Document Purpose
Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 36 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior.
CVS154
Product and cybersecurity architecture understanding package generated from Markdown-derived requirements.
CVS154
Responsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC · Responsibility / Process · Core ECA system behavior
Executive Takeaway
Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 36 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior. Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model.
Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 22 accept; 4 accept with assumption; 7 partially accept; 1 needs customer clarification; 2 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 9 supplier system requirement records. Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them.
Requires customer confirmation: 2 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).; Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision. Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed.
Requirements36from this PDF
Critical8ranked
Open Points2linked
Derived SSRs9linked
Concept Impactyesdocument-specific
Estimation Impactyesdocument-specific
Document Abstract
Engineering Interpretation
Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model.
Main Requirement Themes
Core ECA system behavior; Cybersecurity concept and evidence; Responsibility and customer approval model; System architecture design; System (showing 5 of 8)
System / Security Impact
Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them.
Supplier Proposal Impact
Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 22 accept; 4 accept with assumption; 7 partially accept; 1 needs customer clarification; 2 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 9 supplier system requirement records.
Customer Clarification Impact
Requires customer confirmation: 2 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).; Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision.
Confidence and Limits
Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed.
Main Requirement Themes
| Theme | Engineering Meaning | Requirement Count | Representative Requirements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Core ECA system behavior | Defines actuator ECU behavior, drivetrain integration, electrical/mechanical constraints, and verification scope. | 33 | REQ-AUTO-00843; REQ-AUTO-00844; REQ-AUTO-00845 |
| Cybersecurity concept and evidence | Drives cybersecurity concept, risk treatment, verification evidence, and traceability obligations. | 26 | REQ-AUTO-00843; REQ-AUTO-00844; REQ-AUTO-00847 |
| Responsibility and customer approval model | Creates supplier/OEM allocation decisions for work products, backend infrastructure, approvals, and residual risk. | 24 | REQ-AUTO-00843; REQ-AUTO-00844; REQ-AUTO-00847 |
| System architecture design | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 15 | REQ-AUTO-00845; REQ-AUTO-00846; REQ-AUTO-00856 |
| System | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 14 | REQ-AUTO-00845; REQ-AUTO-00846; REQ-AUTO-00856 |
| System core | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 14 | REQ-AUTO-00845; REQ-AUTO-00846; REQ-AUTO-00856 |
| Constraint | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 3 | REQ-AUTO-00844; REQ-AUTO-00855; REQ-AUTO-00857 |
| Secure communication and freshness protection | Defines protected communication behavior, freshness/replay checks, and signal or PDU allocation dependencies. | 3 | REQ-AUTO-00843; REQ-AUTO-00866; REQ-AUTO-00867 |
Document Content Structure
| Section | Requirements | Critical | Open Points | SSR Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Scope | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| -- 1.1 Target readers | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 Technical content | 31 | 8 | 2 | 8 |
| -- 3.1 DSC structure | 19 | 4 | 0 | 5 |
| -- -- 3.1.1 VerificationEntry | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| -- -- 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry | 6 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| -- 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| -- 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification | 11 | 3 | 1 | 6 |
| 4 Referenced documents and IT-Systems | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| -- 4.2 Informative references | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
What This PDF Is About
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Source PDF | customer-input/pdf/CVS154.pdf |
| Converted Markdown | converted/markdown/CVS154.md |
| Document Type | Responsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC |
| Domain | Responsibility / Process |
| Scope Summary | 36 extracted requirements; 9 linked SSRs; 2 linked open points. |
| Main Themes | Core ECA system behavior; Cybersecurity concept and evidence; Responsibility and customer approval model; System architecture design; System (showing 5 of 8) |
| Does Not Confirm | Customer-owned responsibility, final customer decisions, and unresolved open points remain unconfirmed. |
| Confidence | High |
| Evidence Basis | Markdown-derived requirements and generated RFQX registers; no downstream PDF analysis. |
Key Conclusions From This PDF
- Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 36 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior.
- Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 22 accept; 4 accept with assumption; 7 partially accept; 1 needs customer clarification; 2 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 9 supplier system requirement records.
- Requires customer confirmation: 2 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).; Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision.
