High-Level Architecture

One-Screen Architecture Diagram

Architecture Cockpit Overview

flowchart LR subgraph Vehicle["Vehicle / drivetrain domain"] Drivetrain["GW AMT drivetrain"] Network["Vehicle network (CAN / PWM)"] end subgraph ECA["ECA ECU domain"] App["Clutch actuation application"] Sec["Security services"] Boot["Bootloader / update logic"] end subgraph Diagnostic["Diagnostic / service domain"] Tester["Diagnostic tester"] end subgraph OEM["OEM backend / security operations domain"] Backend["Update and evidence backend"] PKI["Key and certificate provisioning"] SecOps["Security operations"] end subgraph Supplier["Supplier engineering domain"] Engineering["Supplier ALM / CI / evidence"] end Drivetrain --> Network Network <-->|commands, status, freshness| App Tester -->|authenticated UDS| Sec Backend -->|signed software / IVD| Boot PKI -->|trust material| Sec Boot --> App Sec --> App App -->|events| SecOps Engineering -->|software and evidence| Backend

Mermaid source

flowchart LR
  subgraph Vehicle["Vehicle / drivetrain domain"]
    Drivetrain["GW AMT drivetrain"]
    Network["Vehicle network (CAN / PWM)"]
  end
  subgraph ECA["ECA ECU domain"]
    App["Clutch actuation application"]
    Sec["Security services"]
    Boot["Bootloader / update logic"]
  end
  subgraph Diagnostic["Diagnostic / service domain"]
    Tester["Diagnostic tester"]
  end
  subgraph OEM["OEM backend / security operations domain"]
    Backend["Update and evidence backend"]
    PKI["Key and certificate provisioning"]
    SecOps["Security operations"]
  end
  subgraph Supplier["Supplier engineering domain"]
    Engineering["Supplier ALM / CI / evidence"]
  end
  Drivetrain --> Network
  Network <-->|commands, status, freshness| App
  Tester -->|authenticated UDS| Sec
  Backend -->|signed software / IVD| Boot
  PKI -->|trust material| Sec
  Boot --> App
  Sec --> App
  App -->|events| SecOps
  Engineering -->|software and evidence| Backend

Component Table

This table is horizontally scrollable. Use the bottom scrollbar to view all columns.

Component	Responsibility	Interfaces	Security Role	Evidence Status	Open Decision
Vehicle / Drivetrain Domain	Provides CAN/PWM commands and receives ECA status/fault data	Vehicle Network Interface	Primary external runtime boundary	Confirmed	Confirm network topology and protected signals
ECA ECU Application Software	Controls clutch actuation and reports status	CAN, internal security services, diagnostics	Validates commands and enforces fail-safe behaviour	Confirmed	Confirm final function allocation
ECA ECU Security Services	Provides auth, crypto, key/certificate, logging and secure communication services	Diagnostics, update, PKI, vehicle network	Central protection layer	Inferred	Confirm concrete mechanisms and HSM support
Bootloader / Update Logic	Handles flash, IVD and software validity checks	Update / Flash, diagnostics, security services	Protects software authenticity and integrity	Inferred	Confirm signing chain and rollback policy
Diagnostic / Service Domain	Performs service, programming and authenticated diagnostic access	Diagnostic Tester Interface	Privileged access boundary	Inferred	Confirm role model and service whitelist
OEM Backend / Security Operations	Owns approval, monitoring, update/key decisions and residual-risk workflow	OEM Evidence, logging, update, PKI	Offboard security governance boundary	Inferred	Confirm ownership split
Supplier Engineering Domain	Produces software, evidence, traceability and review artifacts	ALM, CI/test, OEM evidence handoff	Protects evidence and release integrity	Confirmed	Confirm evidence repository authority

