CVS31

Responsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC · Key / Certificate Handling · Core ECA system behavior

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Executive Takeaway

Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 108 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior. Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model.

Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 20 accept; 24 accept with assumption; 60 partially accept; 1 needs internal review; 3 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 18 supplier system requirement records. Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them.

Requires customer confirmation: 3 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.; Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision. Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed.

Requirements108from this PDF
Critical60ranked
Open Points3linked
Derived SSRs18linked
Concept Impactyesdocument-specific
Estimation Impactyesdocument-specific

Document Abstract

Document Purpose

Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 108 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior.

Engineering Interpretation

Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model.

Main Requirement Themes

Core ECA system behavior; Cybersecurity concept and evidence; Responsibility and customer approval model; System architecture design; Key, certificate, and PKI handling (showing 5 of 8)

System / Security Impact

Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them.

Supplier Proposal Impact

Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 20 accept; 24 accept with assumption; 60 partially accept; 1 needs internal review; 3 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 18 supplier system requirement records.

Customer Clarification Impact

Requires customer confirmation: 3 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.; Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision.

Confidence and Limits

Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed.

Main Requirement Themes

ThemeEngineering MeaningRequirement CountRepresentative Requirements
Core ECA system behaviorDefines actuator ECU behavior, drivetrain integration, electrical/mechanical constraints, and verification scope.86REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00881
Cybersecurity concept and evidenceDrives cybersecurity concept, risk treatment, verification evidence, and traceability obligations.67REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00886
Responsibility and customer approval modelCreates supplier/OEM allocation decisions for work products, backend infrastructure, approvals, and residual risk.57REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00884
System architecture designGroups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.41REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00882
Key, certificate, and PKI handlingAffects ECU trust material storage, provisioning, lifecycle ownership, and customer PKI dependencies.40REQ-AUTO-00889; REQ-AUTO-00891; REQ-AUTO-00892
SystemGroups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.32REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00882
System coreGroups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.31REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00882; REQ-AUTO-00884
CybersecurityGroups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.22REQ-AUTO-00892; REQ-AUTO-00895; REQ-AUTO-00907

Document Content Structure

SectionRequirementsCriticalOpen PointsSSR Links
1 Scope1001
-- 1.1 Summary1001
2 Abbrevations3203
3 subFunctions4329312
-- 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional14928
-- -- 3.1.1 Request5424
-- -- 3.1.2 Response9516
-- 3.2 proofOfOwnership211638
-- -- 3.2.1 Request7615
-- -- 3.2.2 Response3102
-- -- 3.2.3 Negative Response7614
-- 3.3 deAuthenticate5214
-- -- 3.3.3 Negative Response5214
4 General5529314
-- 4.1 Certificate3014210
-- -- 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension9316
-- -- 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time11515
-- 4.2 State-keeping8814
-- 4.5 CRNG4103
-- 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication7313
-- -- 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication7313
-- 4.9 Authentication completion timer6314
6 Normative references1001

What This PDF Is About

FieldValue
Source PDFcustomer-input/pdf/CVS31.pdf
Converted Markdownconverted/markdown/CVS31.md
Document TypeResponsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC
DomainKey / Certificate Handling
Scope Summary108 extracted requirements; 18 linked SSRs; 3 linked open points.
Main ThemesCore ECA system behavior; Cybersecurity concept and evidence; Responsibility and customer approval model; System architecture design; Key, certificate, and PKI handling (showing 5 of 8)
Does Not ConfirmCustomer-owned responsibility, final customer decisions, and unresolved open points remain unconfirmed.
ConfidenceHigh
Evidence BasisMarkdown-derived requirements and generated RFQX registers; no downstream PDF analysis.

Key Conclusions From This PDF

Critical Requirements

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IDScoreCategoryRequirement / ReasonSupplier Position
REQ-AUTO-0088977High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityTable 4 – Supported subFunctions (ISO 14229-1:2020) Name verifyCertificateBidirectional proofOfOwnership deAuthenticate AUTH_REQ 155 The server shall not accept an application-layer service 0x29 request when it is received inside an SDT (service 0x84) protected message.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0089277High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityTable 5 – verifyCertificateBidirectional Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipServer Authentication Request SID Service ID for Authentication service request 0x29 M Yes verifyCertificateBidirectional] Initiate Authentication by verifying the Certificate and generating a Proof of Ownership from the server 0x02 M Yes communicationConfiguration NOT USED 0x00 M Yes lengthOfCertificateClient Length parameter for certificateClient uint16 M Yes certificateClient The Certificate to verify uint8[] M Yes lengthOfChallengeClient Length parameter for challengeClient uint16 M Yes challengeClient See 3.1.1.1 uint8[] M Yes AUTH_REQ 117 Upon reception of a verifyCertificateBidirectional request, the server shall determine whether the Authentication delay timer is currently running.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0089377High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityAUTH_REQ 118 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is expired, the server shall continue to process the verifyCertificateBidirectional request.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0089577High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityAUTH_REQ 45 If the server verifies the client certificate as valid, the server shall create the requested client authentication pending state.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0090077High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityAUTH_REQ 173 The server shall verify the value of lengthOfCertificateClient upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0090177High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityAUTH_REQ 174 If the lengthOfCertificateClient value is not within the expected range, the server shall send negative response code 0x13 (incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat).security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0090677High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility3.1.3 Negative Response AUTH_REQ 121 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is running, the server shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x37, indicating requiredTimeDelayNotExpired.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0090777High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityAUTH_REQ 122 If the server verifies the client certificate as invalid, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0090877High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityAUTH_REQ 123 If the server fails or cannot determine that the authentication pending state was stored, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0091077High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityTable 7 – proofOfOwnership Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipClient Authentication Request SID Service ID for 0x29 M Yes proofOfOwnership] Verify the Proof of Ownership from the client 0x03 M Yes lengthOfProofOfOwnershipClient This field indicates the length (in octets) of the proofOfOwnershipClient field proofOfOwnershipClient See 3.2.1.1 uint8[] M No lengthOfEphemeralPublicKey Client Length parameter for ephemeralPublicKey Client ephemeralPublicKeyClient See 3.2.1.2 uint16 M Yes AUTH_REQ 110 The server shall verify whether any existing authentication pending state corresponds to the client submitting the proofOfOwnership request.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0092277High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityAUTH_REQ 126 If the server cannot determine if the client does have an existing authentication pending state, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept
REQ-AUTO-0092477High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilityAUTH_REQ 128 If the server is trying to delete the authentication pending state as consequence of the client proofOfOwnership signature verification failure, and the server cannot determine that the authentication pending state was deleted, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactPartially Accept

Customer Clarifications / Open Points

Total Open Points3document-linked
P10priority
P20priority
Blocking Conceptyesyes/no
Blocking Estimationyesyes/no
Blocking SSRyesyes/no

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Open PointPriorityQuestion / ImpactRequired Customer DecisionRecommended Supplier PositionOwnerStatus
OP-002Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.Security-access design and verification scope cannot be frozen; risk of an unprotected diagnostic service.Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.Implement configurable session/security-access on the ECU and request the customer-confirmed service-to-role table.Shared (OEM policy / Supplier ECU)Open
OP-003Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.ECU secure-storage and provisioning design is blocked; production-line and PKI dependencies stay open.Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.Provide ECU-side secure storage and provisioning hooks; require OEM confirmation of PKI ownership and the provisioning interface.OEM / Customer (PKI) + Supplier (ECU)Open
OP-004Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied.Update-control scope and evidence ownership stay open; risk of an unprotected update path.Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied.Implement authenticated, integrity-protected ECU programming with controlled boot/app state; require OEM update-chain definition.Shared (OEM backend / Supplier ECU)Open

Requirements From This PDF

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IDRequirement / ProposalSupplier PositionReviewSecurity CapabilityFeature / InterfaceSSROpen PointSource
REQ-AUTO-00889Table 4 – Supported subFunctions (ISO 14229-1:2020) Name verifyCertificateBidirectional proofOfOwnership deAuthenticate AUTH_REQ 155 The server shall not accept an application-layer service 0x29 request when it is received inside an SDT (service 0x84) protected message.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneApplication software behavior; Secure communication and freshness protection
None
SSR-KEY-003OP-0023 subFunctions
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3 subFunctions

