CVS154

What this document contains

Confirmed Requirements24customer ID + normative

Needs Clarification6no customer ID

Information15descriptive

Reference2definitions, scope

Critical12ranked impact

Open Points3linked

Tables / Diagrams0 / 8extracted

Derived SSRs7linked

Executive Takeaway

Systems-engineering read of what this document defines for the system - scope, boundaries, interfaces, obligations, and what is still open.

Document Purpose

System Boundary & Interfaces

System boundary and interfaces: the document constrains 1 interface(s) - OEM/Customer Review Interface; principal functions in scope are Security evidence and traceability; Secure communication and freshness protection.

Design / Security Impact

Design and security impact: affects Security evidence and traceability; Secure communication and freshness protection; security capabilities touched: Key management; 7 supplier system requirement(s) were derived from this document.

Open For Customer

Open for the customer: 3 document-linked open point(s) - mainly Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).; Confirm the DIA / responsibility (RASIC/CIA) split for each cybersecurity work product before supplier scope is fixed.; Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline - plus 6 unidentified requirement-like statement(s). Do not baseline these until the customer confirms.

Confidence and limits: High confidence. Categorisation is derived from the converted Markdown (customer IDs, normative wording, and section context); no OCR or downstream PDF analysis is used.

Main Requirement Themes

Theme	Engineering Meaning	Requirement Count	Representative Requirements
Cybersecurity concept and evidence	Drives cybersecurity concept, risk treatment, verification evidence, and traceability obligations.	31	RFQX-CVS154-0001; RFQX-CVS154-0002; RFQX-CVS154-0006
Responsibility and customer approval model	Creates supplier/OEM allocation decisions for work products, backend infrastructure, approvals, and residual risk.	25	RFQX-CVS154-0001; RFQX-CVS154-0002; RFQX-CVS154-0008
System architecture design	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	25	RFQX-CVS154-0003; RFQX-CVS154-0004; RFQX-CVS154-0005
Requirement	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	24	RFQX-CVS154-0008; RFQX-CVS154-0009; RFQX-CVS154-0010
System	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	24	RFQX-CVS154-0003; RFQX-CVS154-0004; RFQX-CVS154-0005
Information	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	15	RFQX-CVS154-0005; RFQX-CVS154-0006; RFQX-CVS154-0007
System core	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	15	RFQX-CVS154-0003; RFQX-CVS154-0004; RFQX-CVS154-0017
Needs clarification	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	6	RFQX-CVS154-0002; RFQX-CVS154-0003; RFQX-CVS154-0004

Document Content Structure

Section	Requirements	Information	Total Items	Critical	Open Points	SSR Links
1 Scope	0	0	1	1	1	0
-- 1.1 Target readers	0	0	1	1	1	0
3 Technical content	24	15	42	8	2	7
-- 3.1 DSC structure	13	12	28	6	2	4
-- -- 3.1.1 VerificationEntry	1	6	7	0	0	1
-- -- 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry	3	2	8	3	2	2
-- 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition	2	1	3	1	0	1
-- 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification	9	2	11	1	0	5
4 Referenced documents and IT-Systems	0	0	1	1	1	0
-- 4.2 Informative references	0	0	1	1	1	0

Tables and Diagrams

Tables are reconstructed column-correct from the document text layer (no OCR). Diagrams are linked from converted image assets.

Tables0column-correct

Diagrams8image-linked

Linked Artifacts5requirement-linked

Diagrams (8)

DiagramFigure 1 – Specification relationship

4.2 Informative references . 12 · page 3 · Linked: None

Page SnapshotLink confidence: High

Open full size

Diagram source context

DiagramFigure 2

3.1 DSC structure · page 4 · Linked: DSC_BASE_INFO 2; DSC_BASE_INFO 1; DSC_BASE_INFO 3

Page SnapshotLink confidence: High

Open full size

Diagram source context

DiagramFigure 2 – DSC structure

3.1 DSC structure · page 4 · Linked: DSC_BASE_INFO 2; DSC_BASE_INFO 1; DSC_BASE_INFO 3

Page SnapshotLink confidence: High

Open full size

Diagram source context

DiagramFigure 3 – HashCmp

3.1.1.1 HashCmp · page 6 · Linked: DSC_BASE_INFO 7; DSC_BASE_REQ 5

Page SnapshotLink confidence: High

Open full size

Security protocol or cryptographic context

DiagramFigure 4 – AESCTR128

3.1.2.1 AESCTR128 · page 7 · Linked: DSC_BASE_REQ 11

Page SnapshotLink confidence: High

Open full size

Diagram source context

DiagramFigure 4 – ChaCha20

3.1.2.2 CHACHA20 · page 8 · Linked: None

Page SnapshotLink confidence: High

Open full size

Diagram source context

DiagramFigure 5 – Item list

3.1.3 ItemEntry · page 9 · Linked: DSC_BASE_INFO 17; DSC_BASE_REQ 41; DSC_BASE_REQ 42

Page SnapshotLink confidence: High

Open full size

Security protocol or cryptographic context

DiagramFigure 6 – DSC sanity check and verification

4.2 Informative references · page 13 · Linked: None

Page SnapshotLink confidence: High

Open full size

Security protocol or cryptographic context

What This PDF Is About

Field	Value
Source PDF	CVS154.pdf
Document Type	Responsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC
Domain	Responsibility / Process
Scope Summary	24 confirmed requirements, 6 needing clarification, 15 information, 2 reference items; 7 linked SSRs; 3 linked open points.
Main Themes	Cybersecurity concept and evidence; Responsibility and customer approval model; System architecture design; Requirement; System (sample: 5 of 8)
Does Not Confirm	Customer-owned responsibility, final customer decisions, and unresolved open points remain unconfirmed.
Confidence	High
Evidence Basis	Markdown-derived requirements and generated RFQX registers; no downstream PDF analysis.

