorithm AUTH_REQ 105 The extension SignatureAlgorithm shall contain ED25519 (1.3.101.112).Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-DAI-002 | - | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00879 | The User shall apply the latest version of this CVS31.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | page-1 Page 1 page 1 Source detailsDocument section page-1 Page 1 Section path Page 1 Page reference page 1 |
| REQ-AUTO-00881 | Any review of CVS31 shall only be done in agreement with the involved departments stated in the table on the first page under section “Technical responsibility”.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-009 | - | page-3 Page 3 page 3 Source detailsDocument section page-3 Page 3 Section path Page 3 Page reference page 3 |
| REQ-AUTO-00882 | The whole standard has been reworked and shall be read in its entirety.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | page-3 Page 3 page 3 Source detailsDocument section page-3 Page 3 Section path Page 3 Page reference page 3 |
| REQ-AUTO-00883 | • Affiliate means any legal entity that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is commonly controlled with TRATON SE, it is being understood that “control” shall mean ownership of at least 50% of the voting rights or interest in the issued share capital, including for the avoidance of doubt any branch.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | page-3 Page 3 page 3 Source detailsDocument section page-3 Page 3 Section path Page 3 Page reference page 3 |
| REQ-AUTO-00884 | Any deviations from this specification shall be documented and must be reviewed by the vehicle manufacturer.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 1.1 Summary page 4 Source detailsDocument section 1.1 Summary Section path 1 Scope > 1.1 Summary Page reference page 4 |
| REQ-AUTO-00888 | AUTH_REQ 1 The server shall only support subfunctions in Table 4.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3 subFunctions page 7 Source detailsDocument section 3 subFunctions Section path 3 subFunctions Page reference page 7 |
| REQ-AUTO-00897 | 3.1.1.1 challengeClient AUTH_REQ 3 This field shall consists of 32 octets.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 3.1.2 Response page 9 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response Page reference page 9 |
| REQ-AUTO-00898 | AUTH_REQ 4 The challengeClient (ISO 14229-1:2020) shall be generated using a CRNG.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-009 | - | 3.1.2 Response page 9 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response Page reference page 9 |
| REQ-AUTO-00909 | Internal Page 12 (31) 3.2.1 Request AUTH_REQ 8 The request for proofOfOwnership subfunction shall be defined according to Table 7.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 3.2.1 Request page 12 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.1 Request Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request Page reference page 12 |
| REQ-AUTO-00917 | AUTH_REQ 160 The proofOfOwnershipClient shall be generated according to the pseudo code below.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 3.2.2 Response page 13 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.2 Response Page reference page 13 |
| REQ-AUTO-00918 | 3.2.2 Response AUTH_REQ 161 The response for proofOfOwnership subfunction shall be according to Table 8.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 3.2.2 Response page 13 Source detailsDocument section 3.2.2 Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.2 Response Page reference page 13 |
| REQ-AUTO-00926 | 3.3.1 Request AUTH_REQ 159 The request for deAuthenticate subfunction shall be formatted according to Table 9.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 3.3.3 Negative Response page 15 Source detailsDocument section 3.3.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.3 deAuthenticate > 3.3.3 Negative Response Page reference page 15 |
| REQ-AUTO-00929 | 3.3.3 Negative Response AUTH_REQ 130 If the server determines that the client is not currently authenticated, it shall respond to the deAuthenticate request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x24, indicating a requestSequenceError.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.3.3 Negative Response page 15 Source detailsDocument section 3.3.3 Negative Response Section path 3 subFunctions > 3.3 deAuthenticate > 3.3.3 Negative Response Page reference page 15 |
| REQ-AUTO-00941 | Internal Page 18 (31) 4.1.1 NodeUID extension If the NodeUID extension is detected, the server shall: AUTH_REQ 166 • Check if the NodeUID of the server is present in the NodeUIDs extension.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension page 18 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension Page reference page 18 |
| REQ-AUTO-00954 | 4.1.4 basicContraints extension AUTH_REQ 42 The basicConstraints extension CA field shall be False.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time page 19 Source detailsDocument section 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Section path 4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time Page reference page 19 |
| REQ-AUTO-00972 | 4.5 CRNG AUTH_REQ 33 Solution for a CRNG shall be according to (CVS150).Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 4.5 CRNG page 22 Source detailsDocument section 4.5 CRNG Section path 4 General > 4.5 CRNG Page reference page 22 |