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3 subFunctions

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page 7

REQ-AUTO-00892Table 5 – verifyCertificateBidirectional Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipServer Authentication Request SID Service ID for Authentication service request 0x29 M Yes verifyCertificateBidirectional] Initiate Authentication by verifying the Certificate and generating a Proof of Ownership from the server 0x02 M Yes communicationConfiguration NOT USED 0x00 M Yes lengthOfCertificateClient Length parameter for certificateClient uint16 M Yes certificateClient The Certificate to verify uint8[] M Yes lengthOfChallengeClient Length parameter for challengeClient uint16 M Yes challengeClient See 3.1.1.1 uint8[] M Yes AUTH_REQ 117 Upon reception of a verifyCertificateBidirectional request, the server shall determine whether the Authentication delay timer is currently running.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001OP-0023.1.1 Request
page 8
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3.1.1 Request

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3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.1 Request

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REQ-AUTO-00893AUTH_REQ 118 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is expired, the server shall continue to process the verifyCertificateBidirectional request.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-KEY-005OP-0033.1.1 Request
page 8
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3.1.1 Request

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3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.1 Request

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page 8

REQ-AUTO-00895AUTH_REQ 45 If the server verifies the client certificate as valid, the server shall create the requested client authentication pending state.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001OP-0033.1.1 Request
page 8
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3.1.1 Request

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3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.1 Request

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page 8

REQ-AUTO-00900AUTH_REQ 173 The server shall verify the value of lengthOfCertificateClient upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-KEY-005OP-0033.1.2 Response
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3.1.2 Response

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3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response

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page 9

REQ-AUTO-00901AUTH_REQ 174 If the lengthOfCertificateClient value is not within the expected range, the server shall send negative response code 0x13 (incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat).Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-KEY-005OP-0033.1.2 Response
page 9
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3.1.2 Response

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3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response

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page 9

REQ-AUTO-009063.1.3 Negative Response AUTH_REQ 121 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is running, the server shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x37, indicating requiredTimeDelayNotExpired.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-KEY-005OP-0033.2 proofOfOwnership
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3.2 proofOfOwnership

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3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership

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page 11

REQ-AUTO-00907AUTH_REQ 122 If the server verifies the client certificate as invalid, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001OP-0033.2 proofOfOwnership
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3.2 proofOfOwnership

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3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership

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REQ-AUTO-00908AUTH_REQ 123 If the server fails or cannot determine that the authentication pending state was stored, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-KEY-005OP-0033.2 proofOfOwnership
page 11
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3.2 proofOfOwnership

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3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership

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page 11

REQ-AUTO-00910Table 7 – proofOfOwnership Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipClient Authentication Request SID Service ID for 0x29 M Yes proofOfOwnership] Verify the Proof of Ownership from the client 0x03 M Yes lengthOfProofOfOwnershipClient This field indicates the length (in octets) of the proofOfOwnershipClient field proofOfOwnershipClient See 3.2.1.1 uint8[] M No lengthOfEphemeralPublicKey Client Length parameter for ephemeralPublicKey Client ephemeralPublicKeyClient See 3.2.1.2 uint16 M Yes AUTH_REQ 110 The server shall verify whether any existing authentication pending state corresponds to the client submitting the proofOfOwnership request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneApplication software behavior
None
SSR-RBAC-004OP-0023.2.1 Request
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3.2.1 Request

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3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request

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page 12

REQ-AUTO-00922AUTH_REQ 126 If the server cannot determine if the client does have an existing authentication pending state, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-COM-003OP-0043.2.3 Negative Response
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3.2.3 Negative Response

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3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response

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page 14

REQ-AUTO-00924AUTH_REQ 128 If the server is trying to delete the authentication pending state as consequence of the client proofOfOwnership signature verification failure, and the server cannot determine that the authentication pending state was deleted, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability
OEM/Customer Review Interface
SSR-DAI-004OP-0043.2.3 Negative Response
page 14
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3.2.3 Negative Response

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3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response

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page 14

REQ-AUTO-00925AUTH_REQ 129 If the server is deleting the authentication pending state as consequence of failure to store the authentication state, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002OP-0043.2.3 Negative Response
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3.2.3 Negative Response

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3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response

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REQ-AUTO-00931Internal Page 16 (31) AUTH_REQ 132 If the server is unable to delete the client's authentication state or cannot verify its presence, it shall respond to the deAuthenticate request with Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-COM-003OP-0044.1 Certificate
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4.1 Certificate

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate

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REQ-AUTO-00935AUTH_REQ 177 The server shall use the private key corresponding to the server certificate to generate the signatures.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001OP-0034.1 Certificate
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4.1 Certificate

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate

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REQ-AUTO-00937AUTH_REQ 164 The server shall reject a received client’s certificate, sent using the verifyCertificateBidirectional subFunction, if it matches the server’s own certificate.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001OP-0034.1 Certificate
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4.1 Certificate

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate

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REQ-AUTO-00938AUTH_INFO 7 It should not be possible to “unlock” the server using its own key/certificate.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001OP-0034.1 Certificate
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4.1 Certificate

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate

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REQ-AUTO-00939AUTH_REQ 165 The server shall verify the client certificate, sent using the verifyCertificateBidirectional subFunction, according to Figure 3.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001OP-0034.1 Certificate
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4.1 Certificate

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate

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REQ-AUTO-00940AUTH_REQ 134 The server shall verify the Signature of the Client certificate using the AUTH-CA EMP entity public key.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001OP-0034.1 Certificate
page 16
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4.1 Certificate

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate

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REQ-AUTO-00942AUTH_REQ 9 • If the server NodeUID is not found in the NodeUID extension, the server shall reject the certificate and generate NRC 0x10 (generalReject).Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001OP-0034.1.3 D-RBACC extension
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4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

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REQ-AUTO-00950Internal Page 19 (31) As part of the certificate verification: AUTH_REQ 135 • The server shall validate the D-RBACC by parsing all its content.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication; Security evidence and traceability
OEM/Customer Review Interface
SSR-DAI-001OP-0034.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
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4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

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REQ-AUTO-00951If content is invalid, the certificate is invalid and the server shall return a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyCertificate handlingCertificate handling
None
SSR-KEY-002OP-0034.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
page 19
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4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

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REQ-AUTO-00953If non-compliant, the certificate is invalid and the server shall return a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyCertificate handlingCertificate handling
None
SSR-KEY-002OP-0034.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
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4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

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REQ-AUTO-009604.1.8 Certificate Validity Time AUTH_REQ 169 The server shall validate the certificate so that: 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≤ 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒-𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ≤ 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 AUTH_INFO 137 The notBefore and notAfter are received as fields in the certificate while Certificate-Time is the EMP entity defined in CVS34.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001OP-0034.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
page 19
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4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

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4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

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page 19

REQ-AUTO-00962AUTH_REQ 156 If a server reset is triggered by a client request (e.g., UDS service 0x11), the server shall send the corresponding response before invalidating the authentication pending state.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneApplication software behavior
None
SSR-DIAG-004OP-0024.2 State-keeping
page 20
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Document section

4.2 State-keeping

Section path

4 General > 4.2 State-keeping

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page 20

REQ-AUTO-00964AUTH_REQ 157 If a server reset is triggered by a client request (e.g., UDS service 0x11), the server shall send the corresponding response before invalidating the authentication state.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneApplication software behavior
None
SSR-DIAG-004OP-0024.2 State-keeping
page 20
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Document section

4.2 State-keeping

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4 General > 4.2 State-keeping

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page 20

REQ-AUTO-00967AUTH_REQ 147 • Client roles (ECU diagnostic Role extension in client’s certificate) AUTH_REQ 148 • Client D-RBACC, if provided in the client’s certificate AUTH_REQ 149 The server shall support only one authentication state.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-RBAC-002OP-0024.2 State-keeping
page 21
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Document section

4.2 State-keeping

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4 General > 4.2 State-keeping

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page 21

REQ-AUTO-00973Internal Page 23 (31) 4.6 Role Based Access Control AUTH_REQ 25 The server shall always allow the Authentication 0x29 service (ISO 14229-1:2020) regardless of the RBAC logic (CVS151).Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneApplication software behavior
None
SSR-RBAC-004OP-0024.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication
page 23
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Document section