Critical Requirements
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| ID | Score | Category | Requirement / Reason | Supplier Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-AUTO-00866 | 95 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition DSC_BASE_REQ 41 The structure version for this document release shall be: Major ‘04’ and Minor ‘00’ DSC_BASE_REQ 42 The server shall have support for the ASN.1 contents as defined: DataSecurityContainer ::= SEQUENCE { version OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)), id OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), verificationEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF VerificationEntry, encryptionEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF EncryptionEntry, itemEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF ItemEntry } VerificationEntry ::= CHOICE { hashCmp [0] EXPLICIT HashCmp }security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; Unknown estimation impact; blocks SSR derivation | Needs Customer Clarification |
| REQ-AUTO-00873 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | DSC_BASE_INFO 35 The verification of servers support of specified dataRanges in the VerificationEntry, shall be stated for the DSC instance.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00876 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | DSC_BASE_INFO 36 The verification of servers support of specified dataRanges in the EncryptionEntry, shall be stated for the DSC instance.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00849 | 48 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | DSC_BASE_REQ 29 The server shall support a DSC containing verificationEntries.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00852 | 48 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | DSC_BASE_REQ 45 The server shall expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag with length zero for verificationEntries that contains no VerificationEntry items in a DSC transmitted by the client.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00855 | 48 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | DSC_BASE_REQ 26 The server shall support an empty DSC containing only Metadata (version and id) and the empty sequences for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and ItemEntries.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00857 | 48 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | Page 6 DSC_BASE_INFO 33 A DSC containing only version and id states that verification and encryption is not to be performed by the server, although the server shall have the support.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept | Partially Accept |
| REQ_DSC_BASE-20 | 48 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | REQ_DSC_BASE 20 The version shall be verified with the servers supported Major and Minor version of the DSC logic for compliancy.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept | Partially Accept |
| REQ-AUTO-00875 | 44 | High impact on PKI/key ownership | DSC_BASE_REQ 22 The length of key and iv shall be verified accordingly to the algorithm stipulated in EncryptionEntry.security relevant; architecture relevant; High estimation impact | Accept with Assumption |
| REQ-AUTO-00858 | 30 | General project impact | 3.1.1.1 HashCmp DSC_BASE_REQ 5 VerificationEntry hashCmp states that a hash comparison shall be used to verify the data.security relevant; architecture relevant | Accept with Assumption |
| REQ-AUTO-00860 | 30 | General project impact | Page 7 • hashAlgorithm: States which HashAlgorithm (see RFC 6234) shall be used for hashing the data to verify.security relevant; architecture relevant | Accept with Assumption |
| REQ-AUTO-00878 | 30 | General project impact | The sequence tags for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and itemEntries are required but empty (zero length).security relevant; architecture relevant | Accept with Assumption |
Customer Clarifications / Open Points
Total Open Points2document-linked
P10priority
P20priority
Blocking Conceptyesyes/no
Blocking Estimationyesyes/no
Blocking SSRyesyes/no
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| Open Point | Priority | Question / Impact | Required Customer Decision | Recommended Supplier Position | Owner | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OP-001 | Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).TARA scope and effort stay open; downstream assets, goals and design may rework. | Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA). | Proceed on the working ECA-ECU interpretation; flag every TARA-scope statement as assumption until confirmed. | OEM / Customer | Open | |
| OP-011 | Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline.Supplier position, estimation, and affected design allocation remain conditional for the listed requirements. | Decide whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context. | Carry the items as customer-confirmation dependencies and review them in the next clarification workshop. | OEM / Customer | Open |
Requirements From This PDF
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| ID | Requirement / Proposal | Supplier Position | Review | Security Capability | Feature / Interface | SSR | Open Point | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-AUTO-00866 | 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition DSC_BASE_REQ 41 The structure version for this document release shall be: Major ‘04’ and Minor ‘00’ DSC_BASE_REQ 42 The server shall have support for the ASN.1 contents as defined: DataSecurityContainer ::= SEQUENCE { version OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)), id OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), verificationEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF VerificationEntry, encryptionEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF EncryptionEntry, itemEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF ItemEntry } VerificationEntry ::= CHOICE { hashCmp [0] EXPLICIT HashCmp }Proposal: Needs customer clarification. The requirement implies customer-owned infrastructure, approval, or a responsibility split that is not yet available. | Needs Customer Clarification | Reviewed Internally | None | Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | None | OP-011 | 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition page 9 Source detailsDocument section 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition Section path 3 Technical content > 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition Page reference page 9 |