Critical Requirements

This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.

ID	Score	Category	Requirement / Reason	Supplier Position
RFQX-CVS154-0025	81	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	• hashAlgorithm: States which HashAlgorithm (see RFC 6234) shall be used for hashing the data to verify.security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	Needs Customer Clarification
RFQX-CVS154-0047	81	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	The sequence tags for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and itemEntries are required but empty (zero length).security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	Reference / Document Information
RFQX-CVS154-0026	80	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	• dataRanges: sequence of Range items - Range: Information on which data chunks that shall be verified.architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; High estimation impact; blocks SSR derivation	Needs Customer Clarification
RFQX-CVS154-0002	66	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	Any review of this CVS154 shall only be done in agreement with the involved TRATON Group commercial vehicle Affiliates stated in the table below under section “Technical responsibility”.architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	Needs Customer Clarification
RFQX-CVS154-0003	66	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	The User shall apply the latest version of this CVS154.architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	Needs Customer Clarification
RFQX-CVS154-0004	66	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	This document shall be used accompanied with these specifications.architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	Needs Customer Clarification
RFQX-CVS154-0032	66	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	Range: Information on which data chunks that shall be decrypted.architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	Needs Customer Clarification
DSC_BASE_REQ 29	48	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	The server shall support a DSC containing verificationEntries.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept	Partially Accept
DSC_BASE_REQ 45	48	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	The server shall expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag with length zero for verificationEntries that contains no VerificationEntry items in a DSC transmitted by the client.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept	Partially Accept
DSC_BASE_REQ 26	48	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	The server shall support an empty DSC containing only Metadata (version and id) and the empty sequences for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and ItemEntries.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept	Partially Accept
DSC_BASE_REQ 42	48	High impact on estimation/resources/tools	The server shall have support for the ASN.1 contents as defined: DataSecurityContainer ::= SEQUENCE { version OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)), id OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), verificationEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF VerificationEntry, encryptionEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF EncryptionEntry, itemEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF ItemEntry } VerificationEntry ::= CHOICE { hashCmp [0] EXPLICIT HashCmp }security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Internal Review	Needs Internal Review
REQ_DSC_BASE_20	48	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	The version shall be verified with the servers supported Major and Minor version of the DSC logic for compliancy.security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept	Partially Accept

Customer Clarifications / Open Points

Total Open Points3document-linked

P10priority

P20priority

Blocking Conceptyesyes / no

Blocking Estimationyesyes / no

Blocking SSRyesyes / no

Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).

Impact if unresolved: TARA scope and effort stay open; downstream assets, goals and design may rework.

OpenOpen

Confirm the DIA / responsibility (RASIC/CIA) split for each cybersecurity work product before supplier scope is fixed.

Impact if unresolved: Without an agreed DIA the supplier risks owning customer work products or leaving cybersecurity gaps in the case.

OpenOpen

Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline.

Impact if unresolved: Supplier position, estimation, and affected design allocation remain conditional for the listed requirements.

OpenOpen

Open full open-point table (all fields)

This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.

Open Point	Question / Impact	Required Customer Decision	Recommended Supplier Position	Owner	Status
OP-001	Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).TARA scope and effort stay open; downstream assets, goals and design may rework.	Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).	Proceed on the working ECA-ECU interpretation; flag every TARA-scope statement as assumption until confirmed.	OEM / Customer	Open
OP-009	Confirm the DIA / responsibility (RASIC/CIA) split for each cybersecurity work product before supplier scope is fixed.Without an agreed DIA the supplier risks owning customer work products or leaving cybersecurity gaps in the case.	Confirm the DIA / responsibility (RASIC/CIA) split for each cybersecurity work product before supplier scope is fixed.	Deliver supplier-owned work products per concept; require a signed DIA/RASIC before treating shared items as supplier scope.	OEM / Customer + Supplier (DIA)	Open
OP-011	Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline.Supplier position, estimation, and affected design allocation remain conditional for the listed requirements.	Decide whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context.	Carry the items as customer-confirmation dependencies and review them in the next clarification workshop.	OEM / Customer	Open

Confirmed requirements (24)

Items carrying a customer requirement ID and a normative (shall/must) statement.

Content / SectionSupplier PositionReview StatusSecurity CapabilityEstimation ImpactOpen PointDecision Source

DSC_BASE_REQ 29RFQX-CVS154-0010Requirement3.1 DSC structurepage 5

The server shall support a DSC containing verificationEntries.

Partially AcceptSSR SSR-VV-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface

Supplier proposal

Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Decision Decision Source Reviewer / Owner Evidence Reference Comment Linked Open Point Close Linked Open Point? Open Point Closure Reason Closure Source Modified Requirement Text / Requested Change Superseding Requirement ID / Explanation

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 45RFQX-CVS154-0013Requirement3.1 DSC structurepage 5

The server shall expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag with length zero for verificationEntries that contains no VerificationEntry items in a DSC transmitted by the client.

Partially AcceptSSR SSR-VV-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface

Supplier proposal

Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 26RFQX-CVS154-0016Requirement3.1 DSC structurepage 5

The server shall support an empty DSC containing only Metadata (version and id) and the empty sequences for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and ItemEntries.

Partially AcceptSSR SSR-VV-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface

Supplier proposal

Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 42RFQX-CVS154-0035Requirement3.2 DSC ASN.1 definitionpage 9

The server shall have support for the ASN.1 contents as defined: DataSecurityContainer ::= SEQUENCE { version OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)), id OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), verificationEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF VerificationEntry, encryptionEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF EncryptionEntry, itemEntries SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF ItemEntry } VerificationEntry ::= CHOICE { hashCmp [0] EXPLICIT HashCmp }

Needs Internal Review0 tables · 1 diagrams

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition

Page

page 9

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface

Supplier proposal

Needs internal review. Confirm the extracted wording and the intended scope before committing a supplier position. Related source tables/diagrams are treated as interpretation context, not separate customer IDs.