4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Section path

4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

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page 23

REQ-AUTO-00982AUTH_REQ 151 If the delay timer is not running, the server shall start it as part of verifyCertificateBidirectional request.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-KEY-005OP-0034.9 Authentication completion timer
page 24
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Document section

4.9 Authentication completion timer

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4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer

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page 24

REQ-AUTO-00890If such an encapsulated 0x29 request is detected, the server shall return application-layer NRC 0x39, provided as a correctly formatted SDT positive response.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneApplication software behavior; Secure communication and freshness protection
None
SSR-RBAC-004OP-0023 subFunctions
page 7
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Document section

3 subFunctions

Section path

3 subFunctions

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page 7

REQ-AUTO-00930AUTH_REQ 131 If the server cannot determine that the client is currently authenticated, it shall respond to the deAuthenticate request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating a ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-COM-003OP-0043.3.3 Negative Response
page 15
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Document section

3.3.3 Negative Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.3 deAuthenticate > 3.3.3 Negative Response

Page reference

page 15

REQ-AUTO-00896Internal Page 9 (31) AUTH_REQ 119 If an authentication pending state already exists, the server shall replace the existing authentication pending state with the new one.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-3.1.2 Response
page 9
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Document section

3.1.2 Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response

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page 9

REQ-AUTO-00903AUTH_REQ 120 Upon positively responding, the server shall start the Authentication completion timer.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-3.1.2 Response
page 9
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Document section

3.1.2 Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response

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page 9

REQ-AUTO-00904ephemeralPublicKeyServer See 3.1.2.3 uint8[] M Yes 3.1.2.1 challengeServer AUTH_REQ 6 The challengeServer field shall consists of 32 octets generated using a CRNG.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-3.1.2 Response
page 10
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Document section

3.1.2 Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response

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page 10

REQ-AUTO-00911AUTH_REQ 111 If an existing authentication pending state is found, the server shall verify if the Authentication completion timer is currently running.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-3.2.1 Request
page 12
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Document section

3.2.1 Request

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request

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page 12

REQ-AUTO-00912AUTH_REQ 112 If the Authentication completion timer is currently running, the server shall continue to process the client’s proofOfOwnership request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-3.2.1 Request
page 12
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Document section

3.2.1 Request

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request

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page 12

REQ-AUTO-00913AUTH_REQ 113 If the client proofOfOwnership signature verification fails, the server shall delete the authentication pending state connected to the client submitting the proofOfOwnership request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability
OEM/Customer Review Interface
SSR-DAI-004-3.2.1 Request
page 12
Source details
Document section

3.2.1 Request

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request

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page 12

REQ-AUTO-00914AUTH_REQ 114 If the server fails or cannot determine that the authentication state was stored, the server shall delete the authentication pending state connected to the client submitting the proofOfOwnership request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-COM-003-3.2.1 Request
page 12
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Document section

3.2.1 Request

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request

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page 12

REQ-AUTO-00915AUTH_REQ 115 If the client’s proofOfOwnership signature is successfully verified, the server shall establish a new authentication state for the client.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-DAI-004-3.2.1 Request
page 12
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Document section

3.2.1 Request

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request

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page 12

REQ-AUTO-00916Internal Page 13 (31) If an active authentication state already exists, the server shall replace the existing state with the newly established one.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-3.2.2 Response
page 13
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Document section

3.2.2 Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.2 Response

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page 13

REQ-AUTO-009203.2.3 Negative Response AUTH_REQ 124 If the server determines that the client does not have an existing authentication pending state, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x24, indicating requestSequenceError.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-3.2.3 Negative Response
page 14
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Document section

3.2.3 Negative Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response

Page reference

page 14

REQ-AUTO-00921AUTH_REQ 125 If the server determines that the client have an existing authentication pending state and the Authentication completion timer is expired, the server shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x24, indicating requestSequenceError.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-3.2.3 Negative Response
page 14
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Document section

3.2.3 Negative Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response

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page 14

REQ-AUTO-00923AUTH_REQ 127 If the server is trying to delete the authentication pending state as consequence of the client proofOfOwnership signature verification failure, and the server determines that the authentication pending state was deleted, it shall respond to the proofOfOwnership request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability
OEM/Customer Review Interface
SSR-DAI-004-3.2.3 Negative Response
page 14
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Document section

3.2.3 Negative Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response

Page reference

page 14

REQ-AUTO-009280x00 – 0xFF M AUTH_REQ 158 The server shall delete/invalidate the client’s authentication prior to positively responding to the deAuthenticate request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-3.3.3 Negative Response
page 15
Source details
Document section

3.3.3 Negative Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.3 deAuthenticate > 3.3.3 Negative Response

Page reference

page 15

REQ-AUTO-00961Internal Page 20 (31) 4.2 State-keeping The server shall invalidate the authentication pending state in the event of: AUTH_REQ 138 • The server is reset (i.e server is power cycled).Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-4.2 State-keeping
page 20
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Document section

4.2 State-keeping

Section path

4 General > 4.2 State-keeping

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page 20

REQ-AUTO-00963If a client and server have successfully completed the authentication process, the server shall invalidate the authentication state in the event of: AUTH_REQ 16 • The server is reset (i.e server is power cycled).Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-4.2 State-keeping
page 20
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Document section

4.2 State-keeping

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4 General > 4.2 State-keeping

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page 20

REQ-AUTO-00965The server’s authentication pending state shall contain the minimum of (non-exhaustive list): AUTH_REQ 140 • Client address that issued the authentication request.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-4.2 State-keeping
page 20
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Document section

4.2 State-keeping

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4 General > 4.2 State-keeping

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page 20

REQ-AUTO-00966The server’s authentication state shall contain the minimum of (non-exhaustive list): AUTH_REQ 21 • SessionKey.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-4.2 State-keeping
page 21
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Document section

4.2 State-keeping

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4 General > 4.2 State-keeping

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page 21

REQ-AUTO-00968AUTH_REQ 150 The server shall support only one authentication pending state.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-003-4.2 State-keeping
page 21
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Document section

4.2 State-keeping

Section path

4 General > 4.2 State-keeping

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page 21

REQ-AUTO-00971AUTH_REQ 24 The server shall ensure that the sessionKey is exclusively used for the application responsible for communication over securedDataTransmission (CVS32).Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement ECU-side UDS/session/security-access behavior; customer must confirm the service-to-role table, diagnostic authorization policy, and acceptance criteria.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneApplication software behavior
None
SSR-SYS-008-4.5 CRNG
page 22
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Document section

4.5 CRNG

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4 General > 4.5 CRNG

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page 22

REQ-AUTO-009754.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication AUTH_REQ 26 The server shall start the timer (A3) after a valid proofOfOwnership has been received.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-003-4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication
page 23
Source details
Document section

4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Section path

4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Page reference

page 23

REQ-AUTO-00977AUTH_REQ 28 If the A3 timer timeouts before a new request is received (from the same client), the server shall invalidate the authentication state.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-003-4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication
page 23
Source details
Document section

4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Section path

4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Page reference

page 23

REQ-AUTO-00983AUTH_REQ 152 If the server can determine that a delay is not running after reset, it shall accept a subsequent authentication request without any delay.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-COM-003-4.9 Authentication completion timer
page 24
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Document section

4.9 Authentication completion timer

Section path

4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer

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page 24

REQ-AUTO-00984AUTH_REQ 153 If the server cannot determine that a delay is not running after reset, it shall not accept a subsequent authentication request without any delay.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-COM-003-4.9 Authentication completion timer
page 24
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Document section

4.9 Authentication completion timer

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4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer

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page 24

REQ-AUTO-00886It contains the information required for the server to verify the client’s subsequent request and to generate the corresponding response.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-2 Abbrevations
page 6
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Document section

2 Abbrevations

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2 Abbrevations

Page reference

page 6

REQ-AUTO-00887It contains the information required for the server to maintain continuous authenticated communication with the client and to generate authenticated responses.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-COM-003-2 Abbrevations
page 6
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Document section