| REQ-AUTO-00976 | AUTH_REQ 27 The server shall restart the timer (A3) every time a request is received by the same client.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-003 | - | 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication page 23 Source detailsDocument section 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Section path 4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Page reference page 23 |
| REQ-AUTO-00978 | AUTH_REQ 29 The parameter for passive timeout based deAuthenticate shall be decided in the project.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication page 23 Source detailsDocument section 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Section path 4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication Page reference page 23 |
| REQ-AUTO-00981 | AUTH_REQ 133 The delay timer shall be set to 1 second.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 4.9 Authentication completion timer page 24 Source detailsDocument section 4.9 Authentication completion timer Section path 4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer Page reference page 24 |
| REQ-AUTO-00986 | Internal Page 29 (31) Annex B (informative) Change history Release Date Changes The whole standard has been reworked and shall be read in its entirety.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-006 | - | 6 Normative references page 29 Source detailsDocument section 6 Normative references Section path 6 Normative references Page reference page 29 |
| REQ-AUTO-00880 | Internal Page 3 (31) Foreword This CVS31 contains requirement specification for TRATON GROUP and may be used by all within TRATON Group, if applicable.Proposal: Informational only. Keep as context; do not treat as an implementation requirement unless the customer confirms applicability. | Informational Only | Proposal Ready | None | None None | None | - | page-3 Page 3 page 3 Source detailsDocument section page-3 Page 3 Section path Page 3 Page reference page 3 |
This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.
| SSR | Statement / Trace | Feature | Security Capability | Interface | Responsibility | Status | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSR-COM-003 | Backend and IT integration — Secure Communication and Boundary ControlThe ECU shall restrict and protect communication for Backend and IT integration, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00887; REQ-AUTO-00914; REQ-AUTO-00922; REQ-AUTO-00930; REQ-AUTO-00931; REQ-AUTO-00983; REQ-AUTO-00984. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Backend and IT integration | None | None | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-DAI-001 | Authentication — Data Authenticity and Integrity VerificationThe ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of Authentication data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00892; REQ-AUTO-00895; REQ-AUTO-00907; REQ-AUTO-00933; REQ-AUTO-00934; REQ-AUTO-00935; REQ-AUTO-00937; REQ-AUTO-00938; REQ-AUTO-00939; REQ-AUTO-00940; REQ-AUTO-00942; REQ-AUTO-00943; REQ-AUTO-00950; REQ-AUTO-00955; REQ-AUTO-00956; REQ-AUTO-00957; REQ-AUTO-00960. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Authentication | Authentication | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-DAI-002 | System behavior — Data Authenticity and Integrity VerificationThe ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of System behavior data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00905; REQ-AUTO-00919; REQ-AUTO-00959. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | System behavior | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test |
| SSR-DAI-004 | Backend and IT integration — Data Authenticity and Integrity VerificationThe ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of Backend and IT integration data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00894; REQ-AUTO-00913; REQ-AUTO-00915; REQ-AUTO-00923; REQ-AUTO-00924. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Backend and IT integration | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-DIAG-004 | Application software behavior — Diagnostic ServicesThe ECU shall provide the diagnostic services for Application software behavior required by the allocated customer requirements, including the specified services, sessions and data identifiers.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00962; REQ-AUTO-00964. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Application software behavior | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Test |
| SSR-KEY-002 | Certificate handling — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Certificate handling across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00951; REQ-AUTO-00953. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Certificate handling | Certificate handling | None | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-KEY-003 | Application software behavior — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Application software behavior across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00889. | Application software behavior | None | None | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-KEY-004 | System behavior — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for System behavior across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00891; REQ-AUTO-00899; REQ-AUTO-00902; REQ-AUTO-00936; REQ-AUTO-00969; REQ-AUTO-00980. | System behavior | None | None | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Review + Test |