Related Tables / Diagrams

Linked tables: 0 | Linked diagrams: 1

DIAGRAM-CVS154-0007 Diagram: Figure 5 – Item list page 9
Security protocol or cryptographic context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
Open full size

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

REQ_DSC_BASE_20RFQX-CVS154-0038Requirement3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 10

The version shall be verified with the servers supported Major and Minor version of the DSC logic for compliancy.

Partially AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-003

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 10

Supplier proposal

Partially accept. Supplier can implement the ECU-side behaviour, but OEM-owned backend/PKI/fleet responsibilities require customer confirmation.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 22RFQX-CVS154-0044Requirement3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 11

The length of key and iv shall be verified accordingly to the algorithm stipulated in EncryptionEntry.

Accept with AssumptionSSR SSR-KEY-001

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 11

Security capability

Key management

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 5RFQX-CVS154-0021Requirement3.1.1 VerificationEntrypage 6

VerificationEntry hashCmp states that a hash comparison shall be used to verify the data.

Accept with AssumptionSSR SSR-VV-0010 tables · 1 diagrams

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1.1.1 HashCmp

Page

page 6

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement as part of the cybersecurity concept and map to verification evidence, assuming the customer confirms responsibility allocation and method. Related source tables/diagrams are treated as interpretation context, not separate customer IDs.

Related Tables / Diagrams

Linked tables: 0 | Linked diagrams: 1

DIAGRAM-CVS154-0004 Diagram: Figure 3 – HashCmp page 6
Security protocol or cryptographic context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
Open full size

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 39RFQX-CVS154-0029Requirement3.1.2 EncryptionEntrypage 7

For crypto agility reasons, both of the choices shall be supported by the server.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1.2 EncryptionEntry

Page

page 7

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 37RFQX-CVS154-0008Requirement3.1 DSC structurepage 5

The server shall support a DSC Metadata block containing version and id fields.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 43RFQX-CVS154-0009Requirement3.1 DSC structurepage 5

The server shall support the Major and Minor version as specified in 3.2.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 30RFQX-CVS154-0011Requirement3.1 DSC structurepage 5

The server shall support a DSC containing encryptionEntries.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 31RFQX-CVS154-0012Requirement3.1 DSC structurepage 5

The server shall support a DSC containing itemEntries.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 46RFQX-CVS154-0014Requirement3.1 DSC structurepage 5

The server shall expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag with length zero for encryptionEntries that contains no EncryptionEntry items in a DSC transmitted by the client.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 49RFQX-CVS154-0015Requirement3.1 DSC structurepage 5

The server shall expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag with length zero for ItemEntries that contains no items in a DSC transmitted by the client.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 47RFQX-CVS154-0027Requirement3.1.2 EncryptionEntrypage 7

The server shall support the SHA512 HashAlgorithm as referred in 3.2 ASN1 definition.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1.2 EncryptionEntry

Page

page 7

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 11RFQX-CVS154-0031Requirement3.1.2 EncryptionEntrypage 7

The initial counter value shall be set to 0 (zero).

AcceptSSR SSR-SYS-0010 tables · 1 diagrams

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.1.2 EncryptionEntry

Page

page 7

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria. Related source tables/diagrams are treated as interpretation context, not separate customer IDs.

Related Tables / Diagrams

Linked tables: 0 | Linked diagrams: 1

DIAGRAM-CVS154-0005 Diagram: Figure 4 – AESCTR128 page 7
Diagram source context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
Open full size

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 41RFQX-CVS154-0034Requirement3.2 DSC ASN.1 definitionpage 9

The structure version for this document release shall be: Major ‘04’ and Minor ‘00’

AcceptSSR SSR-SYS-0010 tables · 1 diagrams

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition

Page

page 9

Supplier proposal

Related Tables / Diagrams

Linked tables: 0 | Linked diagrams: 1

DIAGRAM-CVS154-0007 Diagram: Figure 5 – Item list page 9
Security protocol or cryptographic context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
Open full size

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 19RFQX-CVS154-0036Requirement3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 10

Upon reception of a DSC to the server, before the DSC is stored in NVM, the DSC shall be semantically verified by parsing all its content.

AcceptSSR SSR-COM-009

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 10

Feature / Interface

Secure communication and freshness protection / None

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 51RFQX-CVS154-0037Requirement3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 10

The length of the version field shall be verified.

AcceptSSR SSR-SYS-001

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 10

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 34RFQX-CVS154-0039Requirement3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 10

The length of the id field shall be verified.

AcceptSSR SSR-SYS-001

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 10

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 27RFQX-CVS154-0040Requirement3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 10

The hashAlgorithm shall be supported by the server.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 10

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 50RFQX-CVS154-0041Requirement3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 11

The length of every referenceHash shall be consistent with the output size of the hash algorithm specified in the hashAlgorithm.

AcceptSSR SSR-SYS-001

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 11

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 28RFQX-CVS154-0043Requirement3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 11

The EncryptionEntry algorithm shall be supported by the server.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 11

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

DSC_BASE_REQ 48RFQX-CVS154-0046Requirement3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 11

If the DSC instance is rejected by the server (see Annex A) when transmitted with EMP, an error code shall be returned to the client.

AcceptSSR SSR-TOOL-002

Details & reviewer feedback

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 11

Supplier proposal

Accept. Implement the ECA ECU behavior against the mapped feature/interface and verify through supplier test evidence, subject to customer-confirmed responsibility and acceptance criteria.

Reviewer Decision / Feedback

Feedback Authoring

Needs customer clarification (6)

Reads like a requirement but no customer requirement ID was identified in the source. Confirm with the customer before baselining — not counted as a confirmed requirement.