2 Abbrevations

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2 Abbrevations

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page 6

REQ-AUTO-00894AUTH_INFO 24 The column “Included in proofOfOwnershipServer”, present in several message-definition tables, indicates whether the corresponding field shall be covered by the proofOfOwnershipServer signature computed by the server and included in its response.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-DAI-004-3.1.1 Request
page 8
Source details
Document section

3.1.1 Request

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.1 Request

Page reference

page 8

REQ-AUTO-00948AUTH_REQ 14 If D-RBACC extension is detected, the server shall overrule the RBACC with the D-RBACC permissions.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-RBAC-003-4.1.3 D-RBACC extension
page 18
Source details
Document section

4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Page reference

page 18

REQ-AUTO-00949AUTH_INFO 61 This means that if D-RBACC logic denies/permits certain access, the server shall deny/permit the access regardless of what RBACC logic permits/denies.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneApplication software behavior
None
SSR-RBAC-004-4.1.3 D-RBACC extension
page 18
Source details
Document section

4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Page reference

page 18

REQ-AUTO-00952AUTH_REQ 136 • The server shall verify that the D-RBACC version provided by the client is compatible with the server’s supported D-RBACC version.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.Partially AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-RBAC-003-4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
page 19
Source details
Document section

4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Page reference

page 19

REQ-AUTO-00891Internal Page 8 (31) 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional 3.1.1 Request AUTH_REQ 2 The request for verifyCertificateBidirectional subfunction shall be formatted according to Table 5.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-KEY-004-3.1.1 Request
page 8
Source details
Document section

3.1.1 Request

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.1 Request

Page reference

page 8

REQ-AUTO-008993.1.1.2 lengthOfCertificateClient AUTH_REQ 172 The expected range values of lengthOfCertificateClient shall be from 0x00C8 to 0x0800.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-KEY-004-3.1.2 Response
page 9
Source details
Document section

3.1.2 Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response

Page reference

page 9

REQ-AUTO-009023.1.2 Response AUTH_REQ 5 The response for verifyCertificateBidirectional subfunction shall be formatted according to Table 6.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-KEY-004-3.1.2 Response
page 9
Source details
Document section

3.1.2 Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response

Page reference

page 9

REQ-AUTO-00927Table 9 – deAuthenticate request message layout Field Description Type/Value Cvt Authentication Request SID Service ID for 0x29 M SubFunction = [AuthenticationTask = deAuthenticate] Subfunction for request to leave the authenticated state 0x00 M 3.3.2 Response AUTH_REQ 96 The response for deAuthenticate subfunction shall be formatted according to Table 10.Proposal: Accept with assumption. Implement the ECU-side diagnostic behavior with configurable authorization and verification evidence, subject to customer-confirmed UDS service allocation and role model.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneApplication software behavior
None
SSR-RBAC-004-3.3.3 Negative Response
page 15
Source details
Document section

3.3.3 Negative Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.3 deAuthenticate > 3.3.3 Negative Response

Page reference

page 15

REQ-AUTO-009334 General 4.1 Certificate AUTH_REQ 175 The signature algorithm used throughout the authentication process shall be ED25519.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001-4.1 Certificate
page 16
Source details
Document section

4.1 Certificate

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate

Page reference

page 16

REQ-AUTO-00934AUTH_REQ 176 The client shall use the private key corresponding to the client certificate to generate the signatures.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001-4.1 Certificate
page 16
Source details
Document section

4.1 Certificate

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate

Page reference

page 16

REQ-AUTO-00936AUTH_REQ 163 The format and the structure of the certificates shall be based on (CVS30).Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-KEY-004-4.1 Certificate
page 16
Source details
Document section

4.1 Certificate

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate

Page reference

page 16

REQ-AUTO-00943AUTH_REQ 106 If the NodeUID extension is not detected, the operation shall continue as in AUTH_INFO 25 A certificate without NodeUID extension implies that the certificate is applicable for any NodeUID.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001-4.1.3 D-RBACC extension
page 18
Source details
Document section

4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Page reference

page 18

REQ-AUTO-009444.1.2 ECU-Diagnostic Role extension AUTH_REQ 170 The ECU-Diagnostic role extension shall be included in the client certificate.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-RBAC-002-4.1.3 D-RBACC extension
page 18
Source details
Document section

4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Page reference

page 18

REQ-AUTO-009554.1.5 Key Usage extension AUTH_REQ 15 The Key Usage extension (RFC 5280) shall be included in the client certificate.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001-4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
page 19
Source details
Document section

4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

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page 19

REQ-AUTO-00956AUTH_REQ 47 The Key Usage extension shall contain DigitalSignature.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001-4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
page 19
Source details
Document section

4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Page reference

page 19

REQ-AUTO-009574.1.6 Extended Key Usage extension AUTH_REQ 95 The Extended Key Usage extension (RFC 5280) shall be included in the client certificate.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyAuthenticationAuthentication
None
SSR-DAI-001-4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
page 19
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Document section

4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

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page 19

REQ-AUTO-00958AUTH_REQ 107 The extension ExtendedKeyUsage shall contain clientAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2).Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
page 19
Source details
Document section

4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Page reference

page 19

REQ-AUTO-00969AUTH_REQ 167 The private keys shall be generated using a CRNG.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-KEY-004-4.5 CRNG
page 22
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Document section

4.5 CRNG

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4 General > 4.5 CRNG

Page reference

page 22

REQ-AUTO-00970AUTH_REQ 168 The sessionKey shall be generated according to the pseudo code below.Proposal: Accept with assumption. Implement the ECU-side diagnostic behavior with configurable authorization and verification evidence, subject to customer-confirmed UDS service allocation and role model.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-4.5 CRNG
page 22
Source details
Document section

4.5 CRNG

Section path

4 General > 4.5 CRNG

Page reference

page 22

REQ-AUTO-00974AUTH_REQ 109 Only Passive time-based de-authentication shall be supported.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication
page 23
Source details
Document section

4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Section path

4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Page reference

page 23

REQ-AUTO-00980Internal Page 24 (31) 4.8 Authentication delay timer AUTH_INFO 38 The delay timer represents the required minimum time between verifyCertificateBidirectional request attempts.Proposal: Needs customer clarification. Supplier can implement ECU-side certificate/key handling, but ownership of PKI, certificate provisioning, lifecycle management, and backend responsibility must be confirmed through CIA/RASIC.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-KEY-004-4.9 Authentication completion timer
page 24
Source details
Document section

4.9 Authentication completion timer

Section path

4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer

Page reference

page 24

REQ-AUTO-00985AUTH_REQ 154 The Authentication completion timer shall be set to 1 minute.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-4.9 Authentication completion timer
page 24
Source details
Document section

4.9 Authentication completion timer

Section path

4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer

Page reference

page 24

REQ-AUTO-00932AUTH_INFO 133 If the server is unable to delete the client’s authentication state or cannot retrieve it due to internal errors, the server responds NRC 0x94.This informs the client that the authentication state may still exist on the server.Proposal: Informational only. Keep as context; do not treat as an implementation requirement unless the customer confirms applicability.Informational OnlyProposal ReadyNoneNone
None
None-4.1 Certificate
page 16
Source details
Document section

4.1 Certificate

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate

Page reference

page 16

REQ-AUTO-00947While the ECU-Diagnostic Role extension specifies the roles assigned to a client, the D-RBACC extension may both grant additional permissions and restrict permissions beyond those derived from the client’s roles.Proposal: Informational only. Keep as context; do not treat as an implementation requirement unless the customer confirms applicability.Informational OnlyProposal ReadyNoneNone
None
None-4.1.3 D-RBACC extension
page 18
Source details
Document section

4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Page reference

page 18

REQ-AUTO-00979AUTH_INFO 14 The A3 timer differs from S3 timer in terms of expected behavior during timeout and should not be implemented as a single timer.Proposal: Needs internal review. Confirm whether this should-level requirement is in the committed baseline.Needs Internal ReviewReviewed InternallyNoneSystem behavior
None
None-4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication
page 23
Source details
Document section

4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Section path

4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Page reference

page 23

REQ-AUTO-00885Shall be agreed between the supplier and the vehicle manufacturer.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
OEM/Customer Review Interface
SSR-SYS-005-2 Abbrevations
page 6
Source details
Document section