| REQ-AUTO-00873 | DSC_BASE_INFO 35 The verification of servers support of specified dataRanges in the VerificationEntry, shall be stated for the DSC instance.Proposal: Accept. Provide the cybersecurity concept as a supplier work product covering scope, assumptions, risk-treatment traceability, cybersecurity goals/requirements, mitigation strategy, V&V approach, and open responsibility dependencies. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-VV-001 | OP-001 | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 11 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 11 |
| REQ-AUTO-00876 | DSC_BASE_INFO 36 The verification of servers support of specified dataRanges in the EncryptionEntry, shall be stated for the DSC instance.Proposal: Accept. Provide the cybersecurity concept as a supplier work product covering scope, assumptions, risk-treatment traceability, cybersecurity goals/requirements, mitigation strategy, V&V approach, and open responsibility dependencies. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-VV-001 | OP-001 | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 11 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 11 |
| REQ-AUTO-00849 | DSC_BASE_REQ 29 The server shall support a DSC containing verificationEntries.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-VV-002 | - | 3.1 DSC structure page 5 Source detailsDocument section 3.1 DSC structure Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure Page reference page 5 |
| REQ-AUTO-00852 | DSC_BASE_REQ 45 The server shall expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag with length zero for verificationEntries that contains no VerificationEntry items in a DSC transmitted by the client.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-VV-002 | - | 3.1 DSC structure page 5 Source detailsDocument section 3.1 DSC structure Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure Page reference page 5 |
| REQ-AUTO-00855 | DSC_BASE_REQ 26 The server shall support an empty DSC containing only Metadata (version and id) and the empty sequences for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and ItemEntries.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-VV-002 | - | 3.1 DSC structure page 5 Source detailsDocument section 3.1 DSC structure Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure Page reference page 5 |
| REQ-AUTO-00857 | Page 6 DSC_BASE_INFO 33 A DSC containing only version and id states that verification and encryption is not to be performed by the server, although the server shall have the support.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-VV-002 | - | 3.1.1 VerificationEntry page 6 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.1 VerificationEntry Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure > 3.1.1 VerificationEntry Page reference page 6 |
| REQ_DSC_BASE-20 | REQ_DSC_BASE 20 The version shall be verified with the servers supported Major and Minor version of the DSC logic for compliancy.Proposal: Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation. | Partially Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Application software behavior None | SSR-SYS-008 | - | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 10 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 10 |
| REQ-AUTO-00875 | DSC_BASE_REQ 22 The length of key and iv shall be verified accordingly to the algorithm stipulated in EncryptionEntry.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | Key management | Key management None | SSR-KEY-001 | - | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 11 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 11 |
| REQ-AUTO-00858 | 3.1.1.1 HashCmp DSC_BASE_REQ 5 VerificationEntry hashCmp states that a hash comparison shall be used to verify the data.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-VV-001 | - | 3.1.1 VerificationEntry page 6 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.1 VerificationEntry Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure > 3.1.1 VerificationEntry Page reference page 6 |
| REQ-AUTO-00860 | Page 7 • hashAlgorithm: States which HashAlgorithm (see RFC 6234) shall be used for hashing the data to verify.Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry page 7 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure > 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Page reference page 7 |
| REQ-AUTO-00878 | The sequence tags for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and itemEntries are required but empty (zero length).Proposal: Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. | Accept with Assumption | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior; Security evidence and traceability OEM/Customer Review Interface | SSR-VV-001 | - | 4.2 Informative references page 14 Source detailsDocument section 4.2 Informative references Section path 4 Referenced documents and IT-Systems > 4.2 Informative references Page reference page 14 |
| REQ-AUTO-00861 | • dataRanges: sequence of Range items - Range: Information on which data chunks that shall be verified.Proposal: Accept. Provide the cybersecurity concept as a supplier work product covering scope, assumptions, risk-treatment traceability, cybersecurity goals/requirements, mitigation strategy, V&V approach, and open responsibility dependencies. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-CON-002 | - | 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry page 7 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure > 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Page reference page 7 |
| REQ-AUTO-00863 | DSC_BASE_REQ 39 For crypto agility reasons, both of the choices shall be supported by the server.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry page 7 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure > 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Page reference page 7 |