—RFQX-CVS154-0025Needs Clarification3.1.2 EncryptionEntrypage 7

• hashAlgorithm: States which HashAlgorithm (see RFC 6234) shall be used for hashing the data to verify.

Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline.

Open point OP-011

Details

Section

3.1.2 EncryptionEntry

Page

page 7

—RFQX-CVS154-0026Needs Clarification3.1.2 EncryptionEntrypage 7

• dataRanges: sequence of Range items - Range: Information on which data chunks that shall be verified.

Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).

Open point OP-001

Details

Section

3.1.2 EncryptionEntry

Page

page 7

—RFQX-CVS154-0002Needs Clarificationpage-1 Page 1page 1

Any review of this CVS154 shall only be done in agreement with the involved TRATON Group commercial vehicle Affiliates stated in the table below under section “Technical responsibility”.

Confirm the DIA / responsibility (RASIC/CIA) split for each cybersecurity work product before supplier scope is fixed.

Open point OP-009

Details

Section

page-1 Page 1

Page

page 1

—RFQX-CVS154-0003Needs Clarificationpage-1 Page 1page 1

The User shall apply the latest version of this CVS154.

Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline.

Open point OP-011

Details

Section

page-1 Page 1

Page

page 1

—RFQX-CVS154-0004Needs Clarification1.1 Target readerspage 3

This document shall be used accompanied with these specifications.

Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline.

Open point OP-011

Details

Section

1.1 Target readers

Page

page 3

—RFQX-CVS154-0032Needs Clarification3.1.2 EncryptionEntrypage 8

Range: Information on which data chunks that shall be decrypted.

Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline.

Open point OP-011

Details

Section

3.1.2 EncryptionEntry

Page

page 8

Information / descriptive (15)

Descriptive or contextual statements with a customer ID but no binding (shall/must) wording.

DSC_BASE_INFO 33RFQX-CVS154-0018Information3.1.1 VerificationEntrypage 6

A DSC containing only version and id states that verification and encryption is not to be performed by the server, although the server shall have the support.

Details

Section

3.1.1 VerificationEntry

Page

page 6

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface

DSC_BASE_INFO 35RFQX-CVS154-0042Information3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 11

The verification of servers support of specified dataRanges in the VerificationEntry, shall be stated for the DSC instance.

Details

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 11

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface

DSC_BASE_INFO 36RFQX-CVS154-0045Information3.3 DSC sanity check and verificationpage 11

The verification of servers support of specified dataRanges in the EncryptionEntry, shall be stated for the DSC instance.

Details

Section

3.3 DSC sanity check and verification

Page

page 11

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface

DSC_BASE_INFO 2RFQX-CVS154-0006Information3.1 DSC structurepage 4

The DSC is divided in a metadata header block and three configuration blocks as shown in Figure 2 verificationEntries[..] encryptionEntries[..] itemEntries[..] id version Metadata Figure 2 – DSC structure

0 tables · 2 diagrams

Details

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 4

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / None

Related Tables / Diagrams

Linked tables: 0 | Linked diagrams: 2

DIAGRAM-CVS154-0002 Diagram: Figure 2 page 4
Diagram source context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
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DIAGRAM-CVS154-0003 Diagram: Figure 2 – DSC structure page 4
Diagram source context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
Open full size

DSC_BASE_INFO 4RFQX-CVS154-0019Information3.1.1 VerificationEntrypage 6

The VerificationEntry is of ASN.1 type CHOICE, where the choice stipulates the verification strategy for a piece of data.

Details

Section

3.1.1 VerificationEntry

Page

page 6

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / None

DSC_BASE_INFO 38RFQX-CVS154-0020Information3.1.1 VerificationEntrypage 6

See 3.2 for the context-specific tag number for the VerificationEntry choices.

Details

Section

3.1.1 VerificationEntry

Page

page 6

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / None

DSC_BASE_INFO 6RFQX-CVS154-0022Information3.1.1 VerificationEntrypage 6

When the server is instructed to verify the programmed data, in general the following actions are taken by the server.

Details

Section

3.1.1 VerificationEntry

Page

page 6

—RFQX-CVS154-0023Information3.1.1 VerificationEntrypage 6

However, the instance specification may state specialized actions: • Server processes each VerificationEntry one by one.

Details

Section

3.1.1 VerificationEntry

Page

page 6

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / None

DSC_BASE_INFO 7RFQX-CVS154-0024Information3.1.1 VerificationEntrypage 6

Definition of hashCmp fields: Refer to Figure 3 for type definitions of each field.

0 tables · 1 diagrams

Details

Section

3.1.1 VerificationEntry

Page

page 6

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / None

Related Tables / Diagrams

Linked tables: 0 | Linked diagrams: 1

DIAGRAM-CVS154-0004 Diagram: Figure 3 – HashCmp page 6
Security protocol or cryptographic context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
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DSC_BASE_INFO 44RFQX-CVS154-0017Information3.1 DSC structurepage 5

An empty DSC issued by client means that in addition to Metadata, the syntax must be correct in accordance with Annex B.

Details

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

DSC_BASE_INFO 1RFQX-CVS154-0005Information3.1 DSC structurepage 4

See further chapter 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition for element types.

0 tables · 2 diagrams

Details

Section

3 Technical content 3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 4

Related Tables / Diagrams

Linked tables: 0 | Linked diagrams: 2

DIAGRAM-CVS154-0002 Diagram: Figure 2 page 4
Diagram source context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
Open full size
DIAGRAM-CVS154-0003 Diagram: Figure 2 – DSC structure page 4
Diagram source context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
Open full size

DSC_BASE_INFO 3RFQX-CVS154-0007Information3.1 DSC structurepage 5

• version: specifies a version of the DSC structure, namely the DSC ASN.1 definition and its elements within the DSC instance.