Capability-to-Component Map

flowchart LR subgraph Capabilities["System capabilities"] Actuation["Clutch actuation"] Diagnostics["Secure diagnostics"] UpdateCap["Secure update"] Keys["Key and certificate handling"] Evidence["Cybersecurity evidence"] end subgraph Components["Architecture components"] App["Application software"] DiagSrv["Diagnostic server"] Boot["Bootloader / update logic"] Sec["Security services"] Tooling["Engineering evidence toolchain"] end Actuation --> App Diagnostics --> DiagSrv Diagnostics --> Sec UpdateCap --> Boot UpdateCap --> Sec Keys --> Sec Evidence --> Tooling Evidence --> Sec

Mermaid source

flowchart LR
  subgraph Capabilities["System capabilities"]
    Actuation["Clutch actuation"]
    Diagnostics["Secure diagnostics"]
    UpdateCap["Secure update"]
    Keys["Key and certificate handling"]
    Evidence["Cybersecurity evidence"]
  end
  subgraph Components["Architecture components"]
    App["Application software"]
    DiagSrv["Diagnostic server"]
    Boot["Bootloader / update logic"]
    Sec["Security services"]
    Tooling["Engineering evidence toolchain"]
  end
  Actuation --> App
  Diagnostics --> DiagSrv
  Diagnostics --> Sec
  UpdateCap --> Boot
  UpdateCap --> Sec
  Keys --> Sec
  Evidence --> Tooling
  Evidence --> Sec

Interface Trust Boundary Map

Mermaid source

flowchart TB
  subgraph ECU["ECA ECU trust boundary"]
    App["Application software"]
    Sec["Security services"]
    Boot["Bootloader / update logic"]
  end
  Vehicle["Vehicle network boundary"] -->|CAN / PWM / protected data| App
  Tester["Diagnostic service boundary"] -->|UDS Auth 0x29| Sec
  Backend["OEM backend boundary"] -->|signed update / logs| Boot
  PKI["PKI provisioning boundary"] -->|keys / certificates| Sec
  Tooling["Supplier engineering boundary"] -->|software / evidence| Backend
  App -->|security events| Backend

Update and Diagnostics Flow

sequenceDiagram participant Tester as Diagnostic Tester participant Sec as ECA Security Services participant Boot as Bootloader / Update Logic participant App as Clutch Actuation Application participant Backend as OEM Update Backend Tester->>Sec: Start UDS session and authenticate Sec-->>Tester: Authorized diagnostic role Backend->>Boot: Signed software package and IVD Boot->>Sec: Validate signature, certificate and integrity Sec-->>Boot: Validation result Boot->>App: Activate accepted software App-->>Tester: Status, DTCs and update result

Mermaid source

sequenceDiagram
  participant Tester as Diagnostic Tester
  participant Sec as ECA Security Services
  participant Boot as Bootloader / Update Logic
  participant App as Clutch Actuation Application
  participant Backend as OEM Update Backend
  Tester->>Sec: Start UDS session and authenticate
  Sec-->>Tester: Authorized diagnostic role
  Backend->>Boot: Signed software package and IVD
  Boot->>Sec: Validate signature, certificate and integrity
  Sec-->>Boot: Validation result
  Boot->>App: Activate accepted software
  App-->>Tester: Status, DTCs and update result

Key and Certificate Flow

Mermaid source

flowchart LR
  OEMPKI["OEM / TRATON PKI"] -->|certificate profile and trust anchors| Provisioning["Provisioning process"]
  Supplier["Supplier engineering"] -->|CSR / ECU identity evidence| Provisioning
  Provisioning -->|keys, certificates, trust anchors| ECU["ECA ECU security services"]
  ECU -->|certificate validation| Diagnostics["Authenticated diagnostics"]
  ECU -->|signature validation| Update["Secure update / flash"]
  ECU -->|MAC / freshness material| Comms["Secure communication"]
  ECU -->|lifecycle evidence| Review["OEM review and residual-risk decision"]