| SSR-KEY-005 | Backend and IT integration — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Backend and IT integration across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00893; REQ-AUTO-00900; REQ-AUTO-00901; REQ-AUTO-00906; REQ-AUTO-00908; REQ-AUTO-00982. | Backend and IT integration | None | None | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-RBAC-002 | Authentication — Secure Diagnostics / RBACThe ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Authentication, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00944; REQ-AUTO-00967. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Authentication | Authentication | None | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-RBAC-003 | Backend and IT integration — Secure Diagnostics / RBACThe ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Backend and IT integration, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00948; REQ-AUTO-00952. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Backend and IT integration | None | None | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-RBAC-004 | Application software behavior — Secure Diagnostics / RBACThe ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Application software behavior, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00890; REQ-AUTO-00910; REQ-AUTO-00927; REQ-AUTO-00949; REQ-AUTO-00973. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Application software behavior | None | None | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-SYS-005 | System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00882; REQ-AUTO-00884; REQ-AUTO-00885; REQ-AUTO-00897. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | System behavior | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Test |
| SSR-SYS-006 | System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00904; REQ-AUTO-00909; REQ-AUTO-00917; REQ-AUTO-00918; REQ-AUTO-00926; REQ-AUTO-00945; REQ-AUTO-00946; REQ-AUTO-00954; REQ-AUTO-00958; REQ-AUTO-00970; REQ-AUTO-00972; REQ-AUTO-00974; REQ-AUTO-00978; REQ-AUTO-00981; REQ-AUTO-00985; REQ-AUTO-00986. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | System behavior | None | None | Shared | Ready for Customer Alignment | Test |
| SSR-SYS-008 | Application software behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the Application software behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00971. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Application software behavior | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Test |
| SSR-SYS-009 | System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00898. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | System behavior | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Test |
| SSR-TOOL-002 | Backend and IT integration — Tooling / IT / Evidence StorageThe supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Backend and IT integration.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00886; REQ-AUTO-00888; REQ-AUTO-00896; REQ-AUTO-00903; REQ-AUTO-00911; REQ-AUTO-00912; REQ-AUTO-00916; REQ-AUTO-00920; REQ-AUTO-00921; REQ-AUTO-00925; REQ-AUTO-00928; REQ-AUTO-00929; REQ-AUTO-00941; REQ-AUTO-00961; REQ-AUTO-00963; REQ-AUTO-00965; REQ-AUTO-00966. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Backend and IT integration | None | None | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-TOOL-003 | Backend and IT integration — Tooling / IT / Evidence StorageThe supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Backend and IT integration.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00968; REQ-AUTO-00975; REQ-AUTO-00976; REQ-AUTO-00977. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Backend and IT integration | None | None | Shared | Ready for Customer Alignment | Review + Test |
| Impact Area | Evidence From This PDF |
|---|---|
| Impacted system features | Application software behavior; Application software behavior; Secure communication and freshness protection; Authentication; Authentication; Security evidence and traceability; Backend and IT integration; Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability; Certificate handling; System behavior |
| Impacted interfaces | OEM/Customer Review Interface |
| Impacted security capabilities | Authentication; Certificate handling |
| Impacted architecture elements | Application Software; Backend and IT Systems; Backend and IT Systems; OEM/Customer Review Interface; Compliance Process; Security Services; Security Services; OEM/Customer Review Interface; System Core; System Core; OEM/Customer Review Interface |
| Impacted work products | Cybersecurity concept; Cybersecurity verification report; DIA / cybersecurity case; Requirement traceability record; System/architecture design |
| Tools / IT / hardware / test | High/High/Low; High/High/Medium; High/Low/Low; High/Low/Medium; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Medium/Low/Medium |
| Design assumptions introduced | Security-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed. |
| Design decisions required | Agree responsibility split (DIA) for the non-ECU portion. |
| Impact | Status |
|---|---|
| Estimation impact | yes |
| Resource/tool/IT/HW/test impact | High/High/Low; High/High/Medium; High/Low/Low; High/Low/Medium; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Medium/Low/Medium |
Generated from document-specific requirement, traceability, SSR, and open-point evidence.