0 tables · 2 diagrams

Details

Section

3.1 DSC structure

Page

page 5

Related Tables / Diagrams

Linked tables: 0 | Linked diagrams: 2

DIAGRAM-CVS154-0002 Diagram: Figure 2 page 4
Diagram source context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
Open full size
DIAGRAM-CVS154-0003 Diagram: Figure 2 – DSC structure page 4
Diagram source context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
Open full size

DSC_BASE_INFO 9RFQX-CVS154-0028Information3.1.2 EncryptionEntrypage 7

The encryptionEntry is of ASN.1 type CHOICE stipulating the decryption strategy for a piece of data.

Details

Section

3.1.2 EncryptionEntry

Page

page 7

DSC_BASE_INFO 40RFQX-CVS154-0030Information3.1.2 EncryptionEntrypage 7

See 3.2 for the context-specific tag number for the EncryptionEntry choices.

Details

Section

3.1.2 EncryptionEntry

Page

page 7

DSC_BASE_INFO 17RFQX-CVS154-0033Information3.2 DSC ASN.1 definitionpage 9

An ItemEntry is of ASN.1 type CHOICE, where the choice stipulates the type of item the ItemEntry holds.

0 tables · 1 diagrams

Details

Section

3.1.3 ItemEntry

Page

page 9

Related Tables / Diagrams

Linked tables: 0 | Linked diagrams: 1

DIAGRAM-CVS154-0007 Diagram: Figure 5 – Item list page 9
Security protocol or cryptographic context Image available: yes View artifact
Page SnapshotLink confidence: High
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Reference / document information (2)

Definitions, abbreviations, document history, scope and other boilerplate. Not customer requirements.

—RFQX-CVS154-0047Reference4.2 Informative referencespage 14

Informative references

The sequence tags for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and itemEntries are required but empty (zero length).

Open point OP-011

Details

Section

4.2 Informative references

Page

page 14

Feature / Interface

Security evidence and traceability / OEM/Customer Review Interface

—RFQX-CVS154-0001Referencepage-1 Page 1page 1

Page 1

Data Security Container base definition Foreword This Commercial Vehicle Standard (“CVS154”) contains requirement specifications for TRATON Group and may be referred to by any of its commercial vehicle Affiliates.

Details

Section

page-1 Page 1

Page

page 1

Derived Supplier System Requirements

This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.

SSR	Statement / Trace	Feature	Security Capability	Interface	Responsibility	Status	Verification
SSR-COM-009	Secure communication and freshness protection — Secure Communication and Boundary ControlThe ECU shall restrict and protect communication for Secure communication and freshness protection, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals (IT / backend domain; allocated to Backend and IT Systems).From this PDF: RFQX-CVS154-0036.	Secure communication and freshness protection	None	None	Shared	Blocked by Customer Clarification	Review + Test + table/diagram context review
SSR-KEY-001	Key and Certificate Handling — Key and Certificate HandlingThe ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Key and Certificate Handling across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Certificate handling; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-CVS154-0044.	Key and Certificate Handling	Certificate handling	OEM/Customer Review Interface	Shared	Blocked by Customer Clarification	Review + Test + table/diagram context review
SSR-SYS-001	System Function — System FunctionThe ECU shall implement the System Function behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing (System domain; allocated to System Core; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-CVS154-0031; RFQX-CVS154-0034; RFQX-CVS154-0037; RFQX-CVS154-0039; RFQX-CVS154-0041.	System Function	None	OEM/Customer Review Interface	Supplier-Owned	Candidate	Test + table/diagram context review
SSR-TOOL-002	Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage — Tooling / IT / Evidence StorageThe supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage (IT / backend domain; allocated to Backend and IT Systems; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-CVS154-0008; RFQX-CVS154-0009; RFQX-CVS154-0011; RFQX-CVS154-0012; RFQX-CVS154-0014; RFQX-CVS154-0015; RFQX-CVS154-0027; RFQX-CVS154-0029; RFQX-CVS154-0040; RFQX-CVS154-0043; RFQX-CVS154-0046.	Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage	None	OEM/Customer Review Interface	Shared	Blocked by Customer Clarification	Review + Test + table/diagram context review
SSR-TOOL-003	Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage — Tooling / IT / Evidence StorageThe supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage (Software domain; allocated to Application Software).From this PDF: RFQX-CVS154-0038.	Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage	None	None	Shared	Ready for Customer Alignment	Review + Test + table/diagram context review
SSR-VV-001	Security evidence and traceability — Verification and ValidationThe supplier shall verify and validate Security evidence and traceability per the agreed cybersecurity verification and validation plan (System domain; allocated to System Core; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-CVS154-0021.	Security evidence and traceability	None	OEM/Customer Review Interface	Supplier-Owned	Candidate	Review + Test + table/diagram context review
SSR-VV-002	Security evidence and traceability — Verification and ValidationThe supplier shall verify and validate Security evidence and traceability per the agreed cybersecurity verification and validation plan (IT / backend domain; allocated to Backend and IT Systems; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).From this PDF: RFQX-CVS154-0010; RFQX-CVS154-0013; RFQX-CVS154-0016.	Security evidence and traceability	None	OEM/Customer Review Interface	Shared	Ready for Customer Alignment	Review + Test + table/diagram context review

System / Security Design Impact

Impact Area	Evidence From This PDF
Impacted system features	Secure communication and freshness protection; Security evidence and traceability
Impacted interfaces	OEM/Customer Review Interface
Impacted security capabilities	Key management
Impacted architecture elements	Application Software; Backend and IT Systems; Backend and IT Systems; OEM/Customer Review Interface; Compliance Process; Security Services; System Core; System Core; OEM/Customer Review Interface
Impacted work products	Cybersecurity concept; Cybersecurity verification report; DIA / cybersecurity case; Requirement traceability record; System/architecture design
Tools / IT / hardware / test	High/High/Low; High/Low/Low; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Low/Low/Medium; Medium/Low/Medium
Design assumptions introduced	Security-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed. Linked source table/diagram context was considered for interpretation.; Security-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed.
Design decisions required	Confirm with customer whether this is a binding requirement and assign a customer ID.