Decision Dependency Map

flowchart TB Boundary["P1: item boundary and variants"] --> TARA["TARA / asset allocation"] Interfaces["P1: interface and signal scope"] --> Comms["SecOC / SDT allocation"] Diagnostics["P1: diagnostic role model"] --> DiagSec["Secure diagnostics baseline"] Update["P1: update and signing ownership"] --> UpdateSec["Secure update baseline"] PKI["P1: PKI, HSM and key hierarchy"] --> Crypto["Crypto and trust baseline"] TARA --> Closure["Architecture / security baseline closure"] Comms --> Closure DiagSec --> Closure UpdateSec --> Closure Crypto --> Closure

Mermaid source

flowchart TB
  Boundary["P1: item boundary and variants"] --> TARA["TARA / asset allocation"]
  Interfaces["P1: interface and signal scope"] --> Comms["SecOC / SDT allocation"]
  Diagnostics["P1: diagnostic role model"] --> DiagSec["Secure diagnostics baseline"]
  Update["P1: update and signing ownership"] --> UpdateSec["Secure update baseline"]
  PKI["P1: PKI, HSM and key hierarchy"] --> Crypto["Crypto and trust baseline"]
  TARA --> Closure["Architecture / security baseline closure"]
  Comms --> Closure
  DiagSec --> Closure
  UpdateSec --> Closure
  Crypto --> Closure

Architecture Overview Evidence

Component Table

Component	Responsibility	Interfaces	Security Role	Evidence Status	Open Decision
Vehicle / Drivetrain Domain	Provides CAN/PWM commands and receives ECA status/fault data	Vehicle Network Interface	Primary external runtime boundary	Confirmed	Confirm network topology and protected signals
ECA ECU Application Software	Controls clutch actuation and reports status	CAN, internal security services, diagnostics	Validates commands and enforces fail-safe behaviour	Confirmed	Confirm final function allocation
ECA ECU Security Services	Provides auth, crypto, key/certificate, logging and secure communication services	Diagnostics, update, PKI, vehicle network	Central protection layer	Inferred	Confirm concrete mechanisms and HSM support
Bootloader / Update Logic	Handles flash, IVD and software validity checks	Update / Flash, diagnostics, security services	Protects software authenticity and integrity	Inferred	Confirm signing chain and rollback policy
Diagnostic / Service Domain	Performs service, programming and authenticated diagnostic access	Diagnostic Tester Interface	Privileged access boundary	Inferred	Confirm role model and service whitelist
OEM Backend / Security Operations	Owns approval, monitoring, update/key decisions and residual-risk workflow	OEM Evidence, logging, update, PKI	Offboard security governance boundary	Inferred	Confirm ownership split
Supplier Engineering Domain	Produces software, evidence, traceability and review artifacts	ALM, CI/test, OEM evidence handoff	Protects evidence and release integrity	Confirmed	Confirm evidence repository authority

Executive Architecture Interpretation

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The architecture should be read as an ECU/component security architecture with a supplier evidence wrapper around it. The product boundary contains system core behavior, application software, hardware platform, security services, diagnostic/update handling, and logging. Outside the boundary are vehicle networks, diagnostic tools, backend/IT systems, PKI/provisioning, development/ALM tooling, security operations, and OEM/customer approval.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0004; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010 (sample: 10 of 641)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 163)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

System Boundary

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The system boundary is the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU security scope plus supplier-controlled lifecycle evidence. Exact vehicle-function allocation remains open.

External Actors

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

OEM/customer, vehicle network/other ECUs, diagnostic/service tools, backend/cloud/IT systems, PKI/provisioning, development/ALM tooling, and security operations.

Major Subsystems

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

System Core, Application Software, Hardware Platform, Security Services, External Interfaces, Backend and IT Systems, Engineering Toolchain, and Compliance Process.