flowchart LR
doc["CVS31.pdf"]
d0["Authentication"]
doc --> d0
d1["Certificate handling"]
doc --> d1
f0["Feature: Application software behavior"]
doc --> f0
f1["Feature: Application software behavior; Secure communication and freshness protection"]
doc --> f1
f2["Feature: Authentication"]
doc --> f2
i0["Interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface"]
doc --> i0
s0["SSR: SSR-COM-003"]
doc --> s0
s1["SSR: SSR-DAI-001"]
doc --> s1
s2["SSR: SSR-DAI-002"]
doc --> s2
o0["Open point: OP-002"]
doc --> o0
o1["Open point: OP-003"]
doc --> o1
o2["Open point: OP-004"]
doc --> o2
This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.
| Customer Requirement | SSR | Disposition | Confidence | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-AUTO-00879 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00880 | None | Informational Only | n/a | Non-binding; not derived. |
| REQ-AUTO-00881 | SSR-SYS-009 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | High | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00882 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00883 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00884 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00885 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00886 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00887 | SSR-COM-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00888 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00889 | SSR-KEY-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00890 | SSR-RBAC-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00891 | SSR-KEY-004 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| REQ-AUTO-00892 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00893 | SSR-KEY-005 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00894 | SSR-DAI-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00895 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00896 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00897 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00898 | SSR-SYS-009 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | High | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00899 | SSR-KEY-004 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00900 | SSR-KEY-005 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00901 | SSR-KEY-005 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00902 | SSR-KEY-004 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00903 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00904 | SSR-SYS-006 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00905 | SSR-DAI-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00906 | SSR-KEY-005 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00907 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00908 | SSR-KEY-005 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00909 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00910 | SSR-RBAC-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00911 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00912 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00913 | SSR-DAI-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00914 | SSR-COM-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00915 | SSR-DAI-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00916 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00917 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00918 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00919 | SSR-DAI-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00920 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00921 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00922 | SSR-COM-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00923 | SSR-DAI-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00924 | SSR-DAI-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00925 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00926 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00927 | SSR-RBAC-004 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00928 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00929 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00930 | SSR-COM-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00931 | SSR-COM-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00932 | None | Informational Only | n/a | Non-binding; not derived. |
| REQ-AUTO-00933 | SSR-DAI-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00934 | SSR-DAI-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00935 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00936 | SSR-KEY-004 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00937 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00938 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00939 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00940 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00941 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00942 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00943 | SSR-DAI-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00944 | SSR-RBAC-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00945 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00946 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00947 | None | Informational Only | n/a | Non-binding; not derived. |
| REQ-AUTO-00948 | SSR-RBAC-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00949 | SSR-RBAC-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00950 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00951 | SSR-KEY-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00952 | SSR-RBAC-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00953 | SSR-KEY-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00954 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00955 | SSR-DAI-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00956 | SSR-DAI-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00957 | SSR-DAI-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00958 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00959 | SSR-DAI-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00960 | SSR-DAI-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00961 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00962 | SSR-DIAG-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00963 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00964 | SSR-DIAG-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00965 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00966 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00967 | SSR-RBAC-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00968 | SSR-TOOL-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00969 | SSR-KEY-004 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00970 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00971 | SSR-SYS-008 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00972 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00973 | SSR-RBAC-004 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00974 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00975 | SSR-TOOL-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00976 | SSR-TOOL-003 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00977 | SSR-TOOL-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00978 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00979 | None | Needs Internal Review | n/a | Low confidence / human review before derivation. |
| REQ-AUTO-00980 | SSR-KEY-004 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00981 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00982 | SSR-KEY-005 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00983 | SSR-COM-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00984 | SSR-COM-003 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00985 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00986 | SSR-SYS-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
customer-input/pdf/CVS31.pdfconverted/markdown/CVS31.mdConfirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 108 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior. Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model.
Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 20 accept; 24 accept with assumption; 60 partially accept; 1 needs internal review; 3 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 18 supplier system requirement records. Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them.
Requires customer confirmation: 3 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.; Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision. Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed.
| Field | Interpretation |
|---|---|
| Document Purpose | Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 108 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior. |
| Engineering Interpretation | Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. |
| Supplier Proposal Impact | Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 20 accept; 24 accept with assumption; 60 partially accept; 1 needs internal review; 3 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 18 supplier system requirement records. |
| System / Security Impact | Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them. |
| Customer Clarification Impact | Requires customer confirmation: 3 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.; Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision. |
| Confidence and Limits | Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed. |
| Theme | Summary | Requirement Count | Representative Requirements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Core ECA system behavior | Defines actuator ECU behavior, drivetrain integration, electrical/mechanical constraints, and verification scope. | 86 | REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00881 |
| Cybersecurity concept and evidence | Drives cybersecurity concept, risk treatment, verification evidence, and traceability obligations. | 67 | REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00886 |
| Responsibility and customer approval model | Creates supplier/OEM allocation decisions for work products, backend infrastructure, approvals, and residual risk. | 57 | REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00884 |
| System architecture design | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 41 | REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00882 |
| Key, certificate, and PKI handling | Affects ECU trust material storage, provisioning, lifecycle ownership, and customer PKI dependencies. | 40 | REQ-AUTO-00889; REQ-AUTO-00891; REQ-AUTO-00892 |
| System | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 32 | REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00882 |
| System core | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 31 | REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00882; REQ-AUTO-00884 |
| Cybersecurity | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 22 | REQ-AUTO-00892; REQ-AUTO-00895; REQ-AUTO-00907 |
| Section | Requirements | Critical | Open Points | SSR Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Scope | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| -- 1.1 Summary | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2 Abbrevations | 3 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| 3 subFunctions | 43 | 29 | 3 | 12 |
| -- 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional | 14 | 9 | 2 | 8 |
| -- -- 3.1.1 Request | 5 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| -- -- 3.1.2 Response | 9 | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| -- 3.2 proofOfOwnership | 21 | 16 | 3 | 8 |
| -- -- 3.2.1 Request | 7 | 6 | 1 | 5 |
| -- -- 3.2.2 Response | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| -- -- 3.2.3 Negative Response | 7 | 6 | 1 | 4 |
| -- 3.3 deAuthenticate | 5 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| -- -- 3.3.3 Negative Response | 5 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| 4 General | 55 | 29 | 3 | 14 |
| -- 4.1 Certificate | 30 | 14 | 2 | 10 |
| -- -- 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension | 9 | 3 | 1 | 6 |
| -- -- 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time | 11 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| -- 4.2 State-keeping | 8 | 8 | 1 | 4 |
| -- 4.5 CRNG | 4 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| -- 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| -- -- 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| -- 4.9 Authentication completion timer | 6 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| 6 Normative references | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Customer-owned responsibility, final customer decisions, and unresolved open points remain unconfirmed.