Estimation / Resource / Tooling Impact

Impact	Status
Estimation impact	yes
Resource/tool/IT/HW/test impact	High/High/Low; High/Low/Low; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Low/Low/Medium; Medium/Low/Medium

Document Impact Diagram

Document Impact

Generated from document-specific requirement, traceability, SSR, and open-point evidence.

flowchart LR doc["CVS154.pdf"] d0["Key management"] doc --> d0 f0["Feature: Secure communication and freshness protection"] doc --> f0 f1["Feature: Security evidence and traceability"] doc --> f1 i0["Interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface"] doc --> i0 s0["SSR: SSR-COM-009"] doc --> s0 s1["SSR: SSR-KEY-001"] doc --> s1 s2["SSR: SSR-SYS-001"] doc --> s2 o0["Open point: OP-001"] doc --> o0 o1["Open point: OP-009"] doc --> o1 o2["Open point: OP-011"] doc --> o2

Mermaid source

flowchart LR
  doc["CVS154.pdf"]
  d0["Key management"]
  doc --> d0
  f0["Feature: Secure communication and freshness protection"]
  doc --> f0
  f1["Feature: Security evidence and traceability"]
  doc --> f1
  i0["Interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface"]
  doc --> i0
  s0["SSR: SSR-COM-009"]
  doc --> s0
  s1["SSR: SSR-KEY-001"]
  doc --> s1
  s2["SSR: SSR-SYS-001"]
  doc --> s2
  o0["Open point: OP-001"]
  doc --> o0
  o1["Open point: OP-009"]
  doc --> o1
  o2["Open point: OP-011"]
  doc --> o2

Source Traceability

Source document

CVS154.pdf

Document type

Responsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC

Domain

Responsibility / Process

Generated records

24 requirements, 15 information, 7 SSRs

Linked artifacts

0 tables, 8 diagrams

Evidence basis

Markdown-derived requirements and registers; OCR disabled; no downstream PDF analysis

Requirement to SSR Traceability

This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.

Customer Requirement	SSR	Disposition	Confidence	Reason
RFQX-CVS154-0001	None	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	n/a	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0002	None	Blocked by Customer Clarification	n/a	Needs customer clarification before derivation.
RFQX-CVS154-0003	None	Blocked by Customer Clarification	n/a	Needs customer clarification before derivation.
RFQX-CVS154-0004	None	Blocked by Customer Clarification	n/a	Needs customer clarification before derivation.
RFQX-CVS154-0005	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0006	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0007	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0008	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0009	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0010	SSR-VV-002	Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed	Low	Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
RFQX-CVS154-0011	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0012	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0013	SSR-VV-002	Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed	Low	Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
RFQX-CVS154-0014	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0015	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0016	SSR-VV-002	Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed	Low	Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
RFQX-CVS154-0017	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0018	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0019	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0020	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0021	SSR-VV-001	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0022	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0023	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0024	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0025	None	Blocked by Customer Clarification	n/a	Needs customer clarification before derivation.
RFQX-CVS154-0026	None	Blocked by Customer Clarification	n/a	Needs customer clarification before derivation.
RFQX-CVS154-0027	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0028	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0029	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0030	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0031	SSR-SYS-001	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0032	None	Blocked by Customer Clarification	n/a	Needs customer clarification before derivation.
RFQX-CVS154-0033	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0034	SSR-SYS-001	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0035	None	Needs Internal Review	n/a	Low confidence / human review before derivation.
RFQX-CVS154-0036	SSR-COM-009	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Low	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0037	SSR-SYS-001	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0038	SSR-TOOL-003	Shared Responsibility / CIA Needed	Low	Partially accepted; ECU portion mapped, OEM portion needs CIA/RASIC.
RFQX-CVS154-0039	SSR-SYS-001	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0040	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0041	SSR-SYS-001	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0042	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0043	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0044	SSR-KEY-001	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0045	None	Informational Only	n/a	Non-binding; not derived.
RFQX-CVS154-0046	SSR-TOOL-002	Covered by Existing Supplier System Requirement	Medium	Accepted requirement; covered by a clustered SSR.
RFQX-CVS154-0047	None	Blocked by Customer Clarification	n/a	Needs customer clarification before derivation.

Next Actions

Resolve 3 open clarification point(s) with the customer

Blocks the agreement baseline until confirmed.

Confirm 12 critical requirement(s) with the customer

High impact on concept, design, estimation, or SSR derivation.

Review derived supplier system requirements

Validate allocation, responsibility, and verification intent.

Detailed Evidence

Document intelligence markdown

Source PDF: CVS154.pdf
Converted Markdown: converted/markdown/source document
Document type: Responsibility Agreement / CIA / RASIC
Domain: Responsibility / Process
Confidence: High
Evidence basis: Markdown-derived requirements and generated RFQX registers; no downstream PDF analysis.

Executive Summary

Scope: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic specifies cybersecurity concept and evidence, covering 1 Scope; 1.1 Target readers; 3 Technical content; 3.1 DSC structure; 3.1.1 VerificationEntry; 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry. System boundary and interfaces: the document constrains 1 interface(s) - OEM/Customer Review Interface; principal functions in scope are Security evidence and traceability; Secure communication and freshness protection.