Main Interfaces

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

OEM/customer cybersecurity approval and evidence interface; Diagnostic/service tool to ECU interface; Vehicle network secure data communication interface; Secure update, flash, and IVD interface; Certificate and key provisioning interface; Backend/cloud/IT operational interface; Development, ALM, and evidence tooling interface; Security operations and vulnerability reporting interface; Application software to security services interface; Hardware platform and key storage interface

Main Data Flows

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Requirements/evidence flow, diagnostic access flow, vehicle data flow, secure update/flash flow, key/certificate flow, security event/logging flow, and vulnerability/incident flow.

Security Architecture Logic

Classification: Recommendation

Protect the highest-risk boundaries first: diagnostics, vehicle network communication, update/flash, key/certificate handling, and backend/tooling evidence. Use traceability and customer approval to keep inferred architecture distinct from confirmed requirements.

What Is Explicitly Required

Classification: Explicit Requirement

Cybersecurity concept documentation, risk assessment input, control derivation and traceability, verification/validation evidence, diagnostic/security controls, key/certificate handling, logging/audit elements, vulnerability and incident handling elements.

What Is Inferred

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Layered ECU security services, backend/update actors, PKI/provisioning flow, security operations flow, and componentized architecture views.

Key Assumptions

Classification: Expert Assumption

The item is treated as one or more ECUs/E/E components until the customer confirms the exact product item definition.

Open Architecture Decisions

Classification: Needs Customer Clarification

Confirm item definition, network topology, diagnostic roles, update mechanism, PKI ownership, HSM capability, backend ownership, and final TARA outputs.

Recommended Next Design Steps

Classification: Recommendation

Hold an item-definition workshop, confirm boundary diagrams, allocate interfaces and assets, perform TARA, confirm security mechanisms, and update traceability with customer-approved decisions.

Logical Architecture

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The logical architecture decomposes the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU into System Core, Application Software, Hardware Platform, Security Services, External Interfaces, Backend/IT, Engineering Toolchain, and Compliance Process.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0004; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010 (sample: 10 of 641)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 163)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Cybersecurity Architecture

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The cybersecurity architecture protects diagnostic access, vehicle communication, update/flash, certificate/key handling, platform integrity, logging, monitoring, vulnerability handling, and evidence traceability.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0004; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010 (sample: 10 of 641)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 163)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Data Flow View

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The data-flow view tracks requirements/evidence, diagnostic traffic, vehicle data, software/update packages, key/certificate data, security events, and vulnerability/incident records.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0004; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010 (sample: 10 of 641)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 163)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Trust Boundaries

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

The trust-boundary view separates the Electric Clutch Actuator ECU, vehicle network, diagnostic, backend/cloud, tooling, customer/OEM, and unknown deployment zones.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0004; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010 (sample: 10 of 641)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 163)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Design Drill-Down

System Context

Overview

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

System Context is treated as a design view needed to understand the product before detailed requirement allocation.

Design Intent

Keep customer-confirmed requirements separate from inferred design structure while exposing the security reasoning.

Requirement Basis

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019 (sample: 18 of 1009)
Source document sections: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 228)

Security Relevance

This view shows where an asset, interface, trust boundary, or evidence obligation could create security risk.

Constraints

No final TARA, topology, algorithm, or implementation ownership is claimed unless a requirement explicitly supports it.

Open Questions

Confirm customer ownership, exact item boundary, allocated mechanisms, and verification evidence for this view.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011 (sample: 10 of 1009)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 228)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Logical Components

Overview

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Logical Components is treated as a design view needed to understand the product before detailed requirement allocation.

Design Intent

Keep customer-confirmed requirements separate from inferred design structure while exposing the security reasoning.

Requirement Basis

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0022; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0023; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0024; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0025 (sample: 18 of 207)
Source document sections: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 101)

Security Relevance

This view shows where an asset, interface, trust boundary, or evidence obligation could create security risk.

Constraints

No final TARA, topology, algorithm, or implementation ownership is claimed unless a requirement explicitly supports it.