| REQ-AUTO-00859 | However, the instance specification may state specialized actions: • Server processes each VerificationEntry one by one.Proposal: Informational only. Keep as context; do not treat as an implementation requirement unless the customer confirms applicability. | Informational Only | Proposal Ready | None | Security evidence and traceability None | None | - | 3.1.1 VerificationEntry page 6 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.1 VerificationEntry Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure > 3.1.1 VerificationEntry Page reference page 6 |
| REQ-AUTO-00843 | Data Security Container base definition Foreword This Commercial Vehicle Standard (“CVS154”) contains requirement specifications for TRATON Group and may be referred to by any of its commercial vehicle Affiliates.Proposal: Informational only. Keep as context; do not treat as an implementation requirement unless the customer confirms applicability. | Informational Only | Proposal Ready | None | None None | None | - | page-1 Page 1 page 1 Source detailsDocument section page-1 Page 1 Section path Page 1 Page reference page 1 |
| REQ-AUTO-00844 | Any review of this CVS154 shall only be done in agreement with the involved TRATON Group commercial vehicle Affiliates stated in the table below under section “Technical responsibility”.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-009 | - | page-1 Page 1 page 1 Source detailsDocument section page-1 Page 1 Section path Page 1 Page reference page 1 |
| REQ-AUTO-00845 | The User shall apply the latest version of this CVS154.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | page-1 Page 1 page 1 Source detailsDocument section page-1 Page 1 Section path Page 1 Page reference page 1 |
| REQ-AUTO-00846 | This document shall be used accompanied with these specifications.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 1.1 Target readers page 3 Source detailsDocument section 1.1 Target readers Section path 1 Scope > 1.1 Target readers Page reference page 3 |
| REQ-AUTO-00847 | DSC_BASE_REQ 37 The server shall support a DSC Metadata block containing version and id fields.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.1 DSC structure page 5 Source detailsDocument section 3.1 DSC structure Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure Page reference page 5 |
| REQ-AUTO-00848 | DSC_BASE_REQ 43 The server shall support the Major and Minor version as specified in 3.2.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.1 DSC structure page 5 Source detailsDocument section 3.1 DSC structure Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure Page reference page 5 |
| REQ-AUTO-00850 | DSC_BASE_REQ 30 The server shall support a DSC containing encryptionEntries.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.1 DSC structure page 5 Source detailsDocument section 3.1 DSC structure Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure Page reference page 5 |
| REQ-AUTO-00851 | DSC_BASE_REQ 31 The server shall support a DSC containing itemEntries.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.1 DSC structure page 5 Source detailsDocument section 3.1 DSC structure Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure Page reference page 5 |
| REQ-AUTO-00853 | DSC_BASE_REQ 46 The server shall expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag with length zero for encryptionEntries that contains no EncryptionEntry items in a DSC transmitted by the client.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.1 DSC structure page 5 Source detailsDocument section 3.1 DSC structure Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure Page reference page 5 |
| REQ-AUTO-00854 | DSC_BASE_REQ 49 The server shall expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag with length zero for ItemEntries that contains no items in a DSC transmitted by the client.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.1 DSC structure page 5 Source detailsDocument section 3.1 DSC structure Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure Page reference page 5 |
| REQ-AUTO-00856 | DSC_BASE_INFO 44 An empty DSC issued by client means that in addition to Metadata, the syntax must be correct in accordance with Annex B.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 3.1 DSC structure page 5 Source detailsDocument section 3.1 DSC structure Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure Page reference page 5 |
| REQ-AUTO-00862 | DSC_BASE_REQ 47 The server shall support the SHA512 HashAlgorithm as referred in 3.2 ASN1 definition.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry page 7 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure > 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Page reference page 7 |
| REQ-AUTO-00864 | DSC_BASE_REQ 11 The initial counter value shall be set to 0 (zero).Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry page 7 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure > 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Page reference page 7 |
| REQ-AUTO-00865 | Range: Information on which data chunks that shall be decrypted.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry page 8 Source detailsDocument section 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Section path 3 Technical content > 3.1 DSC structure > 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry Page reference page 8 |
| REQ-AUTO-00867 | DSC_BASE_REQ 19 Upon reception of a DSC to the server, before the DSC is stored in NVM, the DSC shall be semantically verified by parsing all its content.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Secure communication and freshness protection; Backend and IT integration None | SSR-COM-006 | - | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 10 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 10 |
| REQ-AUTO-00868 | DSC_BASE_REQ 51 The length of the version field shall be verified.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 10 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 10 |
| REQ-AUTO-00870 | DSC_BASE_REQ 34 The length of the id field shall be verified.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 10 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 10 |
| REQ-AUTO-00871 | DSC_BASE_REQ 27 The hashAlgorithm shall be supported by the server.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 10 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 10 |