2 Abbrevations

Section path

2 Abbrevations

Page reference

page 6

REQ-AUTO-00905AUTH_REQ 7 The proof/signature shall be generated according to the pseudo code below.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-DAI-002-3.2 proofOfOwnership
page 11
Source details
Document section

3.2 proofOfOwnership

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership

Page reference

page 11

REQ-AUTO-00919AUTH_REQ 162 The signature shall be generated according to the pseudo code below.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-DAI-002-3.2.3 Negative Response
page 14
Source details
Document section

3.2.3 Negative Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.3 Negative Response

Page reference

page 14

REQ-AUTO-00945AUTH_REQ 13 The roles shall correspond to a bit pattern-octet string.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-4.1.3 D-RBACC extension
page 18
Source details
Document section

4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

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page 18

REQ-AUTO-00946AUTH_INFO 8 The interpretation of the roles should follow as the example below: • Role 1 -> 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 – 00 00 00 01 • Role 32 -> 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 – 80 00 00 00 • Role 2 and 4 -> 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1010 – 00 00 00 0A.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-4.1.3 D-RBACC extension
page 18
Source details
Document section

4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Page reference

page 18

REQ-AUTO-009594.1.7 SignatureAlgorithm AUTH_REQ 105 The extension SignatureAlgorithm shall contain ED25519 (1.3.101.112).Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.Accept with AssumptionProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-DAI-002-4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
page 19
Source details
Document section

4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Page reference

page 19

REQ-AUTO-00879The User shall apply the latest version of this CVS31.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-005-page-1 Page 1
page 1
Source details
Document section

page-1 Page 1

Section path

Page 1

Page reference

page 1

REQ-AUTO-00881Any review of CVS31 shall only be done in agreement with the involved departments stated in the table on the first page under section “Technical responsibility”.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-009-page-3 Page 3
page 3
Source details
Document section

page-3 Page 3

Section path

Page 3

Page reference

page 3

REQ-AUTO-00882The whole standard has been reworked and shall be read in its entirety.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-005-page-3 Page 3
page 3
Source details
Document section

page-3 Page 3

Section path

Page 3

Page reference

page 3

REQ-AUTO-00883• Affiliate means any legal entity that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is commonly controlled with TRATON SE, it is being understood that “control” shall mean ownership of at least 50% of the voting rights or interest in the issued share capital, including for the avoidance of doubt any branch.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-page-3 Page 3
page 3
Source details
Document section

page-3 Page 3

Section path

Page 3

Page reference

page 3

REQ-AUTO-00884Any deviations from this specification shall be documented and must be reviewed by the vehicle manufacturer.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
OEM/Customer Review Interface
SSR-SYS-005-1.1 Summary
page 4
Source details
Document section

1.1 Summary

Section path

1 Scope > 1.1 Summary

Page reference

page 4

REQ-AUTO-00888AUTH_REQ 1 The server shall only support subfunctions in Table 4.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-3 subFunctions
page 7
Source details
Document section

3 subFunctions

Section path

3 subFunctions

Page reference

page 7

REQ-AUTO-008973.1.1.1 challengeClient AUTH_REQ 3 This field shall consists of 32 octets.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-005-3.1.2 Response
page 9
Source details
Document section

3.1.2 Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response

Page reference

page 9

REQ-AUTO-00898AUTH_REQ 4 The challengeClient (ISO 14229-1:2020) shall be generated using a CRNG.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-009-3.1.2 Response
page 9
Source details
Document section

3.1.2 Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional > 3.1.2 Response

Page reference

page 9

REQ-AUTO-00909Internal Page 12 (31) 3.2.1 Request AUTH_REQ 8 The request for proofOfOwnership subfunction shall be defined according to Table 7.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-3.2.1 Request
page 12
Source details
Document section

3.2.1 Request

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.1 Request

Page reference

page 12

REQ-AUTO-00917AUTH_REQ 160 The proofOfOwnershipClient shall be generated according to the pseudo code below.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-3.2.2 Response
page 13
Source details
Document section

3.2.2 Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.2 Response

Page reference

page 13

REQ-AUTO-009183.2.2 Response AUTH_REQ 161 The response for proofOfOwnership subfunction shall be according to Table 8.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-3.2.2 Response
page 13
Source details
Document section

3.2.2 Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.2 proofOfOwnership > 3.2.2 Response

Page reference

page 13

REQ-AUTO-009263.3.1 Request AUTH_REQ 159 The request for deAuthenticate subfunction shall be formatted according to Table 9.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-3.3.3 Negative Response
page 15
Source details
Document section

3.3.3 Negative Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.3 deAuthenticate > 3.3.3 Negative Response

Page reference

page 15

REQ-AUTO-009293.3.3 Negative Response AUTH_REQ 130 If the server determines that the client is not currently authenticated, it shall respond to the deAuthenticate request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x24, indicating a requestSequenceError.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-3.3.3 Negative Response
page 15
Source details
Document section

3.3.3 Negative Response

Section path

3 subFunctions > 3.3 deAuthenticate > 3.3.3 Negative Response

Page reference

page 15

REQ-AUTO-00941Internal Page 18 (31) 4.1.1 NodeUID extension If the NodeUID extension is detected, the server shall: AUTH_REQ 166 • Check if the NodeUID of the server is present in the NodeUIDs extension.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-002-4.1.3 D-RBACC extension
page 18
Source details
Document section

4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension

Page reference

page 18

REQ-AUTO-009544.1.4 basicContraints extension AUTH_REQ 42 The basicConstraints extension CA field shall be False.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time
page 19
Source details
Document section

4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Section path

4 General > 4.1 Certificate > 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time

Page reference

page 19

REQ-AUTO-009724.5 CRNG AUTH_REQ 33 Solution for a CRNG shall be according to (CVS150).Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-4.5 CRNG
page 22
Source details
Document section

4.5 CRNG

Section path

4 General > 4.5 CRNG

Page reference

page 22

REQ-AUTO-00976AUTH_REQ 27 The server shall restart the timer (A3) every time a request is received by the same client.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneBackend and IT integration
None
SSR-TOOL-003-4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication
page 23
Source details
Document section

4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Section path

4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Page reference

page 23

REQ-AUTO-00978AUTH_REQ 29 The parameter for passive timeout based deAuthenticate shall be decided in the project.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication
page 23
Source details
Document section

4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Section path

4 General > 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication > 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication

Page reference

page 23

REQ-AUTO-00981AUTH_REQ 133 The delay timer shall be set to 1 second.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-4.9 Authentication completion timer
page 24
Source details
Document section

4.9 Authentication completion timer

Section path

4 General > 4.9 Authentication completion timer

Page reference

page 24

REQ-AUTO-00986Internal Page 29 (31) Annex B (informative) Change history Release Date Changes The whole standard has been reworked and shall be read in its entirety.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.AcceptProposal ReadyNoneSystem behavior
None
SSR-SYS-006-6 Normative references
page 29
Source details
Document section

6 Normative references

Section path

6 Normative references

Page reference

page 29

REQ-AUTO-00880Internal Page 3 (31) Foreword This CVS31 contains requirement specification for TRATON GROUP and may be used by all within TRATON Group, if applicable.Proposal: Informational only. Keep as context; do not treat as an implementation requirement unless the customer confirms applicability.Informational OnlyProposal ReadyNoneNone
None
None-page-3 Page 3
page 3
Source details
Document section

page-3 Page 3

Section path

Page 3

Page reference

page 3

Derived Supplier System Requirements

This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.