Open Questions

Confirm customer ownership, exact item boundary, allocated mechanisms, and verification evidence for this view.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015 (sample: 10 of 207)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 101)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

External Interfaces

Overview

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

External Interfaces is treated as a design view needed to understand the product before detailed requirement allocation.

Design Intent

Keep customer-confirmed requirements separate from inferred design structure while exposing the security reasoning.

Requirement Basis

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0023; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0024; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0025 (sample: 18 of 214)
Source document sections: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 103)

Security Relevance

This view shows where an asset, interface, trust boundary, or evidence obligation could create security risk.

Constraints

No final TARA, topology, algorithm, or implementation ownership is claimed unless a requirement explicitly supports it.

Open Questions

Confirm customer ownership, exact item boundary, allocated mechanisms, and verification evidence for this view.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014 (sample: 10 of 214)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 103)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Internal Interfaces

Overview

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Internal Interfaces is treated as a design view needed to understand the product before detailed requirement allocation.

Design Intent

Keep customer-confirmed requirements separate from inferred design structure while exposing the security reasoning.

Requirement Basis

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0023; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0024; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0025 (sample: 18 of 227)
Source document sections: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 110)

Security Relevance

This view shows where an asset, interface, trust boundary, or evidence obligation could create security risk.

Constraints

No final TARA, topology, algorithm, or implementation ownership is claimed unless a requirement explicitly supports it.

Open Questions

Confirm customer ownership, exact item boundary, allocated mechanisms, and verification evidence for this view.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014 (sample: 10 of 227)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 110)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Security-Relevant Interfaces

Overview

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Security-Relevant Interfaces is treated as a design view needed to understand the product before detailed requirement allocation.

Design Intent

Keep customer-confirmed requirements separate from inferred design structure while exposing the security reasoning.

Requirement Basis

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0023; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0024; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0025; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0027 (sample: 18 of 203)
Source document sections: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 96)

Security Relevance

This view shows where an asset, interface, trust boundary, or evidence obligation could create security risk.

Constraints

No final TARA, topology, algorithm, or implementation ownership is claimed unless a requirement explicitly supports it.

Open Questions

Confirm customer ownership, exact item boundary, allocated mechanisms, and verification evidence for this view.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015 (sample: 10 of 203)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 96)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Trust Boundaries

Overview

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Trust Boundaries is treated as a design view needed to understand the product before detailed requirement allocation.

Design Intent

Keep customer-confirmed requirements separate from inferred design structure while exposing the security reasoning.

Requirement Basis

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0023; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0024; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0025; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0027 (sample: 18 of 194)
Source document sections: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 93)

Security Relevance

This view shows where an asset, interface, trust boundary, or evidence obligation could create security risk.

Constraints

No final TARA, topology, algorithm, or implementation ownership is claimed unless a requirement explicitly supports it.

Open Questions

Confirm customer ownership, exact item boundary, allocated mechanisms, and verification evidence for this view.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015 (sample: 10 of 194)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 93)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Data Flows

Overview

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Data Flows is treated as a design view needed to understand the product before detailed requirement allocation.

Design Intent

Keep customer-confirmed requirements separate from inferred design structure while exposing the security reasoning.

Requirement Basis

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0023; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0024; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0025; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0027 (sample: 18 of 381)
Source document sections: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 152)

Security Relevance

This view shows where an asset, interface, trust boundary, or evidence obligation could create security risk.

Constraints

No final TARA, topology, algorithm, or implementation ownership is claimed unless a requirement explicitly supports it.

Open Questions

Confirm customer ownership, exact item boundary, allocated mechanisms, and verification evidence for this view.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015 (sample: 10 of 381)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 152)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Security Capabilities

Overview

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Security Capabilities is treated as a design view needed to understand the product before detailed requirement allocation.

Design Intent

Keep customer-confirmed requirements separate from inferred design structure while exposing the security reasoning.