| REQ-AUTO-00872 | Page 11 DSC_BASE_REQ 50 The length of every referenceHash shall be consistent with the output size of the hash algorithm specified in the hashAlgorithm.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | System behavior None | SSR-SYS-005 | - | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 11 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 11 |
| REQ-AUTO-00874 | DSC_BASE_REQ 28 The EncryptionEntry algorithm shall be supported by the server.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 11 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 11 |
| REQ-AUTO-00877 | DSC_BASE_REQ 48 If the DSC instance is rejected by the server (see Annex A) when transmitted with EMP, an error code shall be returned to the client.Proposal: Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. | Accept | Proposal Ready | None | Backend and IT integration None | SSR-TOOL-002 | - | 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification page 11 Source detailsDocument section 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Section path 3 Technical content > 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification Page reference page 11 |
Derived Supplier System Requirements
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| SSR | Statement / Trace | Feature | Security Capability | Interface | Responsibility | Status | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSR-COM-006 | Secure communication and freshness protection — Secure Communication and Boundary ControlThe ECU shall restrict and protect communication for Secure communication and freshness protection, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00867. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Secure communication and freshness protection | None | None | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-CON-002 | System behavior — Cybersecurity Concept and EvidenceThe supplier shall produce and maintain the cybersecurity concept and verification evidence covering System behavior.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00861. | System behavior | None | None | Supplier-Owned | Ready for Internal Review | Review + Test |
| SSR-KEY-001 | Key management — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Key management across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00875. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Key management | Key management | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-SYS-005 | System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00845; REQ-AUTO-00846; REQ-AUTO-00856; REQ-AUTO-00860; REQ-AUTO-00864; REQ-AUTO-00865; REQ-AUTO-00868; REQ-AUTO-00870; REQ-AUTO-00872. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | System behavior | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Test |
| SSR-SYS-008 | Application software behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the Application software behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ_DSC_BASE-20. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Application software behavior | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Test |
| SSR-SYS-009 | System behavior — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00844. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | System behavior | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Supplier-Owned | Candidate | Test |
| SSR-TOOL-002 | Backend and IT integration — Tooling / IT / Evidence StorageThe supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Backend and IT integration.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00847; REQ-AUTO-00848; REQ-AUTO-00850; REQ-AUTO-00851; REQ-AUTO-00853; REQ-AUTO-00854; REQ-AUTO-00862; REQ-AUTO-00863; REQ-AUTO-00871; REQ-AUTO-00874; REQ-AUTO-00877. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Backend and IT integration | None | None | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-VV-001 | System behavior — Verification and ValidationThe supplier shall verify and validate System behavior per the agreed cybersecurity verification and validation plan.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00858; REQ-AUTO-00873; REQ-AUTO-00876; REQ-AUTO-00878. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | System behavior | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Blocked by Customer Clarification | Review + Test |
| SSR-VV-002 | Backend and IT integration — Verification and ValidationThe supplier shall verify and validate Backend and IT integration per the agreed cybersecurity verification and validation plan.From this PDF: REQ-AUTO-00849; REQ-AUTO-00852; REQ-AUTO-00855; REQ-AUTO-00857. This SSR is also supported by requirements from other PDFs. | Backend and IT integration | None | OEM/Customer Review Interface | Shared | Ready for Customer Alignment | Review + Test |
System / Security Design Impact
| Impact Area | Evidence From This PDF |
|---|---|
| Impacted system features | Application software behavior; Backend and IT integration; Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability; Key management; Secure communication and freshness protection; Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability; System behavior; System behavior; Security evidence and traceability |
| Impacted interfaces | OEM/Customer Review Interface |
| Impacted security capabilities | Key management |
| Impacted architecture elements | Application Software; Backend and IT Systems; Backend and IT Systems; OEM/Customer Review Interface; Compliance Process; Security Services; System Core; System Core; OEM/Customer Review Interface |
| Impacted work products | Cybersecurity concept; Cybersecurity verification report; DIA / cybersecurity case; Requirement traceability record; System/architecture design |
| Tools / IT / hardware / test | High/High/Low; High/Low/Medium; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Low/Low/Medium; Medium/Low/Medium |
| Design assumptions introduced | Security-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed. |
| Design decisions required | Send linked open point to the customer for decision.; Agree responsibility split (DIA) for the non-ECU portion. |
Estimation / Resource / Tooling Impact
| Impact | Status |
|---|---|
| Estimation impact | yes |
| Resource/tool/IT/HW/test impact | High/High/Low; High/Low/Medium; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Low/Low/Medium; Medium/Low/Medium |
Document Impact Diagram
Document Impact
Generated from document-specific requirement, traceability, SSR, and open-point evidence.