SSRStatement / TraceFeatureSecurity CapabilityInterfaceResponsibilityStatusVerification
SSR-COM-003Backend and IT integration — Secure Communication and Boundary ControlThe ECU shall restrict and protect communication for Backend and IT integration, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00887; REQ-AUTO-00914; REQ-AUTO-00922; REQ-AUTO-00930; REQ-AUTO-00931; REQ-AUTO-00983; REQ-AUTO-00984. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.Backend and IT integrationNoneNoneSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationReview + Test
SSR-DAI-001Authentication — Data Authenticity and Integrity VerificationThe ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of Authentication data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00892; REQ-AUTO-00895; REQ-AUTO-00907; REQ-AUTO-00933; REQ-AUTO-00934; REQ-AUTO-00935; REQ-AUTO-00937; REQ-AUTO-00938; REQ-AUTO-00939; REQ-AUTO-00940; REQ-AUTO-00942; REQ-AUTO-00943; REQ-AUTO-00950; REQ-AUTO-00955; REQ-AUTO-00956; REQ-AUTO-00957; REQ-AUTO-00960. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.AuthenticationAuthenticationOEM/Customer Review InterfaceSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationReview + Test
SSR-DAI-002System behavior — Data Authenticity and Integrity VerificationThe ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of System behavior data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00905; REQ-AUTO-00919; REQ-AUTO-00959. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.System behaviorNoneOEM/Customer Review InterfaceSupplier-OwnedCandidateReview + Test
SSR-DAI-004Backend and IT integration — Data Authenticity and Integrity VerificationThe ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of Backend and IT integration data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00894; REQ-AUTO-00913; REQ-AUTO-00915; REQ-AUTO-00923; REQ-AUTO-00924. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.Backend and IT integrationNoneOEM/Customer Review InterfaceSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationReview + Test
SSR-DIAG-004Application software behavior — Diagnostic ServicesThe ECU shall provide the diagnostic services for Application software behavior required by the allocated customer requirements, including the specified services, sessions and data identifiers.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00962; REQ-AUTO-00964. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.Application software behaviorNoneOEM/Customer Review InterfaceSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationTest
SSR-KEY-002Certificate handling — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Certificate handling across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00951; REQ-AUTO-00953. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.Certificate handlingCertificate handlingNoneSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationReview + Test
SSR-KEY-003Application software behavior — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Application software behavior across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00889. Application software behaviorNoneNoneSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationReview + Test
SSR-KEY-004System behavior — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for System behavior across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00891; REQ-AUTO-00899; REQ-AUTO-00902; REQ-AUTO-00936; REQ-AUTO-00969; REQ-AUTO-00980. System behaviorNoneNoneSupplier-OwnedCandidateReview + Test
SSR-KEY-005Backend and IT integration — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Backend and IT integration across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00893; REQ-AUTO-00900; REQ-AUTO-00901; REQ-AUTO-00906; REQ-AUTO-00908; REQ-AUTO-00982. Backend and IT integrationNoneNoneSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationReview + Test
SSR-RBAC-002Authentication — Secure Diagnostics / RBACThe ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Authentication, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00944; REQ-AUTO-00967. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.AuthenticationAuthenticationNoneSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationReview + Test
SSR-RBAC-003Backend and IT integration — Secure Diagnostics / RBACThe ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Backend and IT integration, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00948; REQ-AUTO-00952. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.Backend and IT integrationNoneNoneSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationReview + Test
SSR-RBAC-004Application software behavior — Secure Diagnostics / RBACThe ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Application software behavior, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00890; REQ-AUTO-00910; REQ-AUTO-00927; REQ-AUTO-00949; REQ-AUTO-00973. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.Application software behaviorNoneNoneSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationReview + Test
SSR-SYS-005System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00882; REQ-AUTO-00884; REQ-AUTO-00885; REQ-AUTO-00897. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.System behaviorNoneOEM/Customer Review InterfaceSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationTest
SSR-SYS-006System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00904; REQ-AUTO-00909; REQ-AUTO-00917; REQ-AUTO-00918; REQ-AUTO-00926; REQ-AUTO-00945; REQ-AUTO-00946; REQ-AUTO-00954; REQ-AUTO-00958; REQ-AUTO-00970; REQ-AUTO-00972; REQ-AUTO-00974; REQ-AUTO-00978; REQ-AUTO-00981; REQ-AUTO-00985; REQ-AUTO-00986. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.System behaviorNoneNoneSharedReady for Customer AlignmentTest
SSR-SYS-008Application software behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the Application software behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00971. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.Application software behaviorNoneOEM/Customer Review InterfaceSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationTest
SSR-SYS-009System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00898. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.System behaviorNoneOEM/Customer Review InterfaceSupplier-OwnedCandidateTest
SSR-TOOL-002Backend and IT integration — Tooling / IT / Evidence StorageThe supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Backend and IT integration.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00886; REQ-AUTO-00888; REQ-AUTO-00896; REQ-AUTO-00903; REQ-AUTO-00911; REQ-AUTO-00912; REQ-AUTO-00916; REQ-AUTO-00920; REQ-AUTO-00921; REQ-AUTO-00925; REQ-AUTO-00928; REQ-AUTO-00929; REQ-AUTO-00941; REQ-AUTO-00961; REQ-AUTO-00963; REQ-AUTO-00965; REQ-AUTO-00966. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.Backend and IT integrationNoneNoneSharedBlocked by Customer ClarificationReview + Test
SSR-TOOL-003Backend and IT integration — Tooling / IT / Evidence StorageThe supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Backend and IT integration.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00968; REQ-AUTO-00975; REQ-AUTO-00976; REQ-AUTO-00977. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs.Backend and IT integrationNoneNoneSharedReady for Customer AlignmentReview + Test

System / Security Design Impact

Impact AreaEvidence From This PDF
Impacted system featuresApplication software behavior; Application software behavior; Secure communication and freshness protection; Authentication; Authentication; Security evidence and traceability; Backend and IT integration; Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability; Certificate handling; System behavior
Impacted interfacesOEM/Customer Review Interface
Impacted security capabilitiesAuthentication; Certificate handling
Impacted architecture elementsApplication Software; Backend and IT Systems; Backend and IT Systems; OEM/Customer Review Interface; Compliance Process; Security Services; Security Services; OEM/Customer Review Interface; System Core; System Core; OEM/Customer Review Interface
Impacted work productsCybersecurity concept; Cybersecurity verification report; DIA / cybersecurity case; Requirement traceability record; System/architecture design
Tools / IT / hardware / testHigh/High/Low; High/High/Medium; High/Low/Low; High/Low/Medium; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Medium/Low/Medium
Design assumptions introducedSecurity-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed.
Design decisions requiredAgree responsibility split (DIA) for the non-ECU portion.

Estimation / Resource / Tooling Impact

ImpactStatus
Estimation impactyes
Resource/tool/IT/HW/test impactHigh/High/Low; High/High/Medium; High/Low/Low; High/Low/Medium; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Medium/Low/Medium

Document Impact Diagram

Document Impact

Generated from document-specific requirement, traceability, SSR, and open-point evidence.

flowchart LR doc["CVS31.pdf"] d0["Authentication"] doc --> d0 d1["Certificate handling"] doc --> d1 f0["Feature: Application software behavior"] doc --> f0 f1["Feature: Application software behavior; Secure communication and freshness protection"] doc --> f1 f2["Feature: Authentication"] doc --> f2 i0["Interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface"] doc --> i0 s0["SSR: SSR-COM-003"] doc --> s0 s1["SSR: SSR-DAI-001"] doc --> s1 s2["SSR: SSR-DAI-002"] doc --> s2 o0["Open point: OP-002"] doc --> o0 o1["Open point: OP-003"] doc --> o1 o2["Open point: OP-004"] doc --> o2
Mermaid source
flowchart LR
  doc["CVS31.pdf"]
  d0["Authentication"]
  doc --> d0
  d1["Certificate handling"]
  doc --> d1
  f0["Feature: Application software behavior"]
  doc --> f0
  f1["Feature: Application software behavior; Secure communication and freshness protection"]
  doc --> f1
  f2["Feature: Authentication"]
  doc --> f2
  i0["Interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface"]
  doc --> i0
  s0["SSR: SSR-COM-003"]
  doc --> s0
  s1["SSR: SSR-DAI-001"]
  doc --> s1
  s2["SSR: SSR-DAI-002"]
  doc --> s2
  o0["Open point: OP-002"]
  doc --> o0
  o1["Open point: OP-003"]
  doc --> o1
  o2["Open point: OP-004"]
  doc --> o2