| ID | Score | Category | Reason | Statement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-AUTO-00889 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Table 4 – Supported subFunctions (ISO 14229-1:2020) Name verifyCertificateBidirectional proofOfOwnership deAuthenticate AUTH_REQ 155 The server shall not accept an application-layer service 0x29 request when it is received inside an SDT (service 0x84) protected message. |
| REQ-AUTO-00892 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Table 5 – verifyCertificateBidirectional Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipServer Authentication Request SID Service ID for Authentication service request 0x29 M Yes verifyCertificateBidirectional] Initiate Authentication by verifying the Certificate and generating a Proof of Ownership from the server 0x02 M Yes communicationConfiguration NOT USED 0x00 M Yes lengthOfCertificateClient Length parameter for certificateClient uint16 M Yes certificateClient The Certificate to verify uint8[] M Yes lengthOfChallengeClient Length parameter for challengeClient uint16 M Yes challengeClient See 3.1.1.1 uint8[] M Yes AUTH_REQ 117 Upon reception of a verifyCertificateBidirectional request, the server shall determine whether the Authentication delay timer is currently running. |
| REQ-AUTO-00893 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | AUTH_REQ 118 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is expired, the server shall continue to process the verifyCertificateBidirectional request. |
| REQ-AUTO-00895 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | AUTH_REQ 45 If the server verifies the client certificate as valid, the server shall create the requested client authentication pending state. |
| REQ-AUTO-00900 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | AUTH_REQ 173 The server shall verify the value of lengthOfCertificateClient upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request. |
| REQ-AUTO-00901 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | AUTH_REQ 174 If the lengthOfCertificateClient value is not within the expected range, the server shall send negative response code 0x13 (incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat). |
| REQ-AUTO-00906 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | 3.1.3 Negative Response AUTH_REQ 121 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is running, the server shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x37, indicating requiredTimeDelayNotExpired. |
| REQ-AUTO-00907 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | AUTH_REQ 122 If the server verifies the client certificate as invalid, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject. |
| REQ-AUTO-00908 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | AUTH_REQ 123 If the server fails or cannot determine that the authentication pending state was stored, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable. |
| REQ-AUTO-00910 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Table 7 – proofOfOwnership Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipClient Authentication Request SID Service ID for 0x29 M Yes proofOfOwnership] Verify the Proof of Ownership from the client 0x03 M Yes lengthOfProofOfOwnershipClient This field indicates the length (in octets) of the proofOfOwnershipClient field proofOfOwnershipClient See 3.2.1.1 uint8[] M No lengthOfEphemeralPublicKey Client Length parameter for ephemeralPublicKey Client ephemeralPublicKeyClient See 3.2.1.2 uint16 M Yes AUTH_REQ 110 The server shall verify whether any existing authentication pending state corresponds to the client submitting the proofOfOwnership request. |
| Open Point | Priority | Question | Impact | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OP-002 | Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy. | Security-access design and verification scope cannot be frozen; risk of an unprotected diagnostic service. | Open | |
| OP-003 | Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier. | ECU secure-storage and provisioning design is blocked; production-line and PKI dependencies stay open. | Open | |
| OP-004 | Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied. | Update-control scope and evidence ownership stay open; risk of an unprotected update path. | Open |
| SSR | Title | Statement | Reqs From This PDF | Other PDFs | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSR-COM-003 | Backend and IT integration — Secure Communication and Boundary Control | The ECU shall restrict and protect communication for Backend and IT integration, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals. | REQ-AUTO-00887; REQ-AUTO-00914; REQ-AUTO-00922; REQ-AUTO-00930; REQ-AUTO-00931; REQ-AUTO-00983; REQ-AUTO-00984 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-DAI-001 | Authentication — Data Authenticity and Integrity Verification | The ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of Authentication data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data. | REQ-AUTO-00892; REQ-AUTO-00895; REQ-AUTO-00907; REQ-AUTO-00933; REQ-AUTO-00934; REQ-AUTO-00935; REQ-AUTO-00937; REQ-AUTO-00938; REQ-AUTO-00939; REQ-AUTO-00940; REQ-AUTO-00942; REQ-AUTO-00943; REQ-AUTO-00950; REQ-AUTO-00955; REQ-AUTO-00956; REQ-AUTO-00957; REQ-AUTO-00960 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-DAI-002 | System behavior — Data Authenticity and Integrity Verification | The ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of System behavior data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data. | REQ-AUTO-00905; REQ-AUTO-00919; REQ-AUTO-00959 | yes | Candidate |