flowchart LR
doc["CVS154.pdf"]
d0["Key management"]
doc --> d0
f0["Feature: Application software behavior"]
doc --> f0
f1["Feature: Backend and IT integration"]
doc --> f1
f2["Feature: Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability"]
doc --> f2
i0["Interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface"]
doc --> i0
s0["SSR: SSR-COM-006"]
doc --> s0
s1["SSR: SSR-CON-002"]
doc --> s1
s2["SSR: SSR-KEY-001"]
doc --> s2
o0["Open point: OP-001"]
doc --> o0
o1["Open point: OP-011"]
doc --> o1
Mermaid source
flowchart LR
doc["CVS154.pdf"]
d0["Key management"]
doc --> d0
f0["Feature: Application software behavior"]
doc --> f0
f1["Feature: Backend and IT integration"]
doc --> f1
f2["Feature: Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability"]
doc --> f2
i0["Interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface"]
doc --> i0
s0["SSR: SSR-COM-006"]
doc --> s0
s1["SSR: SSR-CON-002"]
doc --> s1
s2["SSR: SSR-KEY-001"]
doc --> s2
o0["Open point: OP-001"]
doc --> o0
o1["Open point: OP-011"]
doc --> o1
Traceability
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| Customer Requirement | SSR | Disposition | Confidence | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-AUTO-00843 | None | Informational Only | n/a | Non-binding; not derived. |
| REQ-AUTO-00844 | SSR-SYS-009 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | High | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00845 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00846 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00847 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00848 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00849 | SSR-VV-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00850 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00851 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00852 | SSR-VV-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00853 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00854 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00855 | SSR-VV-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00856 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00857 | SSR-VV-002 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Low | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00858 | SSR-VV-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00859 | None | Informational Only | n/a | Non-binding; not derived. |
| REQ-AUTO-00860 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00861 | SSR-CON-002 | Derive Supplier System Requirement | High | Accepted requirement; seed of its SSR cluster. |
| REQ-AUTO-00862 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00863 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00864 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00865 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00866 | None | Blocked by Customer Clarification | n/a | Needs customer clarification before derivation. |
| REQ-AUTO-00867 | SSR-COM-006 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Low | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00868 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ_DSC_BASE-20 | SSR-SYS-008 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00870 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00871 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00872 | SSR-SYS-005 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00873 | SSR-VV-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00874 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00875 | SSR-KEY-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00876 | SSR-VV-001 | Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed | Medium | Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC. |
| REQ-AUTO-00877 | SSR-TOOL-002 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
| REQ-AUTO-00878 | SSR-VV-001 | Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement | Medium | Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR. |
Detailed Evidence
Document intelligence markdown
CVS154
- Source PDF:
customer-input/pdf/CVS154.pdf - Converted Markdown:
converted/markdown/CVS154.md - Document type: Responsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC
- Domain: Responsibility / Process
- Confidence: High
- Evidence basis: Markdown-derived requirements and generated RFQX registers; no downstream PDF analysis.
Executive Summary
Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 36 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior. Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model.
Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 22 accept; 4 accept with assumption; 7 partially accept; 1 needs customer clarification; 2 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 9 supplier system requirement records. Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them.
Requires customer confirmation: 2 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).; Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision. Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed.