Traceability

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Customer RequirementSSRDispositionConfidenceReason
REQ-AUTO-00879SSR-SYS-005Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00880NoneInformational Onlyn/aNon-binding; not derived.
REQ-AUTO-00881SSR-SYS-009Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementHighAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00882SSR-SYS-005Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00883SSR-TOOL-002Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00884SSR-SYS-005Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00885SSR-SYS-005Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00886SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00887SSR-COM-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00888SSR-TOOL-002Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00889SSR-KEY-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00890SSR-RBAC-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00891SSR-KEY-004Derive Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster.
REQ-AUTO-00892SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00893SSR-KEY-005Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00894SSR-DAI-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00895SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00896SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00897SSR-SYS-005Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00898SSR-SYS-009Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementHighAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00899SSR-KEY-004Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00900SSR-KEY-005Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00901SSR-KEY-005Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00902SSR-KEY-004Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00903SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00904SSR-SYS-006Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00905SSR-DAI-002Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00906SSR-KEY-005Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00907SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00908SSR-KEY-005Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00909SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00910SSR-RBAC-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00911SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00912SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00913SSR-DAI-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00914SSR-COM-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00915SSR-DAI-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00916SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00917SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00918SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00919SSR-DAI-002Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00920SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00921SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00922SSR-COM-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00923SSR-DAI-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00924SSR-DAI-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00925SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00926SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00927SSR-RBAC-004Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementLowAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00928SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00929SSR-TOOL-002Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00930SSR-COM-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00931SSR-COM-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00932NoneInformational Onlyn/aNon-binding; not derived.
REQ-AUTO-00933SSR-DAI-001Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementLowAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00934SSR-DAI-001Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementLowAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00935SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00936SSR-KEY-004Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00937SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00938SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00939SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00940SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00941SSR-TOOL-002Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00942SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00943SSR-DAI-001Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementLowAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00944SSR-RBAC-002Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementLowAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00945SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00946SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00947NoneInformational Onlyn/aNon-binding; not derived.
REQ-AUTO-00948SSR-RBAC-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00949SSR-RBAC-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00950SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00951SSR-KEY-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00952SSR-RBAC-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00953SSR-KEY-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00954SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00955SSR-DAI-001Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementLowAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00956SSR-DAI-001Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementLowAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00957SSR-DAI-001Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementLowAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00958SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00959SSR-DAI-002Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00960SSR-DAI-001Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00961SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00962SSR-DIAG-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00963SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00964SSR-DIAG-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00965SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00966SSR-TOOL-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00967SSR-RBAC-002Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00968SSR-TOOL-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00969SSR-KEY-004Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00970SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00971SSR-SYS-008Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededMediumPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00972SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00973SSR-RBAC-004Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00974SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00975SSR-TOOL-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00976SSR-TOOL-003Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementLowAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00977SSR-TOOL-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00978SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00979NoneNeeds Internal Reviewn/aLow confidence / human review before derivation.
REQ-AUTO-00980SSR-KEY-004Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00981SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00982SSR-KEY-005Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00983SSR-COM-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00984SSR-COM-003Shared Responsibility / CIA NeededLowPartially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
REQ-AUTO-00985SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
REQ-AUTO-00986SSR-SYS-006Covered by Existing Supplier System RequirementMediumAccepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.

Detailed Evidence

Document intelligence markdown

CVS31

  • Source PDF: customer-input/pdf/CVS31.pdf
  • Converted Markdown: converted/markdown/CVS31.md
  • Document type: Responsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC
  • Domain: Key / Certificate Handling
  • Confidence: High
  • Evidence basis: Markdown-derived requirements and generated RFQX registers; no downstream PDF analysis.

Executive Summary

Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 108 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior. Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model.

Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 20 accept; 24 accept with assumption; 60 partially accept; 1 needs internal review; 3 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 18 supplier system requirement records. Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them.

Requires customer confirmation: 3 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.; Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision. Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed.

Document Abstract

FieldInterpretation
Document PurposeConfirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 108 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior.
Engineering InterpretationInferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model.
Supplier Proposal ImpactConfirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 20 accept; 24 accept with assumption; 60 partially accept; 1 needs internal review; 3 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 18 supplier system requirement records.
System / Security ImpactInferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them.
Customer Clarification ImpactRequires customer confirmation: 3 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.; Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.; Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision.
Confidence and LimitsConfidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed.

Main Requirement Themes

ThemeSummaryRequirement CountRepresentative Requirements
Core ECA system behaviorDefines actuator ECU behavior, drivetrain integration, electrical/mechanical constraints, and verification scope.86REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00881
Cybersecurity concept and evidenceDrives cybersecurity concept, risk treatment, verification evidence, and traceability obligations.67REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00886
Responsibility and customer approval modelCreates supplier/OEM allocation decisions for work products, backend infrastructure, approvals, and residual risk.57REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00884
System architecture designGroups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.41REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00882
Key, certificate, and PKI handlingAffects ECU trust material storage, provisioning, lifecycle ownership, and customer PKI dependencies.40REQ-AUTO-00889; REQ-AUTO-00891; REQ-AUTO-00892
SystemGroups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.32REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00880; REQ-AUTO-00882
System coreGroups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.31REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00882; REQ-AUTO-00884
CybersecurityGroups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.22REQ-AUTO-00892; REQ-AUTO-00895; REQ-AUTO-00907

Document Content Structure

SectionRequirementsCriticalOpen PointsSSR Links
1 Scope1001
-- 1.1 Summary1001
2 Abbrevations3203
3 subFunctions4329312
-- 3.1 verifyCertificateBidirectional14928
-- -- 3.1.1 Request5424
-- -- 3.1.2 Response9516
-- 3.2 proofOfOwnership211638
-- -- 3.2.1 Request7615
-- -- 3.2.2 Response3102
-- -- 3.2.3 Negative Response7614
-- 3.3 deAuthenticate5214
-- -- 3.3.3 Negative Response5214
4 General5529314
-- 4.1 Certificate3014210
-- -- 4.1.3 D-RBACC extension9316
-- -- 4.1.8 Certificate Validity Time11515
-- 4.2 State-keeping8814
-- 4.5 CRNG4103
-- 4.7 PassiveDeAuthentication7313
-- -- 4.7.1 TimeBasedPassiveDeAuthentication7313
-- 4.9 Authentication completion timer6314
6 Normative references1001

What this document does not confirm

Customer-owned responsibility, final customer decisions, and unresolved open points remain unconfirmed.

Critical Requirements

IDScoreCategoryReasonStatement
REQ-AUTO-0088977High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilitysecurity relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactTable 4 – Supported subFunctions (ISO 14229-1:2020) Name verifyCertificateBidirectional proofOfOwnership deAuthenticate AUTH_REQ 155 The server shall not accept an application-layer service 0x29 request when it is received inside an SDT (service 0x84) protected message.
REQ-AUTO-0089277High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilitysecurity relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactTable 5 – verifyCertificateBidirectional Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipServer Authentication Request SID Service ID for Authentication service request 0x29 M Yes verifyCertificateBidirectional] Initiate Authentication by verifying the Certificate and generating a Proof of Ownership from the server 0x02 M Yes communicationConfiguration NOT USED 0x00 M Yes lengthOfCertificateClient Length parameter for certificateClient uint16 M Yes certificateClient The Certificate to verify uint8[] M Yes lengthOfChallengeClient Length parameter for challengeClient uint16 M Yes challengeClient See 3.1.1.1 uint8[] M Yes AUTH_REQ 117 Upon reception of a verifyCertificateBidirectional request, the server shall determine whether the Authentication delay timer is currently running.
REQ-AUTO-0089377High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilitysecurity relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactAUTH_REQ 118 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is expired, the server shall continue to process the verifyCertificateBidirectional request.
REQ-AUTO-0089577High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilitysecurity relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactAUTH_REQ 45 If the server verifies the client certificate as valid, the server shall create the requested client authentication pending state.
REQ-AUTO-0090077High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilitysecurity relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactAUTH_REQ 173 The server shall verify the value of lengthOfCertificateClient upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request.
REQ-AUTO-0090177High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilitysecurity relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactAUTH_REQ 174 If the lengthOfCertificateClient value is not within the expected range, the server shall send negative response code 0x13 (incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat).
REQ-AUTO-0090677High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilitysecurity relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact3.1.3 Negative Response AUTH_REQ 121 If upon reception of verifyCertificateBidirectional request the Authentication delay timer is running, the server shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x37, indicating requiredTimeDelayNotExpired.
REQ-AUTO-0090777High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilitysecurity relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactAUTH_REQ 122 If the server verifies the client certificate as invalid, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x10, indicating generalReject.
REQ-AUTO-0090877High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilitysecurity relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactAUTH_REQ 123 If the server fails or cannot determine that the authentication pending state was stored, it shall respond to the verifyCertificateBidirectional request with a Negative Response Code (NRC) 0x94, indicating ResourceTemporarilyNotAvailable.
REQ-AUTO-0091077High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibilitysecurity relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impactTable 7 – proofOfOwnership Request Field Description Type/Value Cvt Included in proofOfOwnershipClient Authentication Request SID Service ID for 0x29 M Yes proofOfOwnership] Verify the Proof of Ownership from the client 0x03 M Yes lengthOfProofOfOwnershipClient This field indicates the length (in octets) of the proofOfOwnershipClient field proofOfOwnershipClient See 3.2.1.1 uint8[] M No lengthOfEphemeralPublicKey Client Length parameter for ephemeralPublicKey Client ephemeralPublicKeyClient See 3.2.1.2 uint16 M Yes AUTH_REQ 110 The server shall verify whether any existing authentication pending state corresponds to the client submitting the proofOfOwnership request.