Requirement Basis

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0023; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0024; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0025; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0027 (sample: 18 of 194)
Source document sections: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 93)

Security Relevance

This view shows where an asset, interface, trust boundary, or evidence obligation could create security risk.

Constraints

No final TARA, topology, algorithm, or implementation ownership is claimed unless a requirement explicitly supports it.

Open Questions

Confirm customer ownership, exact item boundary, allocated mechanisms, and verification evidence for this view.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015 (sample: 10 of 194)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 93)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Lifecycle and Operations

Overview

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Lifecycle and Operations is treated as a design view needed to understand the product before detailed requirement allocation.

Design Intent

Keep customer-confirmed requirements separate from inferred design structure while exposing the security reasoning.

Requirement Basis

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019 (sample: 18 of 638)
Source document sections: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 209)

Security Relevance

This view shows where an asset, interface, trust boundary, or evidence obligation could create security risk.

Constraints

No final TARA, topology, algorithm, or implementation ownership is claimed unless a requirement explicitly supports it.

Open Questions

Confirm customer ownership, exact item boundary, allocated mechanisms, and verification evidence for this view.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011 (sample: 10 of 638)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 209)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Tooling and Evidence Flow

Overview

Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Tooling and Evidence Flow is treated as a design view needed to understand the product before detailed requirement allocation.

Design Intent

Keep customer-confirmed requirements separate from inferred design structure while exposing the security reasoning.

Requirement Basis

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019 (sample: 18 of 639)
Source document sections: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 209)

Security Relevance

This view shows where an asset, interface, trust boundary, or evidence obligation could create security risk.

Constraints

No final TARA, topology, algorithm, or implementation ownership is claimed unless a requirement explicitly supports it.

Open Questions

Confirm customer ownership, exact item boundary, allocated mechanisms, and verification evidence for this view.

Evidence Basis:

Related requirements: RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0001; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0002; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0006; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011 (sample: 10 of 639)
Source document: source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11(sample: 8 of 209)
Confidence level: Low
Classification: Inferred from Requirements