Document Abstract
| Field | Interpretation |
|---|---|
| Document Purpose | Confirmed by requirements: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic contributes 36 Markdown-derived RFQ requirements with the strongest evidence in core eca system behavior. |
| Engineering Interpretation | Inferred from requirement pattern: for RFQX it affects the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU on the TRATON GW AMT platform by shaping core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. |
| Supplier Proposal Impact | Confirmed by requirements: supplier positioning is 22 accept; 4 accept with assumption; 7 partially accept; 1 needs customer clarification; 2 informational only. The generated traceability links this document to 9 supplier system requirement records. |
| System / Security Impact | Inferred from mapped features, capabilities, and interfaces: the main design/security impact is core eca system behavior; cybersecurity concept and evidence; responsibility and customer approval model. These themes should drive concept updates, verification evidence, and supplier proposal assumptions only where the linked requirements support them. |
| Customer Clarification Impact | Requires customer confirmation: 2 document-linked open point(s) remain, mainly: Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).; Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. Do not convert these items into agreed baseline scope until the customer confirms the decision. |
| Confidence and Limits | Confidence and limits: High confidence. Evidence is limited to Markdown-derived requirements, registers, open points, and SSR links; no downstream PDF analysis or AI-generated conclusion is claimed. |
Main Requirement Themes
| Theme | Summary | Requirement Count | Representative Requirements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Core ECA system behavior | Defines actuator ECU behavior, drivetrain integration, electrical/mechanical constraints, and verification scope. | 33 | REQ-AUTO-00843; REQ-AUTO-00844; REQ-AUTO-00845 |
| Cybersecurity concept and evidence | Drives cybersecurity concept, risk treatment, verification evidence, and traceability obligations. | 26 | REQ-AUTO-00843; REQ-AUTO-00844; REQ-AUTO-00847 |
| Responsibility and customer approval model | Creates supplier/OEM allocation decisions for work products, backend infrastructure, approvals, and residual risk. | 24 | REQ-AUTO-00843; REQ-AUTO-00844; REQ-AUTO-00847 |
| System architecture design | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 15 | REQ-AUTO-00845; REQ-AUTO-00846; REQ-AUTO-00856 |
| System | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 14 | REQ-AUTO-00845; REQ-AUTO-00846; REQ-AUTO-00856 |
| System core | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 14 | REQ-AUTO-00845; REQ-AUTO-00846; REQ-AUTO-00856 |
| Constraint | Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme. | 3 | REQ-AUTO-00844; REQ-AUTO-00855; REQ-AUTO-00857 |
| Secure communication and freshness protection | Defines protected communication behavior, freshness/replay checks, and signal or PDU allocation dependencies. | 3 | REQ-AUTO-00843; REQ-AUTO-00866; REQ-AUTO-00867 |
Document Content Structure
| Section | Requirements | Critical | Open Points | SSR Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Scope | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| -- 1.1 Target readers | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 Technical content | 31 | 8 | 2 | 8 |
| -- 3.1 DSC structure | 19 | 4 | 0 | 5 |
| -- -- 3.1.1 VerificationEntry | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| -- -- 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry | 6 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| -- 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| -- 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification | 11 | 3 | 1 | 6 |
| 4 Referenced documents and IT-Systems | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| -- 4.2 Informative references | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
What this document does not confirm
Customer-owned responsibility, final customer decisions, and unresolved open points remain unconfirmed.
Critical Requirements
| ID | Score | Category | Reason | Statement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-AUTO-00866 | 95 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; Unknown estimation impact; blocks SSR derivation | 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition DSC_BASE_REQ 41 The structure version for this document release shall be: Major ‘04’ and Minor ‘00’ DSC_BASE_REQ 42 The server shall have support for the ASN.1 contents as defined: DataSecurityContainer ::= SEQUENCE { version OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)), id OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), verificationEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF VerificationEntry, encryptionEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF EncryptionEntry, itemEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF ItemEntry } VerificationEntry ::= CHOICE { hashCmp [0] EXPLICIT HashCmp } |
| REQ-AUTO-00873 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | DSC_BASE_INFO 35 The verification of servers support of specified dataRanges in the VerificationEntry, shall be stated for the DSC instance. |
| REQ-AUTO-00876 | 77 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept; linked open point; High estimation impact | DSC_BASE_INFO 36 The verification of servers support of specified dataRanges in the EncryptionEntry, shall be stated for the DSC instance. |
| REQ-AUTO-00849 | 48 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept | DSC_BASE_REQ 29 The server shall support a DSC containing verificationEntries. |
| REQ-AUTO-00852 | 48 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept | DSC_BASE_REQ 45 The server shall expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag with length zero for verificationEntries that contains no VerificationEntry items in a DSC transmitted by the client. |