Open Points

Open PointPriorityQuestionImpactStatus
OP-002Confirm the diagnostic role model, the authorized services per role, and which party owns the diagnostic authorization policy.Security-access design and verification scope cannot be frozen; risk of an unprotected diagnostic service.Open
OP-003Confirm ownership and provisioning flow for keys/certificates (generation, injection, storage, renewal, revocation) between OEM and supplier.ECU secure-storage and provisioning design is blocked; production-line and PKI dependencies stay open.Open
OP-004Confirm the update chain ownership (backend/campaign vs. ECU programming) and the authenticity/integrity scheme to be applied.Update-control scope and evidence ownership stay open; risk of an unprotected update path.Open

Supplier System Requirements

SSRTitleStatementReqs From This PDFOther PDFsStatus
SSR-COM-003Backend and IT integration — Secure Communication and Boundary ControlThe ECU shall restrict and protect communication for Backend and IT integration, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals.REQ-AUTO-00887; REQ-AUTO-00914; REQ-AUTO-00922; REQ-AUTO-00930; REQ-AUTO-00931; REQ-AUTO-00983; REQ-AUTO-00984yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-DAI-001Authentication — Data Authenticity and Integrity VerificationThe ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of Authentication data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data.REQ-AUTO-00892; REQ-AUTO-00895; REQ-AUTO-00907; REQ-AUTO-00933; REQ-AUTO-00934; REQ-AUTO-00935; REQ-AUTO-00937; REQ-AUTO-00938; REQ-AUTO-00939; REQ-AUTO-00940; REQ-AUTO-00942; REQ-AUTO-00943; REQ-AUTO-00950; REQ-AUTO-00955; REQ-AUTO-00956; REQ-AUTO-00957; REQ-AUTO-00960yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-DAI-002System behavior — Data Authenticity and Integrity VerificationThe ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of System behavior data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data.REQ-AUTO-00905; REQ-AUTO-00919; REQ-AUTO-00959yesCandidate
SSR-DAI-004Backend and IT integration — Data Authenticity and Integrity VerificationThe ECU shall verify the authenticity and integrity of Backend and IT integration data and reject manipulated or unauthenticated data.REQ-AUTO-00894; REQ-AUTO-00913; REQ-AUTO-00915; REQ-AUTO-00923; REQ-AUTO-00924yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-DIAG-004Application software behavior — Diagnostic ServicesThe ECU shall provide the diagnostic services for Application software behavior required by the allocated customer requirements, including the specified services, sessions and data identifiers.REQ-AUTO-00962; REQ-AUTO-00964yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-KEY-002Certificate handling — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Certificate handling across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.REQ-AUTO-00951; REQ-AUTO-00953yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-KEY-003Application software behavior — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Application software behavior across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.REQ-AUTO-00889noBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-KEY-004System behavior — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for System behavior across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.REQ-AUTO-00891; REQ-AUTO-00899; REQ-AUTO-00902; REQ-AUTO-00936; REQ-AUTO-00969; REQ-AUTO-00980noCandidate
SSR-KEY-005Backend and IT integration — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Backend and IT integration across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.REQ-AUTO-00893; REQ-AUTO-00900; REQ-AUTO-00901; REQ-AUTO-00906; REQ-AUTO-00908; REQ-AUTO-00982noBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-RBAC-002Authentication — Secure Diagnostics / RBACThe ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Authentication, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model.REQ-AUTO-00944; REQ-AUTO-00967yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-RBAC-003Backend and IT integration — Secure Diagnostics / RBACThe ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Backend and IT integration, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model.REQ-AUTO-00948; REQ-AUTO-00952yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-RBAC-004Application software behavior — Secure Diagnostics / RBACThe ECU shall enforce authenticated, role-authorised access for Application software behavior, restricting security-relevant diagnostic services per the OEM-agreed role model.REQ-AUTO-00890; REQ-AUTO-00910; REQ-AUTO-00927; REQ-AUTO-00949; REQ-AUTO-00973yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-SYS-005System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.REQ-AUTO-00879; REQ-AUTO-00882; REQ-AUTO-00884; REQ-AUTO-00885; REQ-AUTO-00897yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-SYS-006System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.REQ-AUTO-00904; REQ-AUTO-00909; REQ-AUTO-00917; REQ-AUTO-00918; REQ-AUTO-00926; REQ-AUTO-00945; REQ-AUTO-00946; REQ-AUTO-00954; REQ-AUTO-00958; REQ-AUTO-00970; REQ-AUTO-00972; REQ-AUTO-00974; REQ-AUTO-00978; REQ-AUTO-00981; REQ-AUTO-00985; REQ-AUTO-00986yesReady for Customer Alignment
SSR-SYS-008Application software behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the Application software behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.REQ-AUTO-00971yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-SYS-009System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.REQ-AUTO-00881; REQ-AUTO-00898yesCandidate
SSR-TOOL-002Backend and IT integration — Tooling / IT / Evidence StorageThe supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Backend and IT integration.REQ-AUTO-00883; REQ-AUTO-00886; REQ-AUTO-00888; REQ-AUTO-00896; REQ-AUTO-00903; REQ-AUTO-00911; REQ-AUTO-00912; REQ-AUTO-00916; REQ-AUTO-00920; REQ-AUTO-00921; REQ-AUTO-00925; REQ-AUTO-00928; REQ-AUTO-00929; REQ-AUTO-00941; REQ-AUTO-00961; REQ-AUTO-00963; REQ-AUTO-00965; REQ-AUTO-00966yesBlocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-TOOL-003Backend and IT integration — Tooling / IT / Evidence StorageThe supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Backend and IT integration.REQ-AUTO-00968; REQ-AUTO-00975; REQ-AUTO-00976; REQ-AUTO-00977yesReady for Customer Alignment

Design Impact

  • Impacted System Features: Application software behavior; Application software behavior; Secure communication and freshness protection; Authentication; Authentication; Security evidence and traceability; Backend and IT integration; Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability; Certificate handling; System behavior
  • Impacted Interfaces: OEM/Customer Review Interface
  • Impacted Security Capabilities: Authentication; Certificate handling
  • Impacted Architecture Elements: Application Software; Backend and IT Systems; Backend and IT Systems; OEM/Customer Review Interface; Compliance Process; Security Services; Security Services; OEM/Customer Review Interface; System Core; System Core; OEM/Customer Review Interface
  • Impacted Work Products: Cybersecurity concept; Cybersecurity verification report; DIA / cybersecurity case; Requirement traceability record; System/architecture design
  • Impacted Tools It Hardware Test: High/High/Low; High/High/Medium; High/Low/Low; High/Low/Medium; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Medium/Low/Medium
  • Impacted Supplier System Requirements: SSR-COM-003; SSR-DAI-001; SSR-DAI-002; SSR-DAI-004; SSR-DIAG-004; SSR-KEY-002; SSR-KEY-003; SSR-KEY-004 (showing 8 of 18)
  • Design Assumptions Introduced: Security-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed.
  • Design Decisions Required: Agree responsibility split (DIA) for the non-ECU portion.