Architecture Decisions

Decision ID	Decision statement	Classification	Source requirement IDs	Source document	Confidence	Human review required	Reason for human review
ADR-001	Include `Application Software` in the customer-review baseline architecture.	Explicit Requirement	RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0021; RFQX-3299216-1-0061; RFQX-3299216-1-0075; RFQX-3299216-1-0137; RFQX-3299216-1-0139; RFQX-3299216-1-0142; RFQX-3299216-1-0214; RFQX-3299216-1-0218; RFQX-3299216-1-0220; RFQX-3299216-1-0285; RFQX-3299216-1-0306 (sample: 12 of 169)	source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 15; source document page 19(sample: 4 of 82)	High	yes	Customer clarification linked to one or more requirements.
ADR-002	Include `Backend and IT Systems` in the customer-review baseline architecture.	Explicit Requirement	RFQX-3299216-1-0024; RFQX-3299216-1-0033; RFQX-3299216-1-0036; RFQX-3299216-1-0038; RFQX-3299216-1-0039; RFQX-3299216-1-0040; RFQX-3299216-1-0043; RFQX-3299216-1-0049; RFQX-3299216-1-0052; RFQX-3299216-1-0055; RFQX-3299216-1-0058; RFQX-3299216-1-0079 (sample: 12 of 216)	source document page 9; source document page 10; source document page 11; source document page 12(sample: 4 of 103)	High	yes	Customer clarification linked to one or more requirements.
ADR-003	Include `Compliance Process` in the customer-review baseline architecture.	Explicit Requirement	RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0047; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0049; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0050; RFQX-3299216-1-0070; RFQX-3299216-1-0185; RFQX-3299216-1-0189; RFQX-3299216-1-0280; RFQX-3299216-1-0281; RFQX-3299216-1-0283; RFQX-CVS123-2-0002; RFQX-CVS123-2-0320; RFQX-CVS124-0003 (sample: 12 of 55)	source document page 10; source document page 16; source document page 36; source document page 49(sample: 4 of 33)	High	no	none
ADR-004	Include `Engineering Toolchain` in the customer-review baseline architecture.	Explicit Requirement	RFQX-3299216-1-0035	source document page 10	High	no	none
ADR-005	Include `External Interfaces` in the customer-review baseline architecture.	Explicit Requirement	RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0058; RFQX-3299216-1-0031; RFQX-3299216-1-0084; RFQX-3299216-1-0091; RFQX-3299216-1-0092; RFQX-3299216-1-0094; RFQX-3299216-1-0096; RFQX-3299216-1-0102; RFQX-3299216-1-0103; RFQX-3299216-1-0104; RFQX-3299216-1-0106; RFQX-3299216-1-0135 (sample: 12 of 48)	source document page 11; source document page 10; source document page 21; source document page 22(sample: 4 of 27)	High	no	none
ADR-006	Include `Hardware Platform` in the customer-review baseline architecture.	Explicit Requirement	RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0022; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0029; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0030; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0036; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0060; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0062; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0063; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0065; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0066; RFQX-3299216-1-0004; RFQX-3299216-1-0019; RFQX-3299216-1-0041 (sample: 12 of 48)	source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 11; source document page 12(sample: 4 of 39)	High	yes	Customer clarification linked to one or more requirements.
ADR-007	Include `OEM/Customer Review Interface` in the customer-review baseline architecture.	Inferred from Requirements	RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0021 (sample: 12 of 140)	source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7(sample: 4 of 62)	High	yes	Confirm exact OEM/customer evidence and approval workflow.
ADR-008	Include `Security Services` in the customer-review baseline architecture.	Explicit Requirement	RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0013; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0014; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0015; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0016; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019 (sample: 12 of 96)	source document page 3; source document page 5; source document page 6; source document page 7(sample: 4 of 54)	High	yes	Customer clarification linked to one or more requirements.
ADR-009	Include `System Core` in the customer-review baseline architecture.	Explicit Requirement	RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0026; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0028; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0031; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0032; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0033; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0034; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0035; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0038; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0039; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0040 (sample: 12 of 354)	source document page 5; source document page 7; source document page 8; source document page 9(sample: 4 of 143)	High	no	none

Architecture Open Decisions

Needs Customer Clarification: Confirm exact ECU item definition, product designation, and variants.
Needs Customer Clarification: Confirm vehicle network topology, SecOC/SDT applicability, signals, and protection profiles.
Needs Customer Clarification: Confirm diagnostic service list, UDS Authentication 0x29 role model, certificate use, lockout, and audit expectations.
Needs Customer Clarification: Confirm secure update/flash/IVD mechanism, signing chain, backend ownership, and rollback behavior.
Needs Customer Clarification: Confirm key hierarchy, HSM/protected storage capability, PKI ownership, revocation, renewal, and provisioning process.
Needs Customer Clarification: Confirm security monitoring, incident response handoff, and vulnerability reporting channels.
Needs Customer Clarification: Confirm final TARA results and customer residual-risk acceptance workflow.

Unsupported/Assumption-Based Elements

Unsupported Architecture Elements

No unresolved unsupported architecture placeholders remain.

Resolved Former Placeholder

Former element	Resolution	Classification	Evidence basis	Customer clarification
Customer / external systems	Replaced by `OEM/Customer Review Interface` and `OEM customer / vehicle manufacturer` actor in diagrams and narratives.	Inferred from Requirements	RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0003; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0005; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0007; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0008; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0009; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0010; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0011; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0012; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0017; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0018; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0019; RFQX-1001379436-P10-000-01-0021 (sample: 12 of 140)	Confirm exact customer/OEM workflow, approval authority, and evidence handoff.