| REQ-AUTO-00855 | 48 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept | DSC_BASE_REQ 26 The server shall support an empty DSC containing only Metadata (version and id) and the empty sequences for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and ItemEntries. |
| REQ-AUTO-00857 | 48 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept | Page 6 DSC_BASE_INFO 33 A DSC containing only version and id states that verification and encryption is not to be performed by the server, although the server shall have the support. |
| REQ_DSC_BASE-20 | 48 | High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility | security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept | REQ_DSC_BASE 20 The version shall be verified with the servers supported Major and Minor version of the DSC logic for compliancy. |
| REQ-AUTO-00875 | 44 | High impact on PKI/key ownership | security relevant; architecture relevant; High estimation impact | DSC_BASE_REQ 22 The length of key and iv shall be verified accordingly to the algorithm stipulated in EncryptionEntry. |
| REQ-AUTO-00858 | 30 | General project impact | security relevant; architecture relevant | 3.1.1.1 HashCmp DSC_BASE_REQ 5 VerificationEntry hashCmp states that a hash comparison shall be used to verify the data. |
Open Points
| Open Point | Priority | Question | Impact | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OP-001 | Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA). | TARA scope and effort stay open; downstream assets, goals and design may rework. | Open | |
| OP-011 | Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline. | Supplier position, estimation, and affected design allocation remain conditional for the listed requirements. | Open |
Supplier System Requirements
| SSR | Title | Statement | Reqs From This PDF | Other PDFs | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSR-COM-006 | Secure communication and freshness protection — Secure Communication and Boundary Control | The ECU shall restrict and protect communication for Secure communication and freshness protection, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals. | REQ-AUTO-00867 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-CON-002 | System behavior — Cybersecurity Concept and Evidence | The supplier shall produce and maintain the cybersecurity concept and verification evidence covering System behavior. | REQ-AUTO-00861 | no | Ready for Internal Review |
| SSR-KEY-001 | Key management — Key and Certificate Handling | The ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Key management across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle. | REQ-AUTO-00875 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-SYS-005 | System behavior — System Function | The ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing. | REQ-AUTO-00845; REQ-AUTO-00846; REQ-AUTO-00856; REQ-AUTO-00860; REQ-AUTO-00864; REQ-AUTO-00865; REQ-AUTO-00868; REQ-AUTO-00870; REQ-AUTO-00872 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-SYS-008 | Application software behavior — System Function | The ECU shall implement the Application software behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing. | REQ_DSC_BASE-20 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-SYS-009 | System behavior — System Function | The ECU shall implement the System behavior behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing. | REQ-AUTO-00844 | yes | Candidate |
| SSR-TOOL-002 | Backend and IT integration — Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage | The supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Backend and IT integration. | REQ-AUTO-00847; REQ-AUTO-00848; REQ-AUTO-00850; REQ-AUTO-00851; REQ-AUTO-00853; REQ-AUTO-00854; REQ-AUTO-00862; REQ-AUTO-00863; REQ-AUTO-00871; REQ-AUTO-00874; REQ-AUTO-00877 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-VV-001 | System behavior — Verification and Validation | The supplier shall verify and validate System behavior per the agreed cybersecurity verification and validation plan. | REQ-AUTO-00858; REQ-AUTO-00873; REQ-AUTO-00876; REQ-AUTO-00878 | yes | Blocked by Customer Clarification |
| SSR-VV-002 | Backend and IT integration — Verification and Validation | The supplier shall verify and validate Backend and IT integration per the agreed cybersecurity verification and validation plan. | REQ-AUTO-00849; REQ-AUTO-00852; REQ-AUTO-00855; REQ-AUTO-00857 | yes | Ready for Customer Alignment |
Design Impact
- Impacted System Features: Application software behavior; Backend and IT integration; Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability; Key management; Secure communication and freshness protection; Backend and IT integration; Security evidence and traceability; System behavior; System behavior; Security evidence and traceability
- Impacted Interfaces: OEM/Customer Review Interface
- Impacted Security Capabilities: Key management
- Impacted Architecture Elements: Application Software; Backend and IT Systems; Backend and IT Systems; OEM/Customer Review Interface; Compliance Process; Security Services; System Core; System Core; OEM/Customer Review Interface
- Impacted Work Products: Cybersecurity concept; Cybersecurity verification report; DIA / cybersecurity case; Requirement traceability record; System/architecture design
- Impacted Tools It Hardware Test: High/High/Low; High/Low/Medium; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Low/Low/Medium; Medium/Low/Medium
- Impacted Supplier System Requirements: SSR-COM-006; SSR-CON-002; SSR-KEY-001; SSR-SYS-005; SSR-SYS-008; SSR-SYS-009; SSR-TOOL-002; SSR-VV-001 (showing 8 of 9)
- Design Assumptions Introduced: Security-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed.
- Design Decisions Required: Send linked open point to the customer for decision.; Agree responsibility split (DIA) for the non-ECU portion.