Engineering obligations: 24 confirmed customer requirement(s) carry an explicit ID and normative wording and must be implemented and verified; 6 further requirement-like statement(s) have no customer ID and must be clarified before they can be baselined; 15 informational and 2 reference item(s) were separated out as non-binding. Design and security impact: affects Security evidence and traceability; Secure communication and freshness protection; security capabilities touched: Key management; 7 supplier system requirement(s) were derived from this document.

Document Abstract

Field	Interpretation
Document Purpose	Scope: this responsibility agreement / cia / rasic specifies cybersecurity concept and evidence, covering 1 Scope; 1.1 Target readers; 3 Technical content; 3.1 DSC structure; 3.1.1 VerificationEntry; 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry.
Engineering Interpretation	System boundary and interfaces: the document constrains 1 interface(s) - OEM/Customer Review Interface; principal functions in scope are Security evidence and traceability; Secure communication and freshness protection.
Supplier Proposal Impact	Engineering obligations: 24 confirmed customer requirement(s) carry an explicit ID and normative wording and must be implemented and verified; 6 further requirement-like statement(s) have no customer ID and must be clarified before they can be baselined; 15 informational and 2 reference item(s) were separated out as non-binding.
System / Security Impact	Design and security impact: affects Security evidence and traceability; Secure communication and freshness protection; security capabilities touched: Key management; 7 supplier system requirement(s) were derived from this document.
Customer Clarification Impact	Open for the customer: 3 document-linked open point(s) - mainly Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).; Confirm the DIA / responsibility (RASIC/CIA) split for each cybersecurity work product before supplier scope is fixed.; Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline - plus 6 unidentified requirement-like statement(s). Do not baseline these until the customer confirms.
Confidence and Limits	Confidence and limits: High confidence. Categorisation is derived from the converted Markdown (customer IDs, normative wording, and section context); no OCR or downstream PDF analysis is used.

Main Requirement Themes

Theme	Summary	Requirement Count	Representative Requirements
Cybersecurity concept and evidence	Drives cybersecurity concept, risk treatment, verification evidence, and traceability obligations.	31	RFQX-CVS154-0001; RFQX-CVS154-0002; RFQX-CVS154-0006
Responsibility and customer approval model	Creates supplier/OEM allocation decisions for work products, backend infrastructure, approvals, and residual risk.	25	RFQX-CVS154-0001; RFQX-CVS154-0002; RFQX-CVS154-0008
System architecture design	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	25	RFQX-CVS154-0003; RFQX-CVS154-0004; RFQX-CVS154-0005
Requirement	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	24	RFQX-CVS154-0008; RFQX-CVS154-0009; RFQX-CVS154-0010
System	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	24	RFQX-CVS154-0003; RFQX-CVS154-0004; RFQX-CVS154-0005
Information	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	15	RFQX-CVS154-0005; RFQX-CVS154-0006; RFQX-CVS154-0007
System core	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	15	RFQX-CVS154-0003; RFQX-CVS154-0004; RFQX-CVS154-0017
Needs clarification	Groups related document requirements into a single engineering theme.	6	RFQX-CVS154-0002; RFQX-CVS154-0003; RFQX-CVS154-0004

Document Content Structure

Section	Requirements	Information	Total Items	Critical	Open Points	SSR Links
1 Scope	0	0	1	1	1	0
-- 1.1 Target readers	0	0	1	1	1	0
3 Technical content	24	15	42	8	2	7
-- 3.1 DSC structure	13	12	28	6	2	4
-- -- 3.1.1 VerificationEntry	1	6	7	0	0	1
-- -- 3.1.2 EncryptionEntry	3	2	8	3	2	2
-- 3.2 DSC ASN.1 definition	2	1	3	1	0	1
-- 3.3 DSC sanity check and verification	9	2	11	1	0	5
4 Referenced documents and IT-Systems	0	0	1	1	1	0
-- 4.2 Informative references	0	0	1	1	1	0

Tables and Diagrams

Artifact	Type	Caption	Page	Related Requirements	Impact
DIAGRAM-CVS154-0001	Diagram	Figure 1 – Specification relationship	page 3	None	Diagram source context
DIAGRAM-CVS154-0002	Diagram	Figure 2	page 4	RFQX-CVS154-0006; RFQX-CVS154-0005; RFQX-CVS154-0007	Diagram source context
DIAGRAM-CVS154-0003	Diagram	Figure 2 – DSC structure	page 4	RFQX-CVS154-0006; RFQX-CVS154-0005; RFQX-CVS154-0007	Diagram source context
DIAGRAM-CVS154-0004	Diagram	Figure 3 – HashCmp	page 6	RFQX-CVS154-0024; RFQX-CVS154-0021	Security protocol or cryptographic context
DIAGRAM-CVS154-0005	Diagram	Figure 4 – AESCTR128	page 7	RFQX-CVS154-0031	Diagram source context
DIAGRAM-CVS154-0006	Diagram	Figure 4 – ChaCha20	page 8	None	Diagram source context
DIAGRAM-CVS154-0007	Diagram	Figure 5 – Item list	page 9	RFQX-CVS154-0033; RFQX-CVS154-0034; RFQX-CVS154-0035	Security protocol or cryptographic context
DIAGRAM-CVS154-0008	Diagram	Figure 6 – DSC sanity check and verification	page 13	None	Security protocol or cryptographic context

What this document does not confirm

Customer-owned responsibility, final customer decisions, and unresolved open points remain unconfirmed.