| SSR-DAI-004 | Backend and IT integration — Data Authenticity and Integrity Verification | The ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of Backend and IT integration data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data. | REQ-AUTO-00894; REQ-AUTO-00913; REQ-AUTO-00915; REQ-AUTO-00923; REQ-AUTO-00924 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-DIAG-004 | Application software behavior — Diagnostic Services | The ECU shall provide the diagnostic services for Application software behavior required by the allocated customer requirements, including the specified services, sessions and data identifiers. | REQ-AUTO-00962; REQ-AUTO-00964 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-KEY-002 | Certificate handling — Key and Certificate Handling | The ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Certificate handling across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle. | REQ-AUTO-00951; REQ-AUTO-00953 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-KEY-003 | Application software behavior — Key and Certificate Handling | The ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Application software behavior across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle. | REQ-AUTO-00889 | no | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-KEY-004 | System behavior — Key and Certificate Handling | The ECU shall manage key and certificate material for System behavior across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle. | REQ-AUTO-00891; REQ-AUTO-00899; REQ-AUTO-00902; REQ-AUTO-00936; REQ-AUTO-00969; REQ-AUTO-00980 | no | Candidate |
| SSR-KEY-005 | Backend and IT integration — Key and Certificate Handling | The ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Backend and IT integration across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle. | REQ-AUTO-00893; REQ-AUTO-00900; REQ-AUTO-00901; REQ-AUTO-00906; REQ-AUTO-00908; REQ-AUTO-00982 | no | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-RBAC-002 | Authentication — Secure Diagnostics / RBAC | The ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Authentication, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model. | REQ-AUTO-00944; REQ-AUTO-00967 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-RBAC-003 | Backend and IT integration — Secure Diagnostics / RBAC | The ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Backend and IT integration, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model. | REQ-AUTO-00948; REQ-AUTO-00952 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-RBAC-004 | Application software behavior — Secure Diagnostics / RBAC | The ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Application software behavior, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model. | REQ-AUTO-00890; REQ-AUTO-00910; REQ-AUTO-00927; REQ-AUTO-00949; REQ-AUTO-00973 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-SYS-005 | System behavior — System Function | The ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing. | REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00882; REQ-AUTO-00884; REQ-AUTO-00885; REQ-AUTO-00897 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-SYS-006 | System behavior — System Function | The ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing. | REQ-AUTO-00904; REQ-AUTO-00909; REQ-AUTO-00917; REQ-AUTO-00918; REQ-AUTO-00926; REQ-AUTO-00945; REQ-AUTO-00946; REQ-AUTO-00954; REQ-AUTO-00958; REQ-AUTO-00970; REQ-AUTO-00972; REQ-AUTO-00974; REQ-AUTO-00978; REQ-AUTO-00981; REQ-AUTO-00985; REQ-AUTO-00986 | yes | Ready for Customer Alignment |
| SSR-SYS-008 | Application software behavior — System Function | The ECU shall implement the Application software behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing. | REQ-AUTO-00971 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-SYS-009 | System behavior — System Function | The ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing. | REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00898 | yes | Candidate |
| SSR-TOOL-002 | Backend and IT integration — Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage | The supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Backend and IT integration. | REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00886; REQ-AUTO-00888; REQ-AUTO-00896; REQ-AUTO-00903; REQ-AUTO-00911; REQ-AUTO-00912; REQ-AUTO-00916; REQ-AUTO-00920; REQ-AUTO-00921; REQ-AUTO-00925; REQ-AUTO-00928; REQ-AUTO-00929; REQ-AUTO-00941; REQ-AUTO-00961; REQ-AUTO-00963; REQ-AUTO-00965; REQ-AUTO-00966 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-TOOL-003 | Backend and IT integration — Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage | The supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Backend and IT integration. | REQ-AUTO-00968; REQ-AUTO-00975; REQ-AUTO-00976; REQ-AUTO-00977 | yes | Ready for Customer Alignment |