Critical Requirements

ID	Score	Category	Reason	Statement
RFQX-CVS154-0025	81	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	• hashAlgorithm: States which HashAlgorithm (see RFC 6234) shall be used for hashing the data to verify.
RFQX-CVS154-0047	81	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	security relevant; architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	The sequence tags for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and itemEntries are required but empty (zero length).
RFQX-CVS154-0026	80	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; High estimation impact; blocks SSR derivation	• dataRanges: sequence of Range items - Range: Information on which data chunks that shall be verified.
RFQX-CVS154-0002	66	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	Any review of this CVS154 shall only be done in agreement with the involved TRATON Group commercial vehicle Affiliates stated in the table below under section “Technical responsibility”.
RFQX-CVS154-0003	66	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	The User shall apply the latest version of this CVS154.
RFQX-CVS154-0004	66	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	This document shall be used accompanied with these specifications.
RFQX-CVS154-0032	66	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	architecture relevant; Needs Customer Clarification; linked open point; blocks SSR derivation	Range: Information on which data chunks that shall be decrypted.
RFQX-CVS154-0010	48	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept	The server shall support a DSC containing verificationEntries.
RFQX-CVS154-0013	48	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept	The server shall expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag with length zero for verificationEntries that contains no VerificationEntry items in a DSC transmitted by the client.
RFQX-CVS154-0016	48	High risk due to unclear OEM/supplier responsibility	security relevant; architecture relevant; Partially Accept	The server shall support an empty DSC containing only Metadata (version and id) and the empty sequences for verificationEntries, encryptionEntries and ItemEntries.

Open Points

Open Point	Question	Impact	Status
OP-001	Confirm the exact ECU designation/variant and the agreed item definition and boundary used for the risk analysis (TARA).	TARA scope and effort stay open; downstream assets, goals and design may rework.	Open
OP-009	Confirm the DIA / responsibility (RASIC/CIA) split for each cybersecurity work product before supplier scope is fixed.	Without an agreed DIA the supplier risks owning customer work products or leaving cybersecurity gaps in the case.	Open
OP-011	Confirm whether each listed requirement is binding supplier scope, customer-owned scope, or evidence-only context for the ECA ECU baseline.	Supplier position, estimation, and affected design allocation remain conditional for the listed requirements.	Open

Supplier System Requirements

SSR	Title	Statement	Reqs From This PDF	Other PDFs	Status
SSR-COM-009	Secure communication and freshness protection — Secure Communication and Boundary Control	The ECU shall restrict and protect communication for Secure communication and freshness protection, exposing only OEM-agreed services and applying authenticity/integrity/freshness and boundary controls on allocated signals (IT / backend domain; allocated to Backend and IT Systems).	RFQX-CVS154-0036	no	Blocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-KEY-001	Key and Certificate Handling — Key and Certificate Handling	The ECU shall manage key and certificate material for Key and Certificate Handling across provisioning, storage, use, renewal and revocation per the agreed key lifecycle (Cybersecurity domain; allocated to Security Services; security capability: Certificate handling; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).	RFQX-CVS154-0044	no	Blocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-SYS-001	System Function — System Function	The ECU shall implement the System Function behaviour required by its allocated customer requirements, including the specified functions, signals, states and timing (System domain; allocated to System Core; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).	RFQX-CVS154-0031; RFQX-CVS154-0034; RFQX-CVS154-0037; RFQX-CVS154-0039; RFQX-CVS154-0041	no	Candidate
SSR-TOOL-002	Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage — Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage	The supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage (IT / backend domain; allocated to Backend and IT Systems; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).	RFQX-CVS154-0008; RFQX-CVS154-0009; RFQX-CVS154-0011; RFQX-CVS154-0012; RFQX-CVS154-0014; RFQX-CVS154-0015; RFQX-CVS154-0027; RFQX-CVS154-0029; RFQX-CVS154-0040; RFQX-CVS154-0043; RFQX-CVS154-0046	no	Blocked by Customer Clarification
SSR-TOOL-003	Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage — Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage	The supplier shall provide the tooling, IT infrastructure and evidence storage required for Tooling / IT / Evidence Storage (Software domain; allocated to Application Software).	RFQX-CVS154-0038	no	Ready for Customer Alignment
SSR-VV-001	Security evidence and traceability — Verification and Validation	The supplier shall verify and validate Security evidence and traceability per the agreed cybersecurity verification and validation plan (System domain; allocated to System Core; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).	RFQX-CVS154-0021	no	Candidate
SSR-VV-002	Security evidence and traceability — Verification and Validation	The supplier shall verify and validate Security evidence and traceability per the agreed cybersecurity verification and validation plan (IT / backend domain; allocated to Backend and IT Systems; interface: OEM/Customer Review Interface).	RFQX-CVS154-0010; RFQX-CVS154-0013; RFQX-CVS154-0016	no	Ready for Customer Alignment

Design Impact

Impacted System Features: Secure communication and freshness protection; Security evidence and traceability
Impacted Interfaces: OEM/Customer Review Interface
Impacted Security Capabilities: Key management
Impacted Architecture Elements: Application Software; Backend and IT Systems; Backend and IT Systems; OEM/Customer Review Interface; Compliance Process; Security Services; System Core; System Core; OEM/Customer Review Interface
Impacted Work Products: Cybersecurity concept; Cybersecurity verification report; DIA / cybersecurity case; Requirement traceability record; System/architecture design
Impacted Document Artifacts: DIAGRAM-CVS154-0002; DIAGRAM-CVS154-0003; DIAGRAM-CVS154-0004; DIAGRAM-CVS154-0005; DIAGRAM-CVS154-0007
Impacted Tools It Hardware Test: High/High/Low; High/Low/Low; Low/High/Low; Low/High/Medium; Low/Low/Low; Low/Low/Medium; Medium/Low/Medium
Impacted Supplier System Requirements: SSR-COM-009; SSR-KEY-001; SSR-SYS-001; SSR-TOOL-002; SSR-TOOL-003; SSR-VV-001; SSR-VV-002
Design Assumptions Introduced: Security-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed. Linked source table/diagram context was considered for interpretation.; Security-relevant requirement the ECU can own once responsibility/method is confirmed.
Design Decisions Required: Confirm with customer whether this is a binding requirement and assign a customer ID.